Naypyitawlogy Outlook: Regime Alteration and Four Equilibriums to be Watched

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Naypyitawlogy Outlook: Regime Alteration and Four Equilibriums to be Watched (ISP Outlook No.1) was published on March 20, 2026, as a translation of the original Burmese version published on March 17, 2026.  ISP Outlook will cover themes linked to ISP-Myanmar’s core research, including: (1) Tracker, (2) Situation Brief, (3) Policy Brief, (4) Flash Update, (5) ISP OnPoint, (6) The State of Myanmar, and (7) the “30 Minutes with the ISP” talkshow programme. These resources are available on the ISP-Myanmar website.

▪️Introduction

ISP-Myanmar is delighted to introduce a new publication series, ISP Outlook. This series is designed to offer analytical insights drawn from ISP-Myanmar’s research across a range of fields, with a focus on likely developments over the next three to six months, and which factors deserve contemplation. ISP Outlook will cover themes linked to ISP-Myanmar’s core research areas, including Conflict, Peace and Security Studies; China–Myanmar Relations Studies; Conflict Economy Studies; Naypyitawlogy (the study of Naypyitaw’s rulers and ruling systems); Governance Studies (together with Federalism); and Socioeconomic Studies.

ISP Outlook is not intended to predict the future. Instead, it will highlight emerging trends supported by new evidence. It will dissect the primary drivers behind these new data points and trends and analyze how these drivers interact within the existing context to shape new realities. It will examine complex probabilities—from unexpected “Black Swan” events —rare, unpredictable occurrences with severe, widespread consequences —to other plausible scenarios—and assess their strategic policy implications. Where relevant, it will also highlight trajectories that warrant attention, along with the risks, opportunities, and policy adjustments they may require. This inaugural issue, ISP Outlook No. 1, debuts with the Naypyitawlogy, titled “ISP Naypyitawlogy Outlook.”  We warmly welcome you to review critically and engage in the conversation on this issue. 

Across its ongoing research programmes, ISP-Myanmar regularly produces and publishes the following publications and platforms: (1) Tracker, (2) Situation Brief, (3) Policy Brief, (4) Flash Update, (5) ISP OnPoint, (6) The State of Myanmar, and (7) the “30 Minutes with the ISP” talkshow programme. These resources are available on the ISP-Myanmar website.

Naypyitawlogy Outlook: Regime Alteration and Four Equilibriums to be Watched

▪️Summary

Former junta leader Senior General Than Shwe sought, through the 2010 elections, to create a hybrid institutional order in which the Tatmadaw and the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the military’s proxy political party, would share power—partly to prevent the rise of another personalistic autocrat in his own mould. However, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing appears to be using the 2025 elections to prolong a more personalized form of authoritarian rule. As he prepares to assume a civilian role, the central question is whether he can firmly control the four main pillars of the ruling system—the armed forces, the government, parliaments(Hluttaw), and the USDP—and thereby consolidate his power. Within those pillars, actor mapping—identifying who matters, and where they are likely to be placed—will be essential. In the armed forces, if the current Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Senior General Soe Win, or General Ye Win Oo, recently appointed Commander-in-Chief (Army), were to succeed as the next Commander-in-Chief, fourth-generation senior officers would find it harder to shape the armed forces’ future on their own terms. Even if Min Aung Hlaing succeeds in reshaping the regime to his liking, moving into civilian office and assuming the presidency, he is still likely to face serious challenges in controlling the remaining two pillars: the Hluttaw and the USDP. And hanging over this uncertain transition is the ‘Black Swan’ factor- the role of China. Its role is hard to predict, but it remains a consequential variable—one that could shake down the balance if Beijing chooses to intervene.

▪️Evidence and Emerging Trends

A meeting between the foreign ministers, Mr. Than Swe of Myanmar’s State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) and Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow of Thailand on February 18, 2026, disclosed that changes were coming at the top of the Tatmadaw. That was later confirmed by Major General Zaw Min Tun, spokesman for the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC). Since then, speculation has grown that Senior General Min Aung Hlaing may relinquish the post of Commander-in-Chief in order to assume the presidency under the new government. On March 2, General Ye Win Oo, Chief of Military Security Affairs, was appointed Commander-in-Chief (Army). Traditionally, that role has been held concurrently by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services. Its separation and explicit assignment to General Ye Win Oo is therefore notable. In practice, the post has long been treated as the Tatmadaw’s de facto number-two position. At the same time, reports suggest that the Ministry of Defence Council intends to impose a strict five-year term on the top job, the Commander-in-Chief. In this current Tatmadaw structure, only Vice-Senior General Soe Win outranks General Ye Win Oo in institutional seniority. On that note, the succession now appears to rest between two possibilities: either Vice-Senior General Soe Win or General Ye Win Oo as the most likely successor as the new Commander-in-Chief for the next five years.

