Tracker

Personalistic Tyranny: The Constitutional Tribunal Amendment

Curtailing the powers of the Hluttaw speakers has weakened the legislative check and balance over the Tribunal. Concurrently, the Tribunal’s power consolidates.
By ISP Admin | February 11, 2026

Photo – AFP

This Governance Tracker No. 1 (2026 Series) was published on February 11, 2026, as an English translation of the original Burmese version released on February 9, 2026.


▪️Period

January 24, 2026.


▪️Region

The whole of Myanmar.


▪️Actors Involved

State Security and Peace Council (SSPC), Constitutional Tribunal members, and Hluttaw representatives(members of parliament).


▪️Issues

The provisional authority–the SSPC–has amended the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union Law, just a few weeks before the actual parliament convenes. The amendments primarily focus on the selection process for Tribunal members and the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and legal effect.


▪️Status/Development

Under the previous legal provision (2014), the President of Myanmar shall appoint the Chairperson of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union, in coordination with the Speakers of the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) and the Amyotha Hluttaw (Assembly of the Nationalities). However, under the current amendment (2026), the selection is made solely at the President’s discretion. The amendment also removed the requirement for Tribunal members to submit regular reports to the Hluttaw Speakers. Furthermore, it also scrapped the provision granting the Combined Assembly of the Union the authority to amend, supplement, or repeal the law. The current amendment establishes the Tribunal’s interpretations and opinions as binding and robust, thereby significantly expanding its authority.


▪️Implications

Curtailing the powers of the Hluttaw speakers has weakened the legislative check and balance over the Tribunal. Concurrently, by broadening the legal effect of the Tribunal’s decisions and interpretations, the Tribunal’s power is consolidated. The President may leverage this Tribunal—now exempt from legislative oversight and with expanded jurisdiction—to consolidate the Executive power. These developments mirror the assessment in The State of Myanmar: ISP–Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025–2026. This reflects a scenario where the junta leader seeks to extend his influence into the Legislative branch. Ultimately, this creates a trajectory toward infinite presidential power, potentially institutionalizing a system of personalistic authoritarianism.


Remark

The Constitutional Tribunal of the Union Law was previously amended in 2013 and 2014; the current enactment constitutes the Third Amendment to the Law.




Governance Tracker

Personalistic Tyranny: The Constitutional Tribunal Amendment






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