Photo – AFP
On January 17, 2026, ISP-Myanmar held its eleventh 30 Minutes with the ISP event, titled “The Narcotics Domestication: Myanmar’s Next Generation at Risk.” This English translation of the event’s recap memo was published on February 20, 2026. The original Burmese version was published on February 5, 2026. This publication is part of research conducted under ISPMyanmar’s Socioeconomic Studies.
▪️Concept Note
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has long documented Myanmar’s role in the global opium trade. Since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, opium yields there have fallen, leaving Myanmar as the world’s largest producer (Myanmar Opium Surveys, January 2025). In 2024, the cultivated area reportedly expanded by 17 percent to 53,100 hectares, with estimated output reaching 1,010 metric tons. Cultivation is spreading most notably in southern Shan State, Chin State, and Sagaing Region. ISP-Myanmar’s records indicate the authorities seized only around three tons of opium and related products that year—an official seizure rate of roughly 0.3 percent of estimated production.
Myanmar is at the center of the region’s market for synthetic drugs. Shan State—particularly the Golden Triangle—has become a production and transit hub for Yaba (stimulant tablets) and methamphetamine (ice) moving across East and South-East Asia. Production has surged since 2021 and has been entangled with Myanmar’s civil war. After the 2021 coup, conflicts intensified, farmers found ordinary crops increasingly unviable. Crop failures, market disruption, and the destruction of fields pushed some towards opium and cannabis as survival strategies. A conflict economy has since deepened, knitting together online scams (Kyar Phyant), money laundering, narcotics, and armed conflict into a mutually reinforcing convergence.
The social consequences are just as alarming. With schools shuttered or unable to function reliably, and with large numbers of young people dropping out, public education has withered. Drugs have filled the vacuum. The narcotic is commonplace, and use is increasingly normalised—not only among youth, but among adults as well—because narcotics are cheap and easy to obtain. Meanwhile, the collapse of health services, psychological trauma, prolonged school disruption, and the suspension of external assistance, including USAID support, are combining to produce wider harms, including rising HIV infections.
Responsibility is widely shared. The State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), which claims to control the state, cannot be complacent about seizures and public burnings as a substitute for strategy. Nor can Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), as non-state actors, evade accountability for drug-related crimes that can hollow out an entire generation.
Myanmar cannot afford to let a generation sink into a narcotics quagmire. It stains the country’s standing abroad and degrades political life at home. Illicit drug economy can warp—and, over time, corrode—the wider economy. Socially, they will fracture families and communities. Politically, they risk prolonging the civil war. Strategically, they create vulnerabilities that invite meddling—like flies drawn to an open wound. This episode’s discussion aims to put that threat squarely on the table, and to do so with the seriousness it demands.
The Narcotics Domestication: Myanmar’s Next Generation at Risk
Greetings and a warm welcome to all the Gabyin members joining us for another episode of 30 Minutes with the ISP. I’m Ingyin May, and I’ll be your host for today’s program. This marks the 11th episode of our 30 Minutes with the ISP series. Today, we will be presenting and discussing the drug scene with the title: “The Narcotics Domestication: Myanmar’s Next Generation at Risk.” Our panelists today are ISP-Myanmar’s emerging researchers: Yee Mon, Ko Khant, and Ko Htun. Following the presentation, we will open the floor for questions and comments from the audience. You are welcome to ask questions live, or you can ask them via the Chat box and Q&A buttons. After the presentations, we’ll open the floor for your questions and comments. If we can’t address every question during this live session, we’ll answer them in our recap memo afterward. Let’s get started with our discussion. Let’s start with Yee Mon, the floor is yours.
A warm welcome to all Gabyin members joining us today. First, thank you for taking the time to attend this discussion. Since the 2021 coup, drug production and distribution in Myanmar have surged once again. UNODC reports also indicated that opium production in Myanmar has reached its highest level in a decade. Most recently, in Mongyai Township in Shan State, we saw drug seizures that reached record-breaking levels. In value terms, the seizures amounted to more than 1,600 billion kyats (a rough estimate of 400 million USD). When we compare this with seizures over the past five years, the scale has increased dramatically. As the chart shows, seizure cases have remained above 5,000 per year. And when we compare the estimated values of these seizures, 2025 was the highest.
While rising seizures, production, and exports is a serious concern for the international community, we must also pay close attention to the surge in domestic consumption. Simply put, the entire country is at risk of sinking into a drug quagmire. Myanmar’s conflict has become fertile ground for a conflict economy—including the drug trade. In intense conflict zones, opium cultivation has become the only source of income for many.
