Photo – AFP
(This Op-ed article was originally published on the Stimson Center website on 11 December 2025.)
As Myanmar’s junta-led elections approach in December, the junta leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, is consolidating his power and strategically managing the military elites to preserve his control. Historical precedents of elite management by Myanmar’s junta leaders demonstrate how these power plays can determine regime survival or collapse. Analyzing the junta’s internal shifts today provides insights into the regime’s stability and into how Min Aung Hlaing uses the elections to reinforce his dominance.
While much of the current debate around Myanmar’s upcoming elections focuses on rigging, legitimacy, and the resistance’s response, a critical aspect is often overlooked: the junta chief’s sophisticated strategy for managing internal power within the military.
In the lead-up to the polls, the junta chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, has been deploying calculated elite management tactics to mitigate grievances among senior officers and preempt potential power struggles within the military. The interplay between leaders and their circle of inner elites is one of the foundations of regime stability in a dictatorship. How those at the top manage the composition, responsibilities, and hierarchy of elites often determines whether the regime will survive or collapse. The junta chief appears to be aware of this dynamic. Instead of relying solely on repression or coercion, he has pursued a more calculated approach, one rooted in elite management. Elite management does not exclude repression or coercion. It is not only about persuasion and incentives; it may also involve various methods such as coercion, divide and rule, persuasion, and more to manage elite politics.
▪️The Elite Management Toolkit
Historically, elite management has been a central feature of Myanmar’s military rule. Under General Ne Win, elite circulation was tightly managed through frequent purges and reshuffles accompanied by political incentives, ensuring that no single officer accumulated excessive power. He rewarded loyal members of his inner circle with lucrative ministerial posts, reserving top government positions for military officers while limiting civilian technocrats to deputy minister roles. Senior General Saw Maung, who led the military after the 1988 coup, however, struggled to consolidate power amid internal divisions. His failure to maintain control over key figures such as Major General Khin Nyunt, the influential head of Military Intelligence, and Major General Than Shwe, the Vice Commander-in-Chief, along with several powerful regional commanders, ultimately undermined his authority and paved the way for his removal.
Senior General Than Shwe later had more success with this model by consolidating authority and curbing the influence of regional commanders who could challenge his leadership. To weaken their control and dismantle their personal networks, he reassigned powerful regional commanders, including Major General Tun Kyi (Northwestern Command), Major General Myint Aung (Southwestern Command), and Major General Kyaw Ba (Northern Command), to well-paid ministerial positions in 1992. This move distanced them from their loyal subordinates and stripped them of direct command power, allowing him to further centralize authority within his inner circle.
A more calculated approach rooted in elite management is a mix of carrots and sticks. The carrots come in the form of economic incentives and prestigious appointments designed to secure loyalty among top officers. Senior generals are given stakes in military-linked conglomerates such as the Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), tying their financial interests to the regime’s survival. The junta chief has also rewarded trusted figures with lucrative civilian positions, such as General Nyo Saw’s appointment as Head of the Foreign Exchange Supervision Committee (FESC) in 2024 and General Mya Tun Oo’s appointment to the Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) in 2023.
The sticks, by contrast, include forced retirements, demotions, imprisonment, and purges that extend beyond individuals to entire patron-client networks. Recent cases include the imprisonment of Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun, once seen as Min Aung Hlaing’s likely successor, along with Lieutenant General Soe Htut and Brigadier General Yan Naung Soe, all charged with corruption. These actions mirror the sweeping purges under previous regimes, where the removal of a single senior figure often meant the downfall of their entire faction. There is historical precedent for this as well. For example, in the 1977 Ohn Kyaw Myint affair, a coup plot led to the young captain’s execution and the imprisonment of high-ranking officers such as General Tin Oo. Similarly, the 2004 purge of General Khin Nyunt and his entire intelligence apparatus demonstrates the enduring pattern of collective punishment. Under the current junta chief, this blend of economic co-optation and network-based purges reinforces a system in which loyalty and fear remain the twin pillars of regime stability.
▪️Min Aung Hlaing’s Approach to Elite Management
Following historical precedents, the current junta chief has similarly employed elite management to secure loyalty and consolidate control. Instead of allowing senior officers to fade into retirement or risk alienation, the junta chief has been rewarding them with political incentives such as ministerial posts and electoral candidacies. In the months leading up to the elections, he removed at least five generals, seven lieutenant generals, and 10 major generals from their positions, many of whom were well-regarded within the military and part of his winning coalition. Then he rewarded those retired officers with political incentives ahead of the upcoming general elections. Among them, General Nyo Saw (DSA-23), the former Quartermaster General and a close adviser to the junta chief, was rewarded with the position of Prime Minister. Similarly, General Mya Tun Oo (DSA-25), who was once seen as a potential successor to the junta chief and had served in both combat and intelligence commands, cultivating an extensive network of loyal subordinates, has now been positioned as a Pyithu Hluttaw candidate for Pyi Oo Lwin Township.
