Photo – AFP
This On Point No. 2 (2026 Series) was published on April 20, 2026, as an English translation of the original Burmese version released on April 8, 2026.
▪️Events
The Anti-Money Laundering Law (2026) was enacted by the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) on March 11, 2026, before parliament convened. Earlier anti-money-laundering laws had been enacted in 2002 under former junta leader Senior General Than Shwe and in 2014 under President Thein Sein. Those laws have now been repealed and replaced by the new measure. The legislation states that it was drafted in line with recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Compared with its predecessors, the new law is more detailed and broader in scope.
▪️Preliminary Analysis
The new law widens the range of people and powers it covers, potentially speeding up enforcement. It also expands the list of offenses that can trigger action. Its reach extends beyond Myanmar citizens, both at home and abroad, including foreigners residing in the country. It explicitly covers widely used digital currencies, suggesting that online transfers will now come under closer scrutiny. The enforcement machinery has also been strengthened. The law authorizes the creation of a dedicated “Law Enforcement Agency” that operates as an additional state body with powers ranging from investigating money laundering to seizing evidence and prosecuting cases. The budget and resources allocated to support this apparatus have also been increased.
The range of offenses treated as sources of money laundering has been widened. The new additions explicitly target transnational crime and cybercrime, suggesting an effort to crack down on online gambling and Kyar Phyant scam operations. Yet the law also appears aimed at those involved in the resistance. Offenses such as terrorist financing and illegal arms trafficking have been added. And by including corruption, the law extends potential liability beyond civil servants to current political officeholders. That gives the new anti-money-laundering law a dual character. On the surface, it aims to combat online gambling and scams. In practice, it provides an opportunity to impose legal penalties on political activists and opposition, while opening the way for deeper investigations against them.
The implications for ordinary citizens’ private security could also become bigger. Under the current law, money laundering is classified as a cognizable offense, allowing searches and seizures without a court warrant. Additional provisions have been introduced under the “Duties and Powers of the Ministry of Home Affairs”. These give the ministry authority to order access to computer systems, servers, and networks, and to restrict or intercept communications on telephones and social media for up to three months. In effect, these provisions create a backdoor means of curbing the personal freedoms protected under private-security laws. Notably, however, the penalty clauses have been reduced [see ISP Data Matters (ISP-DM2026-028)].
▪️Scenario Forecast
The new Anti-Money Laundering Law could prove an effective legal instrument against internationally scrutinized crimes such as Kyar Phyant scams and drug trafficking. But it also offers a convenient pretext for weakening anti-junta political forces and further intruding into public security. In that sense, the law may deliver several advantages to the ruling authorities. Three notable advantages will be discussed here.
First, the post-election government led by the junta leader may hope to gain a measure of international legitimacy. Myanmar was placed on the FATF blacklist in 2022. While it remains there, the claim that the new law was drafted in line with FATF recommendations suggests this may be a calculated attempt to improve the regime’s standing and, eventually, secure removal from the list.
Second, the law gives the authorities a wider scope to investigate and restrict the property and financial assets of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and resistance forces. If EAOs, that tolerate Kyar Phyant or other illicit operations in their territories, converted and laundered as land and/or movable assets elsewhere, those assets could now be seized under the law. Individuals providing financial support to the National Unity Government (NUG), People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), and other resistance groups may also face greater risks, potentially disrupting fundraising and financial support.
Third, as assessed in The State of Myanmar: ISP-Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025–2026, the law fits into a broader pattern through which Senior General Min Aung Hlaing may be seeking to revive and strengthen his personalist dictatorship. In the three months before parliament convened, the junta leader amended or enacted no fewer than 19 laws. This was one of them. Those measures may become tools of presidential rule once he assumes office. To that end, amendments were also made to the Constitutional Tribunal Law, extending its reach over the legislative branch [see ISP Governance Tracker (GT2026-01)].
The new law further authorizes the Ministry of Home Affairs to approve investigations, intercept communications, and execute arrests and seizures without a court warrant, including in cases with political dimensions involving offenses designated as sources of money laundering. And because it allows current political officeholders, as well as civil servants, to be investigated and prosecuted, there is a strong possibility that it will be used to sharpen the junta leader’s grip on power still further.