In addition, for many armed actors, drugs have become both a weapon of war and a source of capital to fund it. At the same time, as the formal economy has stopped functioning properly, the illicit economy has flourished and grown stronger. For example, we’ve seen the rapid spread of Kyar Phyant (online scam) operations, human trafficking, and drug production and trade.
The real tragedy is that for many young people, drug use now feels as domesticated as eating rice and drinking water. Without realizing it, we have become a generation defined by drugs. Instead of “To Help the Next Generation Thrive,” the book series title by the late and widely respected Burmese writer U Aung Thin, we now have to ask, are we “to let the next generation perish.” This is a wake-up call for all of us. It is a crisis that could pull the entire country into the abyss and undermine the nation’s future.
Building on the points I’ve just raised, we will structure today’s discussion discussion into three parts. First, Htun will walk us through the current escalation and spread of the drug problem, supported by key data and statistics. So, Htun, please go ahead and start us off with your findings on the current drug situation.
Yes, greetings everyone. Researching Myanmar’s illicit drug trade with precise data is still very difficult and has limits. Even so, at ISP-Myanmar, we have been tracking trends in drug production, consumption, and seizures since the coup. Based on available reporting, the total estimated value of drugs seized in Myanmar in 2025 alone is around USD 440 million.
As this chart shows, roughly half of the total value of seized drugs comes from Methamphetamine, commonly known as Ice. The second-largest category is Ketamine, or “K,” which accounts for about 32 percent. Third are WY tablets—also known by names such as Yaba or Yama. Notably, Heroin makes up only 0.3 percent. This suggests that domestic consumption of synthetic drugs is far higher than that of opium-related drugs, which many people tend to focus on most.
There is one important point I want to highlight here. The UN estimates that opium production in Myanmar in 2025 exceeded 1,000 tons. Yet the opium and opium-derived products seized by the SSPC amount to only about three tons. So, as this image shows, what is being seized is only the tip of the iceberg. And this table shows that, in terms of estimated seizure value, Methamphetamine and Ketamine rank highest. But what is most alarming is the nationwide spread of WY (Yaba) tablets, which are being seized across the country.
Looking at this map, seizures are highest in the Yangon Region. Now, this does not mean Yangon is where drugs are produced. Rather, it functions as a major transit hub for exports to other countries, and domestic use is widespread across venues ranging from nightclubs and KTVs to many other settings. There have even been cases where people were caught carrying pills in their pockets while going to pagodas or monasteries. Overall, drug seizures in Yangon account for more than 50 percent of the national total. Next, the second-highest area for seizures was the Tanintharyi Region—along the coast and in the surrounding Myanmar territorial waters. This means traffickers are increasingly shifting to maritime routes. Look further, and you’ll see that the Chin, Rakhine, and Kayah States have no recorded seizures. This is simply because the SSPC has no effective control in those areas.
According to UNODC reports, Shan State remains Myanmar’s largest producer of opium. WY (Yaba) tablets are also widely available there at very low prices. Yet seizures in Shan account for less than five percent of the national total. And when it comes to tablets like WY, production does not require a major facility. With a small pill-pressing machine, you can run a manageable operation—it’s even possible to do with a mini tent. Finally, if you look at this map, you can see that WY tablets are far more widespread across townships than any other type of drug. With that, I’ll hand it over to Khant, who will discuss the wider implications of these findings.
Yes, at this point, Myanmar has effectively become a major drug factory for its neighbors. Our immediate reality is that we are sinking deeper and deeper into a narcotics quagmire.
Among Myanmar young people, drug use has become almost as normal as smoking cigarettes, drinking alcohol, or chewing betel nuts. The prices are also so low that anyone can get them whenever they want. As this chart shows, when we look at current street prices, we can see just how cheap these drugs have become. In Shan State, a single WY (Yaba) tablet sells for just 400 to 700 kyats (roughly US two to four cents). That’s just about the price of one egg. In some places, it’s even cheaper than a cup of tea. Even in Yangon, one tablet is only around 1,000 kyats. It has reached the point where people of any age can pop WY tablets as casually as chewing gum.
The most immediate result of this surge in drug use is a rise in social problems—like financial disputes, physical violence, and community breakdown. Based on ISP-Myanmar’s socioeconomic research, we are increasingly seeing interpersonal violence linked to drugs. In some cases, some manual laborers take WY tablets like energy boosters, believing they need them to endure long hours of hard work. While they may feel alert and productive when the effects are present, but when the effects wear off, the person often feels more frustrated and intense anger. In many cases, that spills into domestic violence—lashing out at family members or beating their wives.
