(This Op-ed article was originally published on The FULCRUM website on January 13, 2025.)
The Arakan Army’s recent victories in Rakhine have significant implications for the state and the country.
On 21 December 2024, the Arakan Army (AA) seized the Myanmar military’s Western Command in Ann Township in Rakhine State. The Western Command was the military’s second regional command to fall into the Ethnic Armed Organisation’s (EAO) hands in 2024. The Myanmar military lost the Northeastern Command in Lashio to the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in August 2024. The AA’s capture of the Western Command and 14 townships in Rakhine State may well constitute a “Victory 2.0” for the AA and its administrative arm, the United Arakan League (ULA). This marks a significant shift in the dynamics of the country’s civil war.
The AA has steadily expanded its power projection since its inception in 2009 in Laiza in Kachin State, eventually establishing a significant foothold in Rakhine, a period now seen as the AA’s “Success 1.0.” As the military body responsible for defence, security, and military operations across Rakhine State, Southern Chin State, the Myanmar-Bangladesh border and parts of the Myanmar-India border, the loss of the Western Command is consequential. Furthermore, the Western Command has played a critical role in securing China’s major investments and India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project in Rakhine State. Its capture by the ULA/ AA could have far-reaching implications for the administration of Rakhine State and the future of these key projects.
The evolving scenario in Rakhine State thus requires close monitoring to assess – and make sense of – the potential directions of current transformations in Rakhine, emerging security dynamics, and the future of the AA’s Arakan Dream. This doctrine, centered on political and social transformation, aims to restore Arakan’s political and self-determination status in the modern era, which was lost following the Burmese’s Konbaung Dynasty’s conquest of Arakan in 1784.
Rakhine state, which is rich in natural resources and serves as a geopolitical gateway for China by providing an alternative to the Strait of Malacca, offers China and other nations a safer, faster, and more efficient trade route. The region is currently undergoing two pivotal transformations. The first is a profound shift in its political, economic, and social structures. The previous governance, economy, and social systems are unlikely to return, even if negotiations between the ULA/ AA and the State Administration Council (SAC) military regime materialise. The ULA/ AA’s vision has begun to redefine administration, security, and society, introducing a new order focused on wartime governance. The ULA/AA’s Arakan Dream, or “The Way of Rakhita“, offers a revolutionary approach that could reshape the relationship between the state, market, and society in Rakhine.
The recent conflicts between SAC forces and the AA have severely damaged Rakhine’s economic infrastructure. Jobs linked to the former administration and key economic sectors have disappeared, contracting the local economy. Once dependent on internal trade with economically developed Burmese regions like Yangon and Mandalay, Rakhine is now grappling with logistical issues and cash shortages. Despite gaining informal trade access with India and Bangladesh, the ULA/ AA still faces challenges, including resource scarcity, logistical barriers, and limited financial capital.
Unlike other regions under EAO control, Rakhine’s natural resources are primarily large-scale, albeit with limited extraction or commercialisation prospects. The destruction wreaked by the current conflict has served as a social and economic reset. This could bring both opportunities and challenges for an emerging order in Rakhine, with outcomes dependent on three key factors related to the ULA/AA’s ability: securing the region by any means, establishing an effective and inclusive administration, and revitalising the local economy. The last factor involves leveraging trade with neighbouring India and Bangladesh.
The changes unfolding in Rakhine are far from superficial; they are deep-rooted shifts with long-term trajectories, affecting domestic issues and regional dynamics. Understanding the depth and magnitude of these changes will aid in assessing possible scenarios beyond Rakhine for the entire country.
As the second transformation, it is important to note that Northern Rakhine State is also entering a new security dynamic following the AA’s takeover of Buthidaung and Maungdaw, along with the capture of facilities occupied and used by the Myanmar military’s Border Guard Police Force 5. After the AA took over the SAC’s outposts along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, many Border Guard Police Force personnel fled to Bangladesh. Some abandoned their weapons in the border areas, while others sold them to the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army (ARSA), the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), and the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA). Militant groups operating along the border, including ARSA, RSO, and ARA, have gained access to arms from the SAC’s military and police forces. This has occurred through abandoned equipment, purchases, and provisions. Reports suggest SAC has leveraged these groups and conscripted local Muslim populations to counter the AA, creating a volatile security landscape. Previously, these groups were reportedly recruiting from refugee populations in Bangladesh. Simultaneously, the AA’s reluctance to collaborate with these groups stems from deep-seated trust issues. For these groups, access to weapons from the SAC has emerged as the key motivator behind any cooperation with the SAC. Their growing access to arms threatens local communities in northern Rakhine. It also presents challenges for the AA, which must now shift from offensive guerrilla tactics to defensive and potential counterinsurgency strategies along the border.
This evolving security dynamic poses interconnected challenges in three critical areas. First, it may delay plans to repatriate refugees from Bangladesh, as the presence of militant groups undermines trust between communities and complicates resettlement efforts. Second, security issues could strain relations between Bangladesh’s security agencies and the ULA/ AA. Access to border surveillance technology could exacerbate misunderstandings and hinder cooperation. Third, these tensions could disrupt the ULA/ AA’s social cohesion initiatives, potentially destabilising the region. The resolution of this complex issue will take time. In the interim, it would impact northern Rakhine’s security, refugee repatriation, regional stability, and ULA/AA governance.
The changes unfolding in Rakhine are far from superficial; they are deep-rooted shifts with long-term trajectories, affecting domestic issues and regional dynamics. Understanding the depth and magnitude of these changes will aid in assessing possible scenarios beyond Rakhine for the entire country. The SAC’s attempts to broker a ceasefire using its ties with China would mostly likely affect only the more visible symptoms rather than the entrenched core sentiments that have motivated the current transformation in Rakhine.
This transformation appears to have infused the AA’s Arakan Dream and its nationalism with renewed confidence. Even so, the ULA/ AA now faces new challenges, distinct from its initial successes. It requires a heightened sense of responsibility and a firm stance to solidify its role and legitimacy in the public eye. Unlike other EAOs that focus solely on territorial control, Rakhine’s unique historical grievances and the AA’s political vision combine to shape a new and transformative trajectory for Rakhine’s future.
The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of ISP-Myanmar.
2025/11
Kyaw Htet Aung is the Program Head of the Conflict, Peace, and Security Research Program at ISP-Myanmar and a political analyst.