(This Op-ed article was originally published on The EASTASIAFORUM website on December 14, 2024.)
In Brief
Myanmar’s junta chief, Min Aung Hlaing, is planning to hold general elections in 2025 to ensure his political survival as the Myanmar military appears to be disunited and might no longer be inclined to support his grip on power. To compensate for the lack of military support, he is seeking political backing outside the military and placing trusted retired generals in crucial positions within USDP, thus reducing his dependence on the military.
After four years of postponing general elections, Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing now appears to have picked up a new sense of urgency to move forward with them in 2025 — likely as a personal survival measure. While much of the international community focuses on diplomatic pressure and external legitimacy, the real game-changer lies within Myanmar’s military itself.
Min Aung Hlaing cannot rely solely on the military to secure his political survival. Its recent battlefield humiliations, ideological failures and breakdown of hierarchical discipline indicate that the junta chief faces significant risk of challenges from particular factions from within the armed forces whose loyalty to him is waning — even though top generals affect unity.
To reduce his dependence on the military, Min Aung Hlaing is seeking to build outside political support, especially with the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), its alliance partners and other parties that accept his transition agenda. He has put his two trusted retired generals, Lieutenant General Myo Zaw Thein and Lieutenant General Aung Soe, into important positions in the USDP.
Hierarchical discipline, ideological success and formidable strength are crucial for the stability of authoritarian regimes. A highly institutionalised military has a disciplined hierarchy, merit-based promotions and autonomy from the leader, ensuring it operates cohesively and efficiently to support the regime. This unity makes the military less prone to internal challenges or coups.
In contrast, a non-institutionalised military is fragmented, lacks cohesion and depends on the commander-in-chief, making it vulnerable to infighting and division. Such instability increases the risk of challenges to the leader’s authority, forcing the leader to seek alternative sources of power to secure their survival, as the military alone cannot guarantee regime stability.
Successive junta chiefs of Myanmar’s military have urged soldiers to unite around the belief that the military is the sole guardian and protector of the state, race and Buddhism. They claim that without the military, the country would fall into chaos. But the widespread atrocities, oppression and killings of innocent civilians after the military coup have led to shame and disillusionment within the ranks, contradicting the military’s narrative as the nation’s protector. These actions have exposed a deep ideological failure, shaking the conviction that the military acts in the country’s best interest and should remain unified.
Trust in Buddhist institutions and famous monks — close allies of the junta’s chief — has also declined within the military and among the public. Many soldiers who once believed in the military’s mission now see it as morally indefensible, leading to defections and desertions. This trend highlights the military’s crumbling ideological foundation and inability to maintain internal loyalty.
The notion of the military as a formidable force has also been undermined by a series of humiliating events, notably Operation 1027. This coordinated offensive by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, comprising three ethnic armed groups, led to the loss of control over several towns — a severe blow to the military’s reputation. The operation captured more than 160 strategic military positions, including combat battalions, the Lukkaing Regional Operation Command, two Military Operation Commands and even the North Eastern Military Command.
These unprecedented defeats have damaged the image of the military as a cohesive and formidable force and shaken soldiers’ confidence in their leadership.
The ultimate destabilising factor contributing to the sense of urgency is the commander-in-chief’s seemingly random promotions, dismissals, transfers and even arrests. The Myanmar military now lacks a clear path to merit-based promotions. As leader, Min Aung Hlaing has complete control over making and breaking military careers. The junta chief has sidelined traditional military protocols to favour personal loyalty, leading to erratic promotions and demotions.
For example, Min Aung Hlaing granted significant power to the Chief of Military Security Affairs, General Ye Win Oo, despite his limited combat experience. In contrast, General Mya Tun Oo, a senior and experienced officer, was stripped of his position as the Joint Chief of Staff (Army, Navy, Air Force), the military’s third-highest rank. Mya Tun Oo had served in various command roles and had rare experience overseeing both combat forces and intelligence units. Yet he was demoted and reassigned as Minister of Transportation — a civilian role without command over military forces.
These unpredictable promotions and demotions underscore the erosion of a disciplined chain of command within the military. Even high-ranking figures like Vice Senior General Soe Win, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, lack true autonomy as all major decisions remain under Min Aung Hlaing.
The military’s growing weaknesses have shattered its cohesion and effectiveness, undermining Min Aung Hlaing’s ability to rely solely on it for political survival. With growing desperation to diversify his power base and secure survival, Min Aung Hlaing has been forced to seek political support outside the military.
Naing Min Khant was a political science student at the University of Yangon who joined the civil resistance movement. He is currently studying Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at Parami University. He is also a program associate at the Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar).
The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of ISP-Myanmar and Parami University.