And when we connect this to the wider conflict, it’s clear that none of the armed actors are untouched by drugs. We are seeing cases of combatants going into battle—or launching attacks—while under the influence. Even some prisoners of war are captured with drugs. Meanwhile, the public-health fallout is becoming another major threat. As we all know, Myanmar’s health system is in shambles. Drug use is contributing to secondary illnesses and worsening mental-health conditions, and sexually transmitted infections like HIV are rising at an alarming rate. For a country already failing across so many sectors, this is like trying to catch minnows with a shark net: the problems are vast, and the capacity to respond is nowhere near enough.
The way this crisis is being handled so far is also far from satisfactory. We have seen the SSPC amend the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law for a second time. They revised how possession thresholds are defined and how different drugs are classified. Some penalties have been increased. And also to open rehabilitation centers—which, to be fair, is a step in the right direction. But legal amendments alone will not solve the problem. And while Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) may hold policy discussions and introduce their own rules on drugs in their administrative territories, there are still major limits to what can be enforced on the ground. In the end, changing laws or issuing statements does not address the root of the crisis. It matters to deal with users and small-scale dealers, but the real solution requires dismantling the core networks—arresting kingpins, the core producers. And that, under current conditions, will remain extremely difficult. Yee Mon will now take over to discuss what may lie ahead for Myanmar as this narcotics quagmire continues to expand.
Sure, I would like to explore possible future scenarios based on three key points. First, the illicit economy tied to drug trafficking is only set to expand.
We are already seeing the nexus between drugs and conflict grow stronger, alongside Kyar Phyant online scam operations and money laundering. In today’s context, drug production has become a central pillar of the conflict economy because it offers quick money and easy profits. We also cannot ignore the involvement of armed groups in these businesses. In many cases, it appears that the drug trade is not just a by-product of conflict, but a key source of capital to sustain it.
So, without a political solution, this trend will only worsen. Simply pointing fingers—blaming each other, saying who did what—will not resolve a crisis of this scale. The SSPC is responsible, just as various armed groups are. Rather than pursuing narrow self interests, all sides must seek a political solution that reduces harm to the public.
The second point is that this crisis may be exploited for political gain. When it comes to scam centers, for instance, we can already see growing involvement from neighboring countries—particularly Thailand and China. The major seizure in Mongyai was reportedly carried out with Beijing’s intelligence assistance. As these bilateral operations with China expand, we should also recognize that we’re losing the space for wider regional and international cooperation. In that context, groups may start reporting on one another or scapegoating others over political differences or personal grievances. We are already seeing this in the way the regime repeatedly blames the Arakan Army(AA) in relation to drug seizures. This raises the question: will they use the same tactics against other armed groups operating along the Myanmar–China border? And would the regime dare to raid territory held by powerful groups on the Myanmar-China border, as it did in Mongyai?
The final point is that unless basic livelihood needs are met, it will be extremely difficult to reduce drug production and opium cultivation. In many highland areas, people grow opium not out of choice, but out of necessity. Survival is simply too hard, and the wider economy is too constrained. For many households, opium has become a lifeline crop that guarantees immediate cash income.
Beyond the three points we just discussed, we must also confront a greater danger of preventing drug use from becoming a daily norm, as Khant highlighted earlier. This is not a problem we can simply put on a tab and deal with later. The costs will fall most heavily on young people—the country’s future. If their future is destroyed, Myanmar’s future will be destroyed with it. With that, I would like to conclude the first part of our program.
Thanks to all three panelists for their insight. We’d like to get on with the questions and remarks from our Gabyin members here today. If you have a question or any remarks, you may raise your hand now. I’ll get started with the first question from the Q&A section.
We can clearly see the drug problem around us, but I’m wondering if we can actually trust the SSPC’s data? It seems questionable to rely on their figures when, on the ground, we know they often just take bribes at checkpoints and simply let go.
It is difficult to capture the real situation on the ground if we rely only on data released by the junta. That said, I want to clarify that today’s discussion is also backed by ISP-Myanmar’s socioeconomic research. For example, our findings suggest that two of the most widely used drugs in Myanmar are WY tablets and marijuana. Yet if you look at the junta’s official seizure figures, marijuana appears relatively low. So, there are clearly discrepancies and data gaps like this. But the main message we want to underscore today is that a wide range of drugs is now within easy reach of young people, at extremely low prices, and drug use is becoming increasingly normalized. That poses a direct threat to the future of the younger generation—and to the country as a whole. Our goal is simply to highlight the scale of the problem and the urgency of addressing it effectively. Thank you very much for the question.
