Opinion

Managing the Margins: China’s Risk Calculus in Myanmar’s Civil War

This paper attempts an explanation using a risk-management assessment approach. It posits that China engages with EAOs in Myanmar based on risk management, which is actor-specific, time-bound and reversible since its primary goals are border stability and safeguarding its strategic and economic interests in Myanmar.
By Htet Shein Lynn | July 9, 2026

This photo taken on 21 May 2024 shows a destroyed house following fighting between Myanmar’s military and the Arakan Army (AA) ethnic minority armed group in a village in Minbya Township in western Rakhine State. Photo by AFP.


(This Op-ed article was originally published on The ISEAS website on July 9, 2026.)



▪️INTRODUCTION

During the launch of “Operation 1027”1 on 27 October 2023, the coalition of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA), known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance, faced little intervention from China. Consequently, the three EAOs swiftly seized numerous towns and military bases in Northern Shan State.2 However, the conflict landscape dramatically changed in late July 2024, after MNDAA seized Lashio, an economic hub in Northern Shan State near the China-Myanmar border, which also housed the Myanmar military’s Northeastern Regional Command.3 China had not expressed any disagreement at the start of Operation 1027, but now it decided to step in to mediate (and pressure MNDAA to agree to) a ceasefire with the State Administration Council (SAC).4 MNDAA then halted its offensive, agreed to a bilateral ceasefire, and relinquished Lashio in April 2025.5 China also facilitated a ceasefire between SAC and TNLA, as well as TNLA’s relinquishment of Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Mogok, and Momeik.6 A significant coordinated military operation against SAC, which initially seemed tolerated by China and which cost SAC a historic defeat, was also halted by China’s assertive mediation.7

China has an unavoidable presence and interest in Myanmar’s conflict. The long, shared border with Myanmar in northern Shan State and extensive investments under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) mean that China engages with both Naypyidaw and multiple EAOs to meet or protect its own interests. Yet its posture toward each of its interlocutors in Myanmar varies.

In any case, China’s posture toward EAOs cannot be considered proxy sponsorship, as its support is conditional and reversible, as in the aftermath of Operation 1027. It is also not an ideological alliance since China has never shown any interest in sharing political goals or norms with EAOs.

This paper attempts an explanation using a risk-management assessment approach. It posits that China engages with EAOs in Myanmar based on risk management, which is actor-specific, time-bound and reversible since its primary goals are border stability and safeguarding its strategic and economic interests in Myanmar.


▪️China’s risk-based peripheral management framework

China’s posture toward EAOs is neither that of alliance formation nor proxy sponsorship; instead, it reflects risk-based peripheral management. China assesses EAOs based on actor-level attributes that affect the stability and security of its interests in Myanmar, and then adopts one of three graduated management modes to preserve border stability, protect strategic assets, and avoid political precedents.

China’s policy may therefore be best understood as calibrated management, rather than outright support or opposition. Its assessments are based on three key independent variables.

  1. Geographic Proximity to Chinese Strategic Assets
    This variable depends on whether or not an armed actor is able to exercise power and control, or on the extent to which China deems that this actor’s operations are close to infrastructure and areas that are of strategic interest to China. Such areas include border trade zones, trade routes, pipeline and CMEC projects. For example, despite its silence at the launch of Operation 1027, China began deploying private security forces in Kyaukphyu township in Rakhine State, where China’s deep seaport project is hosted, only after AA launched an offensive against SAC.8

  2. Leverage Potential on Naypyidaw
    An armed actor’s leverage potential reflects their ability to exert pressure on Naypyidaw in ways that benefit China. For example, when SAC did not comply with China’s request to eradicate online scam operations along the China-Myanmar border, this apparently led China not to oppose the launch of Operation 1027, despite that offensive’s proximity to the China-Myanmar border.9

  3. Independence Ability
    An armed actor may, at times, attempt to forge relations with external actors beyond China, form alliances with newly emerging armed groups, or expand military operations without external assistance (especially from China). For example, once MNDAA started relations with international media and expanded its operations beyond the Kokang region, China started exerting pressure on the EAO, despite not having opposed Operation 1027.10

These variables are dynamic rather than static, based on an armed actor’s risk profile, which can be changed according to that actor’s choice of territorial expansion; battlefield dynamics; and alliance formation. Any of these can prompt forth adjustments to China’s choice of management modes.