In The State of Myanmar: ISP–Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025–2026, published by ISP-Myanmar, we noted that current junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing shows increasing signs of dismantling the hybrid institutional model of “Tatmadaw-USDP joint reign”—originally designed by former junta leader Senior General Than Shwe—in favor of establishing a personalized authoritarian system. Consequently, it becomes imperative to analyze how the new government, set to emerge in early April, will reflect this personalized authoritarianism and what unique characteristics it will embody.

▪️Key Drivers and Interacting Dynamics within the Analytical Scenario

If Senior General Min Aung Hlaing moves into the presidency as a civilian—“U Min Aung Hlaing”—his grip on power will depend on whether he can dominate the four main pillars of the ruling system: the armed forces, the government, parliament, and the USDP. As president, he may find it relatively straightforward to manage the armed forces and the executive. Parliament and the USDP, however, are likely to prove far less predictable and far more prone to challenging (internal bargaining) and power struggles. That is why an institutional reading alone will not suffice. Just as important is an actor mapping: who will become the key players, and where they will be placed. 

First, the analysis will examine changes in the Tatmadaw’s hierarchy. In ISP-Myanmar’s publication, ISP OnPoint No. 27: Prospective 4^th Generation Tatmadaw, it was noted that, when considering who might lead the fourth generation, many would naturally point to General Kyaw Swar Lin (DSA-35) as the most likely successor. However, the analysis also underscored a recurring pattern: highly anticipated candidates do not always secure the post. It also suggested that General Kyaw Swar Lin could serve as a transitional Commander-in-Chief, effectively acting as a shield for the third-generation leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.

However, General Ye Win Oo’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief (Army) calls for a reassessment of that forecast. According to further analysis by ISP-Myanmar, some regard General Kyaw Swar Lin as still too young to be on top. Moreover, after being promoted to general and elevated to what was effectively the number-three position in the institution’s hierarchy, he was reportedly seen as behaving arrogantly towards his seniors (in training cohorts)—displaying vanity based on rank and protocol. This, in turn, appears to have generated considerable dissatisfaction and resentment among his seniors. Those grievances reportedly reached Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, increasing pressure to rethink the succession path. Against that backdrop, the elevation of Chief of Military Security Affairs General Ye Win Oo—who serves as Joint Secretary of the SSPC but stands only around eighth in the formal military protocol (order of precedence)—to the post of Commander-in-Chief (Army) can be read as a clear signal to the incoming fourth generation: the top job is still out of reach, at least for the next five years. [See ISP data matter ISP-DM2026-25.]

Such last-minute reversals of fortune have historical precedent in the Tatmadaw. During the 2010 transition from direct military rule to a system led by the Tatmadaw-backed USDP, for instance, the Tatmadaw’s then number-three figure, General Thura Shwe Mann, was widely expected to become either president or Commander-in-Chief. In the end, he secured neither post and only became Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw, the parliament. A similar fate befell Lieutenant General Thura Myint Aung (DSA-18), who had originally been lined up for the Commander-in-Chief’s post. But after celebrating too early before the official appointment, he lost the role; Senior General Than Shwe reassigned him to the Ministry of Defence instead. The Commander-in-Chief postion then went to Lieutenant General Min Aung Hlaing of DSA-19. Under the 2008 Constitution, the Commander-in-Chief outranks the Defence Minister.  Lieutenant General Thura Myint Aung, being both senior in intake and known for his strong combat achievements and temperament, refused to serve under a junior. After rebelling over the loss of the top post, he was forced into retirement and placed under house arrest.

If Senior General Min Aung Hlaing now finds General Kyaw Swar Lin increasingly difficult to tolerate, it is entirely plausible that he could end his military career by moving him into government—perhaps as minister in one of the three security ministries: Defence, Home Affairs, or Border Affairs. Were that to happen, fourth-generation officers from DSA-38—such as Lieutenant General Ko Ko Oo, Lieutenant General Than Htike, Lieutenant General Htein Win, Lieutenant General Zaw Hein, and Lieutenant General Kyaw Ko Htike—could emerge as plausible candidates for the Commander-in-Chief’s post beyond the next five years. Meanwhile, current regional commanders from DSA intakes 40 and 41 would likely be contenders in the next round of the core leadership competition. General Ye Win Oo, who has risen from Chief of Military Security Affairs to Commander-in-Chief (Army), and if he ultimately rises to Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, fourth-generation senior officers would find it far harder to shape the Tatmadaw’s future on their own terms. General Ye Win Oo, a loyalist to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, would be more likely to protect the junta leader’s personal interests and continue running the armed forces as an instrument of personalized authoritarian rule throughout the term of the incoming government.

