Since the coup in February 2021, three new rail-road-sea cross-border trade routes connecting China and Myanmar have emerged. These three routes were not initially part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and they facilitate access by China’s western provinces to the Indian Ocean and neighboring countries in the region.

The conflict map of Myanmar has become broader and larger as a result of armed conflicts following the coup. Among more than 7,800 clashes nationwide, at least 300 took place in areas where China's major projects are located or near China's potential project areas.

A new maritime trade route, Guangxi - Yangon which will directly connect Qinzhou port in Beibu gulf port in China’s Guangxi to Yangon port in Myanmar, was opened on October 28, 2022. The new trade route will connect the ports in member states of the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Since the military coup in February 2021, the conflict map of Myanmar has become broader and larger as a result of armed conflicts between SAC forces and ethnic armed organizations, as well as between SAC forces and newly formed local defense forces. A number of China's major projects have either come under attack or have been threatened as a result of conflicts in project areas. Most clashes took place in the area surrounding the Letpadaung Copper Mine. Later in June, Wanbao announced that it had suspended operations at the mine for more than 16 months.

The majority of strategic projects designed to boost activity in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor are, currently, going to be implemented in ethnic minority areas where armed conflicts are most frequent. After the military coup, Myanmar’s internal conflict map expanded to incorporate escalating conflicts between State Administration Council (SAC) forces and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), as well as the burgeoning conflict between the newly formed local defense forces and SAC forces. Local People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) have also strengthened their forces in townships where the China-backed Letpadaung Copper Mine and the Tagaung Nickel-Processing Plant are located. 

Since before the military coup, the majority of strategic projects designed to boost activity in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor have been implemented in ethnic minority areas where armed conflicts occur most frequently. In particular, border economic cooperation zone projects are mostly based in northern Shan State where at least 7 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) are active, and where projects such as the construction of the Muse-Mandalay high-speed rail are planned to be built mostly through townships affected by armed clashes. Similarly, since the coup, Myanmar’s internal conflict map has expanded to incorporate escalating conflicts between State Administration Council (SAC) forces and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), between EAOs themselves, as well as the burgeoning conflict between SAC forces and the newly formed local defense forces (PDF/ LDF/ CDF/ KNDF etc.).