Photo – AFP
Summary
ISP-Myanmar is publishing a trilogy of preliminary analyses (OnPoint) on “Myanmar’s Conflict Resolution that Needs Guardrails and the Future Prospect.” This analysis is the second part of the trilogy.
The Karen National Liberation Army’s (KNLA) Brigade 4, along with allied People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), seized the Htee Hta Tactical Operation Command (TOC) and the Htee Khee border checkpoint from the State Administration Council (SAC) in Tanintharyi Region from late April to early May 2025. Fierce fighting continues in Kawkareik and Kyainseikgyi townships between SAC troops and the KNLA Brigade 6. The SAC’s efforts to retake the Asian Highway (AH-1) through Operation Aung Zeya have not yet succeeded.
Thailand has shown interest in resolving Myanmar’s conflict, aiming to reopen the Asian Highway and achieve peace. Former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has emphasized that Myanmar’s conflict should be resolved by its people through dialogue. He facilitated a meeting between the SAC leader and the ASEAN chair. Thailand’s efforts are driven by three primary interests: securing its border, addressing humanitarian concerns, and resolving Myanmar’s armed conflict to achieve sustainable peace. While not explicitly rejecting international frameworks like those of the UN or ASEAN, Thailand is leaning toward China’s approach, focusing on de-escalating conflict through trade, and economic incentives.
However, there are five significant differences between Thailand and China. One of these differences lies in the degree of influence on Myanmar’s conflict actors. Compared to China, Thailand has less influence over the Myanmar military and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). These differences pose challenges to Thailand’s adoption of China’s model. However, if Thailand can leverage these differences to create a strategy tailored to its context—akin to a Thread-the-Needle act—it could develop an effective approach that balances competing interests. Read this On Point to see more differences between Thailand and China in managing Myanmar’s conflict.
This ISP OnPoint No. 25 (English version), titled “O’ Northern Road…, Threading the Needle: A Much-Needed Thai Model for Myanmar’s Political Puzzle,” was published on June 3, 2025, as a translation of the original Burmese version published on May 30, 2025. ISP-Myanmar plans to publish a trilogy on Myanmar’s Conflict Resolution that Needs Guardrails and the Future Prospect, and this OnPoint is the second part of the three. These are part of the research conducted by the ISP-Myanmar’s Conflict, Peace and Security Studies.
“O’ Northern Road…”1
Threading the Needle: A Much-Needed Thai Model for Myanmar’s Political Puzzle
Myanmar’s Conflict Resolution that Needs Guardrails and the Future Prospect2
∎ Events
In late April and early May, Brigade 4 of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), along with allied People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), seized the Htee Hta Tactical Operation Command (TOC) and the Htee Khee border checkpoint in Tanintharyi Region from the State Administration Council (SAC). The KNLA and PDFs, aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG), say they have been conducting “Operation Sittaung River Basin” since 2023. Operation Aung Zeya, launched by the SAC to retake the Asian Highway (AH-1), has yet to make headway. Fierce fighting continues between SAC troops and sub-units of the Karen National Union (KNU) Brigade 6 in Kawkareik and Kyainseikgyi townships. Against this backdrop, Thailand has been making repeated attempts to mediate the conflict and reopen the highway.
∎ Preliminary Analysis
Former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra stated, “I’ve conveyed to all major powers that Thailand wants to see Myanmar resolve its internal conflicts. Without dialogue, there can be no path toward negotiation.” Since April 2025—coinciding with Mr. Thaksin’s remarks—military operations have been intensified by the KNLA and its allied forces along the Thai-Myanmar border. After Thailand invited the State Administration Council (SAC) leader to attend the BIMSTEC summit—an effort to reintegrate Myanmar into the regional fold—and Mr. Thaksin brokered a meeting between the junta chief and the current ASEAN chair, Malaysian prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, a series of battles and border outpost seizures followed.