▪️From risk profile to management modes

Based on the three variables mentioned above, China examines EAOs’ risk profiles in affecting stability and leverage value over Naypyidaw. Different configurations of assessments lead to different management modes, which are observable patterns of state behaviours (in this case, China), which fall short of being state policy or commitment. A chosen management mode defines how China deals with a particular EAO in a defined period, aimed at mitigating risk to China’s interests without formal alliance or sponsorship. The following three management modes focus on what China does, not on how its policy is described.

  1. Tolerant Containment
    In this management mode, China tolerates the existence of a particular EAO within a defined territory while constraining this EAO’s behaviour. How China deals with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) is a good example of this mode. China does not publicly condemn or support the EAO; it allows for cross-border economic interaction, and intervenes only when the EAO’s behaviour seems to cross a red line, such as threatening China’s infrastructure project(s) in Myanmar or internationalising the Myanmar conflict.11

  2. Tactical Accommodation
    Tactical accommodation occurs when China engages a particular EAO on an issue-specific matter to mitigate short-term risks rather than shape long-term political outcomes. China adopts this management mode in its engagements with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Arakan Army (ULA/AA). Both these groups are still conducting military operations in areas where China’s interests are located. The characteristics of this mode are crisis-driven mediation efforts, temporary talks, or public calls for de-escalation without political recognition or sustained support.

  3. Enablement Preceding Restraint
    Under this management mode, China allows military escalation by an EAO or several EAOs, when their moves can have some leverage value over Naypyidaw without China’s direct involvement. China intervenes once an escalation seems to threaten its interests or empower the EAO(s) beyond its influence. Operation 1027 illustrates this mode best. China initially had a muted response; it adopted a non-intervention stance, and only shifted to assertive mediation, warning, and pressure to halt the operation when EAOs seemed to be enlarging their territorial reach and their alliances with emerging armed groups

These management modes are time-bound and conditional on the evolving conflict dynamics and on EAOs’ risk profile changes. They capture the calculus of China’s engagement with EAOs in the context of a constantly changing conflict.


▪️Comparative analysis of EAOs

Using this risk-based management framework to assess five EAOs in Myanmar—UWSA, KIA, ULA/AA, MNDAA and TNLA—can assist comprehension of how China manages the different EAOs and how management modes may change over time.

  1. UWSA: Tolerant Containment
    UWSA is a typical example of the “tolerant containment” management mode. It is the most heavily armed actor, and is known to have solid military capacity. However, it has been avoiding direct military conflict with the Myanmar military since the 1989 ceasefire agreement.
     
    For China, UWSA is a predictable actor who has been stable for decades and is not given to covert political signalling or international advocacy. Therefore, China tolerates it and allows cross-border economic interaction; sets a clear red line to preserve territorial stability and the safety of Chinese infrastructure; and restricts any action that could empower UWSA beyond China’s influence. Two months after MNDAA, an ally of UWSA, seized Lashio in northern Shan State, China’s Special Envoy for Asian Affairs held a meeting with UWSA leaders and warned them not to join the resistance and to cooperate instead in pressuring MNDAA. As a result, UWSA announced in August 2025 that it had halted all support for EAOs.12
     
    The UWSA’s military capacity also has leverage value over Naypyidaw. It affects Naypyidaw’s strategic calculus without active conflict. For China, adopting “tolerant containment” on UWSA allows it to preserve stability and predictability without formal engagement.

  2. KIA: Tactical Accommodation
    China’s engagement with KIA is more conditional. Although KIA is still conducting military offensives in the Kachin and Sagaing regions, it has neither conducted nor participated in coordinated military operations with other EAOs since the 2021 military coup. It thus has moderate offensive capacity and cannot decisively alter the national power balance.
     
    Since the 2021 coup, KIA has been assisting newly emerging armed groups such as the People Defence Forces, with training and weaponry, and local skirmishes. China initially did not oppose these moderate-intensity conflicts; after all, they did not threaten China’s interests and could not destabilise Naypyidaw. However, this dynamic changed in 2024 after KIA seized Chipwi and Pengwa, the primary rare earth element (REE) extraction hubs, formerly controlled by the junta-aligned Kachin armed group, the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K).13
     
    Following that seizure, China shut down all border crossings adjacent to Kachin state and blocked the flow of essential commodities, resulting in a 200% surge in fuel prices in the state. China also cut down electricity to Pengwa to paralyse the KIA-controlled REE mining operations.14 However, China shifted to more pragmatic engagements in December 2024, and a meeting with KIO officials in Kunming led to the reopening of the borders and the resumption of REE exports.15
     