If Senior General Min Aung Hlaing moves into the presidency as a civilian—“U Min Aung Hlaing”…he may find it relatively straightforward to manage the armed forces and the executive. Parliament and the USDP, however, are likely to prove far less predictable …

However, it cannot yet be said with certainty that the post of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces will pass to General Ye Win Oo. He first crossed paths with the current junta leader when Senior General Min Aung Hlaing was a divisional commander; since then, the two families have grown close, making Ye Win Oo a trusted figure within the inner circle. Since the coup, he has retained the rank of general and held one of the most sensitive portfolios at the apex of the military administration. Even so, General Ye Win Oo appears to lack the breadth of leadership experience that spans both battlefield command and institutional administration. His earlier posts—notably as commander of the 101^st Light Infantry Division (LID-101) and of the Southwestern Command in the Ayeyarwady Region—were in areas that, during his tenure, did not require active combat leadership or high-level operational command. Nor does he seem to possess the depth of institutional memory needed to bridge generational divides and fully grasp the Tatmadaw’s joint-operations concept—linking the army, navy, and air force—first developed under Senior General Than Shwe, along with the complexities that span from armaments to defence industries and military procurement. Although he has now been given the powers of Commander-in-Chief (Army)—with authority over all regional military commands (RMCs) and infantry and light-infantry divisions nationwide—his elevation to Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces may still run up against the Tatmadaw’s traditional practice. Handing the top military job to an intelligence chief would be seen by some as a marked break with institutional norms. And because General Ye Win Oo is a graduate of the Officer Training School (OTS), his rise has also prompted questions over whether it might revive the long-dormant rivalry between OTS and DSA graduates. 

If Senior General Min Aung Hlaing were to elevate General Ye Win Oo largely as a reaction to General Kyaw Swar Lin’s perceived misconduct—and above all because General Ye Win Oo is a trusted loyalist—the military, already facing crises on several fronts, could run into serious capacity problems in carrying out the reforms it needs. Such a move would also be seen by some as a breach of Tatmadaw tradition. A more plausible scenario, then, is that General Ye Win Oo remains Commander-in-Chief (Army), while overall command of the armed forces for the next five years passes to the current Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Senior General Soe Win. Vice-Senior General Soe Win is a hardened loyalist to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, possesses deep institutional memory, shows no obvious political ambition, and is widely regarded as a decisive hardliner in military affairs. Once the junta leader has secured the armed forces as the pillar supporting him, he will turn to consolidating control over the government. If he assumes the presidency of the new government as a civilian, that process is likely to be relatively straightforward. He would be able to appoint and oversee not only the Union government, but also the Chief Ministers of the regions and states, along with their cabinets. By contrast, if he tried to control the government indirectly from a post such as chairman of the newly formed Union Advisory Council, conflicts of interest could lead to unexpected missteps and vulnerabilities regarding protocol and subsequent power struggles. For that reason, he appears highly likely to take the presidency himself. According to an analysis by BBC Burmese, the Union Advisory Council may have been created partly to provide Union-level positions for figures who cannot be appointed Vice-President or Minister, and partly to accommodate former officials from former President Thein Sein’s administration who can offer strategic advice. Significantly, the junta leader personally signed and promulgated the Union Advisory Council Law before parliament convened. Under that law, the council can serve as a mechanism to check and balance parliament’s power and room for manoeuvre. Parliament must authorise the president to form the council at his discretion. The body is empowered not only to advise, but also to coordinate on Union security, the judiciary, foreign relations, peace, and legislation. In effect, Min Aung Hlaing appears to be putting in place safeguards against friction between the presidency and parliament before it can arise.In that setting, the main challenges facing the junta leader as he shifts into civilian office are likely to come from parliament and the USDP. That makes the appointment of the Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw especially important. For Min Aung Hlaing, the example of former General Thura Shwe Mann—who combined the roles of speaker and USDP party leader, and then emerged as a challenger to President Thein Sein—remains both a cautionary tale and a fresh trauma and lesson. The speaker can not only initiate impeachment proceedings against the president, but also wield influence over the party machine if he also serves as party leader. It is therefore crucial for Min Aung Hlaing that whoever takes the speakership does not become a rival centre of power but instead serves as a loyal and manageable instrument of his consolidation project.