ISP On Point No.25
Threading the Needle: A Much-Needed Thai Model for Myanmar’s Political Puzzle
Hosting nearly 100,000 refugees in Thai border camps and approximately six million migrant workers from Myanmar, Thailand bears the brunt of cross-border impacts stemming from Myanmar’s armed conflict. Moreover, Washington’s new tariffs risk hitting Thailand’s economy, especially in the export sector, and Myanmar nationals working in Thailand’s manufacturing industries may face significant impacts on their livelihoods (See Appendix 1 for details.) Thailand appears to have three primary interests in the Myanmar crisis: (1) securing its border, (2) addressing humanitarian concerns, and (3)resolving armed conflict and achieving sustainable peace in Myanmar. While not explicitly rejecting UN or ASEAN frameworks, Thailand increasingly leans toward China’s approach: focusing on resolving conflicts in Myanmar through trade and economic incentives, and integrating de-escalation of conflict through humanitarian efforts whenever feasible. Over time, other measures for de-escalation tacitly accept the SAC’s planned elections as unavoidable, backs a gradual transfer of power to a civilian government, prioritize economic development, implement peacebuilding patiently, and seek to limit broader international involvement—particularly sanctions—except in support of humanitarian aid.


As an initial step toward addressing the Myanmar crisis, Thailand wants to see the reopening of the Myawaddy–Kawkareik section of the Asian Highway (AH-1)—a vital corridor for Thai-Myanmar border trade, with an average value (based on fiscal year calculations, 2018–2019 to 2023–2024 excluding mini budget) of around USD 4.4 billion per year and USD 370 million per month (see Appendix 2 for details on the AH-1.) The route is currently controlled by multiple armed groups, including the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Border Guard Force (BGF), forcing trade to divert through a detour riddled with checkpoints and informal taxes. The disruption has hurt Thai businesses and contributed to widespread shortages of consumer goods in Myanmar. For Thailand, reopening the highway serves as a test case for whether a step towards de-escalation through trade and economic incentives can be pursued, and Thailand can strike a balance for mutually beneficial relations with each of Myanmar’s armed actors.
While Thailand appears to be gravitating toward China’s approach to the Myanmar crisis, at least five key contextual differences separate the two countries.
While Thailand appears to be gravitating toward China’s approach to the Myanmar crisis, at least five key contextual differences separate the two countries. First, China wields far greater influence over the Myanmar regime—and actively exercises it—whereas Thailand lacks comparable leverage and has not made strategic use of what influence it holds. Second, China has a stronger grip on the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) along its border. Since mid-2024, for example, it has imposed targeted sanctions through a “five cuts” strategy on EAOs in northeastern Myanmar, prompting military and political shifts aligned with its interests (see 30 Minutes with the ISP, Event 6: “Sanctions with Chinese Characteristics.”) Thailand, by contrast, appears to lack similar authority.

A third key difference lies in the organizational structure and political agendas of the EAOs along China’s and Thailand’s borders. EAOs near China are more centralized and tend to prioritize military victories, but they do so without urgently linking these gains to a political settlement. Many lack formal alliances with pro-democracy forces such as the National Unity Government (NUG). By contrast, EAOs along the Thai border are weaker in centralization and coherency, with diverse political affiliations that make trade-driven or ceasefire-only approaches less effective. One notable distinction is the presence of BGFs on the Thai side. Aligned with the SAC, these units wield significant influence. Furthermore, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) maintains a significant presence of troops, especially close to Thailand’s northern border. This substantial force exacerbates Thailand’s geopolitical challenges, due to the group’s loyalty to China, in addition to the growing scale of drug trafficking and other illicit economies. While the SAC rejected the UWSA offer to mediate in Lashio, it allowed the BGF under Saw Chit Thu to operate in Myawaddy (see Appendix 3 for details on The Battle for Myawaddy)— an arrangement that effectively subcontracted sovereign authority (see On Point No. 24, “O’ Northern Road: Subcontracting Sovereignty.”) Unlike China, which dismantled the Kokang BGF and shut down numerous scam operations, Thailand’s role in anti-scam efforts has been largely confined to human trafficking rescues, underscoring its more limited capacity. A fourth key difference is that Thailand’s political system, institutional capacity, and coordination mechanisms are less swift and decisive than China’s—limiting its ability to match Beijing’s effectiveness. Unlike China, Thailand’s vibrant civil society and relatively independent media make it harder to maintain information control while engaging with the many stakeholders involved in Myanmar’s conflict. A fifth difference lies in Thailand’s more complex relationship with the international community—particularly Western countries and ASEAN—compared to China’s. Beijing shows limited sensitivity to international scrutiny, as illustrated by its targeted sanctions on EAOs in northeastern Myanmar.