    Although China advocates a bilateral ceasefire between KIA and SAC, it does not apply its “five-cuts policy”16 to KIA (The five cuts refer to cutting the supply of internet, fuel, electricity, food and essential commodities). To protect its strategic interests from KIA’s control over REE mining sites, China monopolises the technology and energy infrastructure required for mining and refining.17 Additionally, to reduce its dependence on KIA-controlled REE mining sites, China accelerated exploration of new mining sites in southern Shan state with UWSA. This showed its unwillingness to view the KIA as a long-term strategic partner.18 China has not accorded political recognition to KIO/KIA nor tolerated long-term military operations near its border. Engagement is issue-specific, time-bound and reversible.

  3. ULA/AA: Tactical Accommodation
    China’s engagement mode with ULA/AA can be understood as “tactical accommodation”, resulting from the geographical distance of Rakhine state from the China border and ULA/AA extending control over territories that host China’s strategic economic assets in western Myanmar. ULA/AA primarily operates in Rakhine State, which is not adjacent to Yunnan, and does not cause many direct spillover effects of conflicts into China. Nonetheless, this region hosts important strategic economic interests under the CMEC, such as an oil-and-gas pipeline linking Kyaukphyu in Rakhine with Kunming in Yunnan, and a proposed deep-sea port. Initially, during Operation 1027, China did not publicly oppose or endorse AA’s territorial expansion in Rakhine State; nor did it recognise the ULA/AA as a legitimate authority.
     
    However, China started to engage with AA’s officials after AA gained full control of two wind power projects in Thandwe and Ann, and partially controlled the other eight Chinese projects, including the deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu.19 Chinese officials hosted a meeting with AA’s officials in Tengchong, Yunnan in December 2024.20 Following that meeting, AA publicly announced in August 2025 that it welcomes foreign investment and pays special attention to the security and safety of individuals involved in such investments.21
     
    China has also refrained from using its “five-cuts” tactics on ULA/AA. This was primarily for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, although AA possesses relatively powerful military capacity, the geographical distance of Rakhine state from the China-Myanmar border makes it more difficult for China to conduct “five-cuts” tactics the way it did on TNLA and MNDAA. Second, ULA/AA signals itself as a predictable and reliable actor in protecting Chinese strategic interests. ULA/AA publicly announced for the first time in March 2024 that it welcomes foreign investment and prioritises security and safety before its partial control of the deep-sea port.22 It made a second such announcement in August 2025. Besides, it has not rushed to gain complete control over Kyaukphyu despite besieging the town for months.
     
    Overall, China’s engagement with ULA/AA is issue-specific, conditional, and risk-mitigating, and has the expressed objective of risk containment rather than rollback of AA’s military objectives. This pattern reflects the “tactical accommodation” management mode, aimed at safeguarding strategic assets and preventing escalation without political recognition or long-term partnership.

  4. MNDAA: Enablement preceding Restraint
    China’s management of MNDAA reflects the “enablement preceding restraint” mode. MNDAA’s offensive capacity was useful to China as an instrument to coerce Naypyidaw; however, China constrained MNDAA’s military operations once it assessed that MNDAA had crossed the red line.
     
    Before Operation 1027, China was frustrated with the SAC’s non-compliance with China’s request to eradicate online scam operations in the Kokang region adjacent to the China border, then controlled by the SAC-aligned Border Guard Force led by Bai Saocheng. Despite China’s urging, neither SAC nor Bai’s forces took any action to dismantle the scam operations. The situation worsened in October 2023 with the reported murder of 60 Chinese nationals, including undercover police officers, in Bai’s territory.23
     
    That same month, the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched Operation 1027, framed with dual objectives of controlling territories and eradicating scam operations along the China-Myanmar border. Rather than opposing this move, which had led to unprecedented military losses and the annihilation of Bai’s force, China perceived it as a punishment of Naypyidaw for non-compliance. Only after the crackdown on scam centres along the border did China mediate and host talks between the Brotherhood Alliance and SAC. This led to a ceasefire agreement being signed in Heigang, China, in January 2024.24
     
    However, the Three Brotherhood Alliance and other newly-emerged armed groups launched a second coordinated offensive in July 2024, named “Operation 1027 second wave,” taking a large swath of territories, including Lashio.25 Fulfilling its objective of having the scam centres along the border dismantled, and recognising the lack of centrality to replace Naypyidaw if it fell, China shifted its approach. It backed SAC by restoring diplomatic engagement and putting pressure on TNLA and MNDAA, which had been tolerated in the first wave.
     