If Senior General Min Aung Hlaing were to elevate General Ye Win Oo largely as a reaction to General Kyaw Swar Lin’s perceived misconduct—and above all because General Ye Win Oo is a trusted loyalist—the military, already facing crises on several fronts, could run into serious capacity problems …

As Min Aung Hlaing appears intent on taking the presidency himself, shunting the current USDP chairman, Khin Yi, into another ministerial post or into the Union Advisory Council would look disgraceful, given that he leads the winning party. That’s why handing Khin Yi the speakership on March 16 could be like biting a bullet for Min Aung Hlaing. Retired Brigadier General Khin Yi, a DSA-17 graduate, is not only senior to him by intake but also a seasoned politician and long-serving former minister with deep institutional memory. Moreover, around 1,500 party members were reportedly killed over the past five years by urban-guerrilla (UG) groups and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs). Many within the USDP grassroots, feeling unprotected by the armed forces and having campaigned—quietly or openly—on the claim that voting for the “green color party” was the only realistic route out of direct military rule, appear to have rallied strongly behind Khin Yi’s leadership. Yet despite being in a position where the USDP’s electoral strength alone might have made him president, Khin Yi has had to give up that prospect and settle for the role of parliamentary speaker. For party loyalists, seeing the leader they backed denied the presidency is bound to breed simmering resentment. In that sense, a USDP heavyweight like Khin Yi could become a serious headache for Min Aung Hlaing. From the speakership, Khin Yi would be well placed to use parliament not only to press and constrain the president and cabinet in line with the USDP’s election manifesto, but also to prepare, consolidate, and project his influence over the party beyond the next five years.

▪️Strategic Policy Implications and Potential Black Swan Events

Former junta leader Senior General Than Shwe used the 2010 elections to try to construct a hybrid model of “Tatmadaw–USDP joint rule,” partly to prevent the emergence of another personalistic authoritarian. However, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing appears to be using the 2025 elections to extend a more personalized authoritarian system. In that context, actor mapping—identifying who will be the key players and where they are likely to be positioned—is essential. But this analysis is not a prophecy. Rather, it is a way of unpacking competing probabilities: tracing interests, power struggles, and strategic advantage. Above all, the central question is whether, as he shifts into civilian office, Min Aung Hlaing can firmly dominate the four main pillars of the ruling system—the armed forces, the government, parliament, and the USDP—and thereby consolidate his power.

Even if Min Aung Hlaing succeeds in constructing a personalized authoritarian order by controlling all four pillars, that system could still come under acute strain if he fails to stabilize the country, whether due to public unrest, international sanctions, or his own policy blunders. 

If he succeeds in controlling all four, Myanmar’s regime type would be better described not as conventional military rule, but as a personalistic regime or sultanistic regime type. Under such an arrangement, the regime alternation would probably remain intact. With fear and opportunistic rent-seeking likely to dominate the ruling class across all four pillars. Interestingly, the junta leader did note in his July 30, 2025 speech, “the first page has been written… If the second page can be successfully written with beautiful handwriting…” as comparing the coup five years period with the first page and the post election government as the second page. Unless Min Aung Hlaing himself chose to lead the reforms just as he said, diverting away from the coup five years experience, it would be exceedingly hard for either an institution or an individual reformer to emerge, those who will champion for change. Observers will remain deeply sceptical about what the civilian Min Aung Hlaing of the next five years could achieve that the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing of the previous five did not—especially on the urgent questions of stability, peace, economic recovery, and reintegration into the international community.

One of the perennial weaknesses of personalized authoritarian systems is succession. If the chosen heir becomes a source of anxiety for the ruler—as with the junta chief’s former right-hand man, Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for corruption, or the recently sidelined General Kyaw Swar Lin, whose rapid rise appears to have been halted by perceptions of youthful arrogance towards senior officers—then leadership transition becomes dangerous terrain. As in Feudalism, succession can become a breeding ground for intrigue, factional struggle, uncertainty, and large power vacuums. There is, however, a black swan: a threat harder to foresee, yet potentially more consequential. It is none other than China. Even if Min Aung Hlaing succeeds in constructing a personalized authoritarian order by controlling all four pillars, that system could still come under acute strain if he fails to stabilize the country, whether due to public unrest, international sanctions, or his own policy blunders. Should the resulting socioeconomic fallout begin to harm Chinese interests, Beijing could decide to intervene, as past precedents suggest it might. That, in turn, could trigger a far-reaching reordering of Myanmar’s ruling system.