While these structural differences may limit Thailand’s influence compared to China, some of them also present potential strategic advantages if leveraged wisely. Unlike China, whose approach to the Myanmar crisis struggles to win public and international support, Thailand’s stronger international ties, particularly within ASEAN, and especially under Malaysia’s chairmanship (with which Thailand has good relations), offer a unique opening. If Thailand can navigate the Five-Points Consensus (5PC) to resolve Myanmar’s conflict while delivering concrete outcomes, it can benefit significantly. With creative policymaking and effective coordination, Thailand could help chart a new path toward resolving the Myanmar crisis. (See Appendix 4 for more details of Thailand’s efforts to resolve the Myanmar crisis.)
∎ Scenario Forecast
The military operations launched by the KNLA and its allied forces appear to be a calculated effort to assert their strength. According to ISP-Myanmar’s research, the KNU has conducted what it calls the “Four-Month Operation” since May. Beyond gaining control of part of the Asian Highway, their presence at key border checkpoints like Htee Khee and efforts to seize military outposts in Tanintharyi Region suggest a broader aim: to expand territorial control. In light of recent victories by EAOs in northeastern Myanmar and Rakhine, the KNU seems to believe that without military victories and territorial control— especially along the border— resistance groups are unlikely to be seen by neighboring countries as strategically significant. Demonstrating such military muscle, the KNU hopes, may pressure Thailand to engage with resistance forces more seriously—and perhaps, inevitably.
The joint operations by the KNLA and its allied forces raise pressing questions: will these escalate into full-fledged town-capture offensives, as seen in the northeast and Rakhine, or will securing key border outposts suffice to establish a military corridor in the southeast? (See Appendix 5 for more on southeastern EAOs.) It remains to be seen whether Thailand will begin treating these resistance forces as more than just non-state actors and engage with them more seriously. On the ground, these forces face practical constraints—limited access to arms and ammunition, stretched supply lines, and logistical difficulties that will be compounded by the approaching monsoon season. These factors cast doubt on their capacity to sustain operations beyond August or September. This will be critical in evaluating the momentum and impact of current outpost seizures. More importantly, as is often the case with EAOs in the southeast, the success of these campaigns will hinge on how they will leverage a military victory to pursue specific political objectives and strategically bring alliances on board.
Unlike Beijing, Bangkok cannot ignore the political aspirations of the Myanmar people, nor can it impose a coercive solution. Thailand lacks the structural leverage and unilateral influence that allow China to act with such certainty.
If Thailand hopes to succeed in de-escalating Myanmar’s conflict, it may struggle by simply following China’s lead—particularly if that path leads to endorsing the SAC’s planned election. Unlike Beijing, Bangkok cannot ignore the political aspirations of the Myanmar people, nor can it impose a coercive solution. Thailand lacks the structural leverage and unilateral influence that allow China to act with such certainty. The model of “the elephant’s steps create a path”3—where sheer power determines outcomes—does not translate well to Thailand’s context. When underlying conditions diverge, the “Northern Road” is unlikely to extend southward. Instead, Thailand must develop a model of its own—one grounded in respect for the will of the Myanmar people, inclusive engagement, and alignment with international frameworks such as UN Security Council resolutions and ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. By adapting to these guardrails and leveraging its diplomatic strengths into a coherent policy, Thailand has a better chance of helping to shape a resolution that is both legitimate and durable. As the Burmese proverb goes, “the squirrel can tread on the branch; so can the bees build a hive on it.” The same tree and branch can satisfy opposing sides by navigating a path through conflicting demands. What Thailand needs is a strategic model that is both practical and persuasive—one that is, in effect, a Thread-the-Needle act.




Footnotes
- The phrase of this OnPoint’s title “O’… Northern Road…” is taken from the Muse-Namkham Road [song] composed and sung by famous Shan singer Sai Hsai Mao. ↩︎
- ISP-Myanmar plans to publish a trilogy on this topic: Myanmar’s Conflict Resolution that needs guardrails and the future prospects. This OnPoint is the second of the three. ↩︎
- A literal translation of a Burmese proverb, meaning that powerful figures, or sheer power, can forge a new path by their own weight and strength. ↩︎

ISP On Point No.25
Threading the Needle: A Much-Needed Thai Model for Myanmar’s Political Puzzle