Thank you for your answer, Ko Htun. I’d like to open the floor again to our Gabyin members for any questions or remarks. Is there anyone who would like to ask? Alright—if there are no questions at the moment, I’ll read another question from the Q&A section.
I’ve noticed that it’s not just drug trafficking that’s increasing—opium and marijuana cultivation also seem to be rising. If those in power are involved, who is left to hold them accountable? And is there anything we, as ordinary citizens, can do?
Right, as we noted in our Concept Note, Myanmar’s conflict and the spread of drugs are closely linked. Research shows that as the conflict economy expands, more and more actors are turning to illicit businesses like scam centers and drug trafficking. On the civilian side, when people are forced to flee because of battles and clashes, or when climate-related disasters make regular farming impossible, they often turn to opium and marijuana cultivation, which require less capital. So, to your question—yes, the public’s ability to hold those in power accountable is extremely limited right now. But one thing we can do is document what is happening by collecting evidence, recording patterns, and preserving information, so it can be used when the right time for accountability comes. And at the individual level, we can also play a role by refusing to become part of an economy that poisons our society, which weakens the cycle that keeps it alive.
Thank you for your insight, Khant. I notice that there’s another question in the Q&A section.
How are the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations handling the drug issue? I’m asking because I noticed there wasn’t much discussion about their specific actions in today’s discussion.
Right, I’ll take this question. Various armed groups are indeed carrying out their own operations to combat drug trafficking and use. From what I recall, the KIO (Kachin Independence Organization) in Kachin State has conducted major crackdowns. Similarly, in Karenni State, statements from the IEC (Interim Executive Council of Karenni State) Judiciary Department indicated that drug-related cases accounted for the highest number of arrests. In Rakhine State, the AA’s judiciary has also released information on anti-drug operations and arrests. In northern Shan State, the MNDAA (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army) has been arresting and taking action against users. There have also been cases where Chinese suspects were handed over to Chinese authorities. So, overall, EAOs are addressing the drug issue in their own ways. However, we have not yet seen these efforts become fully effective. To be frank, we also have not seen these operations or arrests carried out with transparency or in line with international standards. Another point is that their actions seem to focus mostly on arresting users. In other words, we have not seen major arrests of dealers, distributors, or the key actors in the supply chain. I will conclude my answer there.
Thank you, Yee Mon, for that answer. We’ve received a few more questions. Let me read one of them.
The drug problem is rampant in the Tanintharyi Region as well. We’re seeing it widely, even in areas that remain under control. How would you suggest we solve these problems? What should be done?
I’ll take this question. We’ve actually touched on this issue earlier. We are indeed seeing seizures in the Tanintharyi Region, as well as in other areas where the SSPC maintains their control. From our perspective, this is happening for reasons that connect directly to what Htun discussed. Drug production is no longer mainly about trafficking opium across borders, as it was in the past. Today, if someone has a small pill-pressing machine, they can manufacture tablets on the spot. We are seeing more and more of this kind of production. In other words, the technology and systems for producing drugs have become more advanced and far more accessible. So, to summarize: yes, borders are part of the problem, but production capacity is spreading as well. And as we emphasized throughout today’s discussion, people are turning to drug production because of economic hardship and the struggle to survive. That is why, in my view, we will only be able to effectively control production, trafficking, and cultivation when people’s basic socioeconomic livelihoods begin to improve.
Thank you very much, Yee Mon. We’ll take one final question. Let me read one from the questions we received.
Regarding the recent rise in drug use in Myanmar, it isn’t really about addiction like in the old days. Instead, people are using it just for fun—recreationally—like drinking beer or alcohol. This kind of casual use, rather than heavy abuse, is what’s trending among the youth. As a result, some no longer see these drugs as dangerous or addictive. What do you think of this development?
I’ll take this question. It’s true that this perspective is becoming quite popular among our youth today. But I don’t think we should frame the discussion only around whether drug use is excessive or not. Instead, I see two main issues here. First, there is the socioeconomic reality. In Myanmar’s current situation, we are facing soaring inflation and shortages of essential goods in many areas. People are under severe economic pressures. The disturbing irony is that while basic necessities are scarce, drugs remain incredibly cheap and easily available—often within arm’s reach. That contrast shows just how broken and unbalanced Myanmar’s socioeconomic conditions have become.
Second, there is the growing trend of normalization—and I see this as extremely dangerous. If drugs are treated as casual entertainment, on par with smoking cigarettes or drinking alcohol, we are setting a risky precedent. Once drug use is normalized, the long-term consequences and crimes can also become normalized. That is why we need to be very cautious about these shifting standards. Otherwise, we risk a future where drug culture becomes deeply embedded and fully normalized among our youth. And if we want to prevent Myanmar from being defined by a conflict economy that is intertwined with narcotics, we have to challenge these attitudes head-on and re-evaluate them critically. That is how I would respond to this question. Thank you.
