MNDAA troops repairing landslide damage along the Kutkai-Nam Hpat Kar road section.
Photo – (The Kokang/Facebook)
This Political & Conflict Economy Tracker No. 3 (2026 Series) was published on April 29, 2026, as an English translation of the original Burmese version released on April 28, 2026.
▪️Period
April 2026.
▪️Regions
Areas along the Myanmar-China border trade routes.
▪️Issues
Following the four-day battle between the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in March 2026, the MNDAA has gained greater control over trade along the Myanmar-China border. It seized Kutkai town and associated trade routes along the Muse-Lashio trade corridor. Furthermore, it also removed the Kachin Independence Army’s (KIA) tax-collection gates in Nam Hpat Kar.
▪️Groups Involved
MNDAA, TNLA, Myanmar Armed Forces, and China.
▪️Status/Development
The MNDAA, which previously controlled only the Chinshwehaw–Hseni–Lashio road, captured the Muse–Kutkai–Hseni road—previously held by the TNLA and KIA—after four days of fighting in March [see ISP Mapping (ISP-M2026-016)]. As a result, the MNDAA has become a pivotal armed actor not only in Myanmar–China border trade but also in the wider conflict economy of northern Shan State. It has also emerged as a key player in multi-party efforts to revive border trade, which has been suspended for a prolonged period.
▪️Implications
Developments in northern Shan State have far-reaching consequences for Myanmar’s wider political, economic, and conflict landscape. China-brokered tripartite talks between the Min Aung Hlaing administration and the MNDAA could emerge as a vehicle for restarting border trade. And once Myanmar–China trade resumes, Beijing is likely to press more forcefully for the implementation of economic corridor projects in northern Shan, along with related projects elsewhere. Even so, disputes over how the economic gains are shared—and the risk of renewed clashes among the parties involved—are likely to endure.