These strategic appointments not only secure the loyalty of influential officers but also bind their personal futures to the survival of the regime. By strategically placing these officers in roles that link their personal interests to the regime’s survival, the junta chief seeks to prevent the emergence of rival power bases and mitigate the risk of palace coups. Without such incentives, influential officers with independent networks could potentially challenge his authority or mobilize opposition, thereby threatening regime cohesion. These appointments function not merely as rewards but as deliberate measures to minimize threats and ensure that elite interests remain aligned with the continued rule of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
These strategies have become even more critical as battlefield setbacks have weakened his authority and heightened internal frustrations. In the 10 months following Operation 1027, from November 2023 to August 2024, the military lost one regional command, at least 145 bases, and 75 towns. ISP-Myanmar referred to this period as “the 10-Month Shock,” during which the regime nearly collapsed. These defeats have intensified frustration within the ranks and resentment toward Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership. Consequently, his reliance on elite management ahead of the planned elections aims to prevent this discontent from escalating into open challenges, thereby maintaining senior officers’ loyalty and consolidating his control over the regime. At the same time, he is preparing two conditions he sees as necessary for a controlled political transition, which are also widely identified in the authoritarian transition literature: adequate protection of the military’s and his own personal and corporate interests under any successor arrangement, and the presence of trustworthy civilians with whom power can be safely shared. To meet these conditions, he has shifted elements of his winning coalition into the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and installed hand-picked civilian allies, since he cannot rely on the current USDP leadership or other civilian parties. These chosen civilians help safeguard the regime’s interests because their own political survival is tied to its continuity. Importantly, these tactics are not simply short-term reactions but reflect Min Aung Hlaing’s long-term strategy of power consolidation. The planned elections and his careful management of elite participation within them also help ease certain tensions and contain rising discontent.
Parallel to these moves on the civilian front, the junta chief has also reshaped the military hierarchy to strengthen his position within the armed forces. He is restructuring the military’s hierarchy by promoting younger officers from the so-called “fourth generation” of the military leadership. These officers, deeply entrenched in the patron-client networks that define the military institution, are now positioned to shape the future of Myanmar’s military. Many who once served as lieutenant colonels or lower-ranking officers have become key members of the junta chief’s winning coalition, now holding senior ranks and influential posts, including the Joint Chief of General Staff (the third-highest position in command) with rank of general, Chief of Staff (Army), Quartermaster General, Chiefs of the Bureau of Special Operations with ranks of lieutenant general, and regional commanders with ranks of major general.
For instance, when the junta chief assumed the role of Commander-in-Chief in 2011, Kyaw Swar Lin was a lieutenant colonel. In just 14 years, he has risen to become one of the most powerful figures in the military, now serving as Joint Chief of Staff (Army, Navy, and Air Force). Although General Kyaw Swar Lin lacks notable combat experience, his steady rise through key administrative positions within the Commander-in-Chief’s Office has made him deeply indebted to the junta chief for his rapid advancement and rewards. Through such promotions, the junta chief balances generational renewal with the consolidation of loyalty, ensuring his continued dominance over the armed forces.
▪️Pre-Election Maneuvers
The strategy extends beyond the barracks. The junta chief is also working to tighten his grip on the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a long-time ally of the military, by placing loyal officers in key leadership positions. Just two years after the coup, he appointed two trusted retired officers, Lieutenant General Myo Zaw Thein and Lieutenant General Aung Soe, to top roles within the party. Now, many senior generals, lieutenant generals, and major generals who were recently retired are contesting in various constituencies under the USDP banner in the upcoming elections.
There has been clear tension even before loyal officers were deployed into the party ahead of the general elections. Within the USDP leadership, occasional disagreements have emerged between Party Chair Khin Yi and Vice Chair Myo Zaw Thein, a former adjutant general and one of Min Aung Hlaing’s closest clients. Reports suggest that Khin Yi has sometimes held meetings without informing Myo Zaw Thein, reflecting mistrust and internal friction. The current USDP leadership largely consists of figures from the same generation as the junta chief, making it difficult for him to exert full control without relying on military pressure. The party is chaired and led by former Brigadier General Khin Yi (DSA Batch 17), former General Myat Hein (DSA-17), former Major General Hla Tun (DSA-15), and former Lieutenant General Thaung Aye (DSA-20), while the junta chief himself belongs to DSA Batch 19. If the junta chief manages to replace this older generation with his own trusted members from the winning coalition, he could extend his influence over the USDP and transform it into a more loyal political instrument. However, this transition is unlikely to be smooth because clashes within the party are expected, particularly after the elections, as older elites resist a generational shift that would significantly diminish their political relevance.
A thorough examination of these maneuvers is critical for understanding the true nature of the junta chief’s grip on power. The upcoming elections are not just a political event but part of the junta chief’s broader elite management strategy, reshaping the military and political leadership to secure loyalty and consolidate control. By rewarding senior officers, promoting a younger generation of commanders, and extending his influence over the USDP, he is building a system that ensures his dominance. These tactics show that the regime’s survival depends not only on might but also on carefully managing elites and institutions. Both the resistance and the international community must look beyond surface-level debates about election legitimacy and focus on these deeper shifts within Myanmar’s military and political network, which will shape the country’s authoritarian future.
▪️Conclusion
Analyzing elite management shifts within Myanmar’s military is essential, as these changes have direct consequences for both the resistance and the country’s broader political trajectory. For resistance sides, such shifts are not merely abstract power plays; they influence operational dynamics on the ground. Promotions, retirements, and strategic appointments determine command structures in key regions, the loyalty or potential defection of units, and the allocation of resources during military operations. The consolidation of authority around the junta chief may result in a more unified and centrally coordinated military, even during apparent setbacks, thereby complicating efforts to exploit internal fractures within the regime.
For the international community, recognizing these shifts offers insight into the junta’s long-term strategies, extending beyond the superficial optics of election manipulation. Instead of solely condemning electoral illegitimacy, policymakers and observers should consider how the junta chief’s elite management influences the regime’s resilience, the stability of patronage networks, and the likelihood of palace coups or factional conflicts. Elite management is not merely an internal military matter; it shapes the environment in which the resistance operates and informs how external actors might engage to support democratic forces or anticipate regime behavior. Focusing on these deeper structural changes enables a more realistic assessment of both the risks and opportunities present in Myanmar’s authoritarian landscape.
Naing Min Khant is a program associate at the Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar). He is a senior at Parami University, studying Philosophy, Politics, and Economics.