    China shut down the border crossings and blocked the flow of essential goods in northern Shan State while retaining MNDAA leaders in Yunnan. Besides, China also warned UWSA, a closed ally of MNDAA and TNLA, not to join and support the resistance. Consequently, MNDAA had to halt its offensive and agree to a bilateral ceasefire with SAC, thus relinquishing Lashio. Moreover, it had to cut ties with newly emerging armed groups within the Spring Revolution movements and the international media.
     
    Overall, China initially tolerated the coordinated military operation to punish the SAC for non-compliance, while restraining MNDAA through the five-cuts tactics, from being powerful enough to overcome China’s influence through new alliances and relations with international media. This “enablement preceding restraint” management mode underscores China’s conditional tolerance, which can be withdrawn once leverage value turns into liability.

  5. TNLA: Enablement preceding Restraint
    Regarding engagement with China, TNLA also faced the same trajectory as MNDAA; both groups operate primarily in northern Shan, adjacent to the China-Myanmar border, and are part of the alliance that launched Operation 1027. But there are some nuanced differences between the two cases.
     
    MNDAA swiftly halted its offensive and relinquished Lashio in January 2025 once China exerted assertive mediation. TNLA, however, decided to continue the offensive and maintain ties with armed groups of the Spring Revolution movement.26 Although China facilitated talks between TNLA and SAC in February27 and April 2025, no substantive results emerged.28 The SAC, this time backed by China and having already agreed to a ceasefire with MNDAA, started a counteroffensive in TNLA-controlled territories, and seized Nawnghkio in July 2025 and Kyaukme in October 2025. Meanwhile, China also escalated its “five-cuts policy” on TNLA. To ensure its survival, TNLA finally agreed to a bilateral ceasefire with SAC in October, resulting in the relinquishment of Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Mogok and Momeik.
     
    TNLA’s initial attempts to continue the offensive and maintain ties with the Spring Revolution movement despite China’s mediation would have been interpreted as TNLA unreliability by China. Consequently, when MNDAA attacked and seized a TNLA-controlled township, Kutkai, located on the Mandalay-Muse border trade road with China in March 2026, China remained silent despite its claim to be maintaining border stability. 
     
    Although China initially tolerated a coordinated military operation along the border and utilised it as a tool to pressure Naypyidaw, it later mediated (and compelled) EAOs towards bilateral ceasefires. When TNLA showed some reluctance, China did not hesitate to assert its five-cuts policy but remained silent when MNDAA attacked TNLA. China’s engagement with TNLA seems issue-specific and reversible based on the actors’ risk profiles, and underscores the sequence of enablement followed by restraints once leverage values turn into liability.

▪️CONCLUSION

China’s differentiated management modes with EAOs have an important effect on Myanmar’s conflict dynamics. An armed group that misinterprets China’s tolerance as support and chooses escalation risks faces coercive tactics from China. This is because China does not view EAOs in Myanmar as long-term strategic partners, but rather, as instrumental tools with which 1) to punish Naypyidaw when and as it deems necessary and 2) to safeguard its strategic interests when Naypyidaw’s ability to do so shrinks.

Even so, China still needs to maintain strong ties with EAOs, and to safeguard its strategic assets in Myanmar. China is aware that these EAOs could gain more territorial and administrative control through military victories, especially alongside new/emerging armed actors, or forge relations with external actors beyond China and thus break free of China’s influence. To prevent this, China constantly monitors Myanmar’s conflict dynamics and does not hesitate to exert coercive and assertive tactics if and when an EAO risk-profile exceeds thresholds. The EAOs are also aware that crossing China’s red line could threaten their overall survival. They thus consistently and cautiously seek to align their strategic interest with China’s, and to expand their military and political power while avoiding China’s redlines.

China’s approach to EAOs cannot be interpreted as support or opposition, but as a form of risk-based management. By assessing EAOs’ risk profiles based on geographic proximity, leverage potential on Naypyidaw, and independence, China chooses a conditional and reversible calibrated management mode to mitigate risks to itself.