Thank you for the answer, Khant. Due to time constraints, we’ll take just one final question. I’ll read one that was sent in the chat.
In many regions, farmers had previously switched to opium-substitution crops. However, because these alternative crops fail to fetch a market price, people are reverting to opium cultivation. How do you think the current local authorities should effectively resolve this situation?
I will answer this one. This ties directly to what we discussed earlier. As we mentioned, if basic livelihood needs are not met, drug production and opium cultivation will inevitably worsen. In that context, crop-substitution efforts become extremely difficult to sustain. To summarize, resolving this comes down to two main points. First, without a political solution, meaningful progress will be hard to achieve. Second, there must be a sustained, coordinated effort to secure people’s livelihoods. This requires commitment from every group and authority involved—on all sides. And if international assistance is necessary to make this possible, then we should be open to accepting that support and working together. One thing is certain: this issue demands serious, effective, and dedicated action. I will end my answer there. Thank you.
Thank you very much for the answer, Htun. Due to time constraints, we will have to conclude the Q&A session here. For the remaining questions, we will follow up with email responses. Before we officially close today’s program, I would like to invite our panelists to share their final concluding remarks.
To summarize today’s discussion, the spread of drugs in Myanmar is not a new problem. At one point, the country was infamous as the “Opium Kingdom.” Later, global and regional anti-narcotics efforts helped reduce opium cultivation and production across the Golden Triangle, including in Myanmar. But opium was effectively replaced by synthetic drugs—stimulants such as WY tablets, ice, and ketamine—which have since surged. And in the current conflict environment, the scale has become increasingly difficult to control. As Yee Mon noted earlier, this is not a crisis we can simply “put on hold” and deal with it later. Right now, driven by the mindset of “I don’t care who suffers as long as I survive,” people are producing, transporting, and selling drugs purely for profit. And while different actors point fingers at one another—blaming particular regions or groups—the reality is that the entire country is entangled. Like interlocking gears, every part is connected: those who grant permission, the producers, the transporters, and finally the users. Together, they keep the cycle turning. As a result, without even realizing it, the new generation—our youth—is being pulled into this narcotics quagmire, and we risk witnessing the destruction of an entire generation. Ultimately, it is young people who will bear the highest cost. So we must ask ourselves: are we really going to pass down a legacy of drugs to the next generation? As the title of today’s discussion suggests, the whole nation is sinking deeper into this narcotics quagmire. I will end with this warning: we are now on a path that endangers the future of our youth and our country.
Thank you very much, Khant. In addition to the data presented today, you can access further research findings and data free of charge on our website at www.ispmyanmar.com, as well as through our social media channels. I would like to extend my special thanks to each and every one of you for taking the time to join us today. With that, we will conclude the program here.
▪️Appendix Questions
The question listed below was submitted via chat during the 30 Minutes with the ISP event on January 17, 2026.
Is data available on drug use in bars?
Regarding drug use in bars, ISP-Myanmar does not currently have specific research data on this issue. However, we do have drug-related data gathered from a socio-economic research study conducted across 110 townships nationwide. You can view this data on the ISP-Myanmar website.
Please share some preventive measures for youth to avoid falling victim to drugs.
Since this ties into individual choices, it is difficult to simply dictate that one shouldn’t try or use them. The best approach is for individuals to be fully aware of the adverse effects of drugs and voluntarily choose to avoid them. On the other hand, it is crucial for various relevant authorities and organizations to effectively enforce laws and implement preventive measures against drug trafficking and usage.
What kind of political implications and challenges might the current drug problem (including the recent seizures in Shan State) have for the current elections and the upcoming new government?
As we have discussed, there is a high likelihood that drug busts are being leveraged for political gain. Whether or not this is happening can be clearly seen by looking at the situation in Shan State. Furthermore, you might have noticed that drug seizures are being highlighted much more frequently as the election period approaches.
What this indicates is that, lacking domestic and international legitimacy, the current military regime is showcasing these busts in an attempt to prove itself as a legitimate government. At the same time, it aims to delegitimize the relevant armed groups. For example, based on our monitoring, the armed group in Rakhine State faces the highest number of drug-related accusations.
Therefore, the upcoming transitional government might also use this same old playbook to boost its legitimacy and gain acceptance regionally and internationally. If they genuinely care about the public and want to minimize harm, they should work transparently in collaboration with relevant domestic policy actors and international organizations. In reality, they may also face pressure that could lead to international intervention.