(This Op-ed article was originally published on The Eastasiaforum website on 09 April 2025.)
In February 2025, Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing initiated a significant military and cabinet reshuffle, making similar moves to former Myanmar military leader Than Shwe before his political exit beginning in 2010. This restructuring raises the question of whether Min Aung Hlaing is preparing for a political departure like his predecessor.
Promoting younger officers to key military positions and reassigning senior officers to the coup administration mirror Than Shwe’s succession strategy. But the unprecedented military defeats and growing strength of the democratic opposition make it unlikely that Min Aung Hlaing can dictate an imposed transition.
Former senior general Than Shwe carefully orchestrated his exit by selecting two younger officers to succeed him and his deputy. He chose then lieutenant general Min Aung Hlaing — an official with administrative and political, but not combat, experience — as Commander-in-Chief and then major general Soe Win — a hardliner willing to use brute force — as deputy.
Before this transition, Than Shwe also reassigned powerful regional commanders to ministerial roles in 1992 before retiring them in 1997. In 2004, he imprisoned a potential rival, intelligence chief general Khin Nyunt. After consolidating control within the military, Than Shwe introduced the 2008 Constitution, setting the stage for an imposed transition.
Five years into the military coup, Min Aung Hlaing appears to be following a similar strategy. He promoted Lieutenant General Kyaw Swar Lin, 16 intakes younger than him, to Chief of the General Staff (Army, Navy, Air Force), the third-highest position in the military. Like Min Aung Hlaing when appointed by Than Shwe, Kyaw Swar Lin lacks significant combat experience but has held key administrative roles within the Commander-in-Chief’s office. Both military leaders appear to prioritise familiarity with Commander-in-Chief office procedures over combat experience.
Lieutenant General Ko Ko Oo, Chief of the Bureau of Special Operations No. 1, has been elevated to the junta’s chief negotiator with the Three Brotherhood Alliance — an alliance of ethnic armed organisations which seized two regional military commands in 2024. Min Aung Hlaing also appointed Northwest Regional Military Commander Than Htike as Chief of Staff (Army). Both Ko Ko Oo and Than Htike are responsible for brutal atrocities in the Sagaing Region, where civilians were killed and mutilated in October 2024.
Min Aung Hlaing’s reshuffle indicates that he may be positioning Kyaw Swar Lin as his successor. Either Lieutenant General Ko Ko Oo or Major General Than Htike may be promoted to Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Joint Chief of Staff — the second- and third-highest ranking military positions. This mirrors Than Shwe’s succession strategy, reinforcing speculation that Min Aung Hlaing is laying the groundwork for his political exit.
Min Aung Hlaing’s reassignment of senior military officers who might challenge his potential top picks to administrative positions further suggests that he is clearing the way for his preferred successor. Like Than Shwe in the 1990s, he has removed numerous generals from military command, pushing them into ministerial roles with limited influence. These officials rarely attend military-related ceremonies or appear in uniform in public, signalling their diminished role in military affairs. This disconnection creates space for Min Aung Hlaing to appoint a more junior general to Commander-in-Chief.
Min Aung Hlaing imprisoned Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun — whose influence had significantly increased after the coup — and Lieutenant General Soe Htut. Although he has favoured Chief of Military Security Affairs Ye Win Oo, intelligence officers rarely rise to Commander-in-Chief. The military intelligence’s expanding power under General Ye Win Oo could also provoke tensions with frontline combat commanders, echoing the internal power struggles of the Khin Nyunt era.
Than Shwe could dictate the terms of his transition because there were no major popular uprisings following the 1988 protests, aside from the brutally suppressed 2007 Saffron Revolution, which lasted approximately two months. His regime had also secured ceasefire agreements with most ethnic armed organisations through a strategy of ‘ceasefire capitalism’ in the borderlands, leaving little credible opposition.
Unprecedented military defeats after Operation 1027 and the growing strength of popular uprisings undermine Min Aung Hlaing’s ability to dictate an imposed transition. The junta could only collect census data in 145 out of 330 townships in 2024, indicating that it lacks control over more than half of the country. The military has not secured ceasefires with all major ethnic armed organisations, evidenced by ongoing negotiations with the Three Brotherhood Alliance. Since Min Aung Hlaing lacks the power to unilaterally dictate those terms, any transition plan must gain acceptance from resistance forces.
By promoting younger officers aligned with him, sidelining senior commanders and eliminating potential rivals, Min Aung Hlaing appears to be laying the groundwork for a possible exit. But while he appears to be following Than Shwe’s footsteps in orchestrating an imposed transition, battlefield losses, the widespread resistance and the junta’s diminishing control make it unlikely that he can impose an exit on his own terms.
Naing Min Khant is a program associate at the Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar). He was a political science student at the University of Yangon who joined the civil resistance movement. He is currently studying Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at Parami University. The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of ISP-Myanmar and Parami University.