This framework may assist in comprehending the apparent inconsistencies in China’s approach, and in providing an alternative lens for analysing China’s role in the Myanmar conflict. The constantly changing on-ground dynamics in Myanmar shape the EAOs’ risk profiles, thereby shifting the nature of China’s approach in line with the underlying logic of its risk-based management framework.


▪️Footnotes

  1. This was a significant offensive military operation initiated and led by three EAOs, known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance (or 3BHA), in Myanmar’s northern Shan State. The Myanmar military lost two Regional Command Centers and hundreds of military bases during this operation. The 3BHA stated Operation 1027’s objectives as: autonomy, deterring bombardments by the Myanmar military, combating online gambling, and “eradicating the oppressive military dictatorship”. This offensive moved rapidly along most parts of the SinoMyanmar trade route before China stepped in to mediate a ceasefire. See Wai Moe, “The Myanmar Junta’s Unhappy New Year”, 24 January 2024, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute https://fulcrum.sg/the-myanmar-juntas-unhappy-new-year/ ; and Wai Moe, “Myanmar Military Losing Control: A Culmination of Past Policy Errors?”, 17 November 2023 https://fulcrum.sg/myanmar-military-losing-control-a-culmination-of-past-policy-errors/ ↩︎
  2. Burma News International (Myanmar Peace Monitor), “Operation 1027 and the Direction of the Spring Revolution,” May 3, 2024. https://mmpeacemonitor.org/en/analysis-paper-en/operation-1027-and-the-direction-of-the-springrevolution/?utm_source=chatgpt.com ↩︎
  3. The Irrawaddy, “MNDAA Claims Seizure of Myanmar Junta Command Headquarters”, 3 August 2024 https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/mndaa-claims-seizure-of-myanmar-junta-commandheadquarters.html ↩︎
  4. Offlicial name of military government then. ↩︎
  5. BBC News Burmese. “တရုတ်ဆုံးဖြတ်တဲ့ လားရှိုးအုပ်ချုပ်သူ အပြောင်းအလဲ ” BBC News Burmese. November 10, 2025.
    https://www.bbc.com/burmese/articles/cm24xd97y3ko. ↩︎
  6. Myanmar Now, “တရုတ်ကြားဝင်မှုဖြင့် TNLA နှင့် စစ်ကော်မရှင် အပစ်ရပ်ပြီ” Myanmar Now, October 27, 2025, https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/68864/ ↩︎
  7. Myo Naing and Yizheng Zou, Operation 1027: A Turning Point in Myanmar’s Conflict Landscape (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2026), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-95-5005-0 ↩︎
  8. Development Media Group (DMG), “တိုက်ပွဲပြင်းထန်လာ၍ ကျောက်ဖြူစီမံကိန်းများကို ကာကွယ်ရန် တရုတ်လုံခြုံရေးတပ် ရာချီ ချထား” DMG, January 13, 2026, https://www.dmgburmese.com/%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8/tkskc.ht ml ↩︎
  9. BBC News Burmese, “၁၀၂၇ စစ်ဆင်ရေး ဘယ်အထိ ရောက်လာမလဲ ” BBC News မြန်မာ, October 31, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/burmese/articles/cz979ydpdpno ↩︎
  10. CNI, “MNDAA Prohibits Its Members of Party, Troops Not to Deal with ASEAN, US and Western Group,” CNI News, October 14, 2024, https://cnimyanmar.com/index.php/english-edition/25099-mndaa-prohibits-itsmembers-of-party-troops-not-to-deal-with-asean-us-and-western-group ↩︎
  11. Eleven Media, “Leak Reveals Secret Meeting between China’s Envoy, Wa Group on Controlling MNDAA,” Asia News Network, October 8, 2024, https://asianews.network/leak-reveals-secret-meeting-between-chinasenvoy-wa-group-on-controlling-mndaa/ ↩︎
  12. Radio Free Asia (RFA) Burmese, “စစ်တပ်ပြိုလဲမှာ မလိုလားကြောင်း တရုတ်အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်ပြောတယ်ဆိုတဲ့ အစည်းအဝေးမှတ်တမ်း ပေါက်ကြား,” RFA Burmese, October 5, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/burmese/news/china-uwsa-myanmar-military-10052024145809.html ↩︎
  13. မင်းသစ်, “ မြေရှား – ဒေါ်လာဘီလျံချီတန်တဲ့ နယ်မြေသိမ်းပိုက်မှု ” BBC News မြန်မာ, November 7, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/burmese/articles/cwyxj7vg9dqo. ↩︎
  14. Mizzima. “All Rare Earth Mining in Pang War Stopped after China Cuts Electricity in Myanmar Town.” Mizzima. October 26, 2024. https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/10/26/15530. ↩︎
  15. Myanmar Now, “ကချင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်းရှိ နယ်စပ်ဂိတ်များကို တရုတ်အစိုးရ ပြန်ဖွင့်ပေး ” October 27, 2025, Myanmar Now, https://web.facebook.com/myanmarnownews/posts/1229811089181634/ ↩︎
  16. China practices a five-cuts policy in Myanmar border areas with China as part of its influence or coercion tactics towards EAOs in those areas. See Jared Bissinger, “How China Outmanoeuvres the West in Myanmar”, 26 November 2025, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute https://fulcrum.sg/how-china-outmanoeuvres-the-west-in-myanmar/ ↩︎
  17. Amara Thiha. ““Rare Earths and Realpolitik: The Future of Mediation in Myanmar.” Stimson Center. June 12, 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/rare-earths-and-realpolitik-future-of-mediation-myanmar/ ↩︎
  18. Yumlembam, Ophelia. “China’s Dominance in Myanmar’s Rare Earth Resources: A Growing Risk for Global Supply Chains.” 9DASHLINE, August 22, 2025. https://www.9dashline.com/article/chinas-dominance-inmyanmars-rare-earth-resources-a-growing-risk-for-global-supply-chains. ↩︎
  19. Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar), “10 Chinese Projects in Rakhine State Under AA’s Control,” ISP-Myanmar, December 24, 2024, https://ispmyanmar.com/mp-75/ ↩︎
  20. Development Media Group (DMG). “တရုတ်နဲ့ AA ဆွေးနွေးမှု ဘယ်လိုရလဒ်တွေ ထွက်ပေါ်လာနိုင်သလဲ” DMG. December 16, 2024. https://www.dmgburmese.com/%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8/taroalad. html ↩︎
  21. Development Media Group (DMG), “တရုတ်စီမံကိန်း ၁၁ ခုအနက် ၉ ခုကို AA တစိတ်တပိုင်းထိန်းချုပ်” DMG, August 24, 2024, https://www.dmgburmese.com/%E1%80%9E%E1%80%90%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8/ispaachi na.html ↩︎
  22. Global Arakan Network, “Arakan Army Vows to Protect the Foreign Investments in Arakan,” Global Arakan Network, March 26, 2024, https://www.globalarakannetwork.com/post/arakan-army-vows-to-protect-theforeign-investments-in-arakan ↩︎
  23. “Crouching Tiger, Fearsome Dragon: China’s Expanding Role in Combating Crime in Myanmar,” Asia Crime Century (Substack), October 2024, https://asiacrimecentury.substack.com/p/crouching-tiger-fearsomedragon-china ↩︎
  24. “Myanmar’s Military, Ethnic Armed Groups Agree to China-Mediated Truce,” Al Jazeera, January 12, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/myanmars-military-ethnic-armed-groups-agree-to-china-mediatedtruce ↩︎
  25. Myanmar Now, “လားရှိုးတိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ်ကို MNDAA သိမ်းပြီးနောက် ပြင်းထန်သည့်တိုက်ပွဲများ ဆက်ဖြစ်,” Myanmar Now, July 25, 2024, https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/55386/ ↩︎
  26. Naing Min Lwin, “တရုတ် ဖိအားကြားက TNLA ၏ ခံနိုင်စွမ်းနှင့် ရှေ့ဆက်ရမည့်လမ်း”, Ayeyarwaddy Times, May 10, 2025, https://web.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1014669954135357&set=a.583120797290277&id=10006777086249 8&_rdc=1&_rdr# ↩︎
  27. BBC News Burmese, “အဖြေမထွက်ခဲ့တဲ့ TNLA နဲ့ စစ်တပ် ဆွေးနွေးပွဲ” BBC News မြန်မာ, February 19, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/burmese/articles/cx2xnl901m9o ↩︎
  28. Radio Free Asia (RFA), “Myanmar Ta’ang Army Expands Territory Despite Chinese Pressure,” Radio Free Asia, May 5, 2025. https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2025/05/05/myanmar-taang-army-territory-chinesepressure/ ↩︎

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