100-Day Plan: Expectations vs. Realities

Photo – AFP

This On Point No. 3 (2026 Series) was published on May 7, 2026, as an English translation of the original Burmese version released on May 5, 2026.

▪️Events

The Min Aung Hlaing administration announced its “100-Day Plan” on April 20, 2026, setting the end of July as the deadline for the plan. The plan comprises two main parts. The first part consists of ministry-specific projects, and the second part pertains to the peace process [see ISP Data Matters (ISP-DM2026-038)].

▪️Preliminary Analysis

The Min Aung Hlaing administration’s “100-Day Plan” can be analyzed from three perspectives.

First, the plan lacks concrete economic policies. There is no solid program designed to rapidly recover the country’s economy, which has been devastated by the coup in 2021 and subsequent policies and events. It lacks economic projects or plans that could remedy and improve the socioeconomic livelihoods of the public. For instance, it does not mention how to stabilize fundamental issues such as rising commodity prices and inflation. It also does not include measures to create a favorable business environment or regulatory relaxations. Instead, it is dominated by the familiar rhetoric such as ‘a focus on agriculture,’ ‘import substitution,’ and ‘public must practice individual frugality and thriftiness.’

Second, the plan has limited coverage. Although the government was formed with 31 ministries, the “100-Day Plan” covers only about five. Furthermore, almost all the processes in the plan are centralized around areas firmly controlled by the Myanmar Armed Forces (Yangon, Mandalay, Naypyitaw) and certain mainland regions. This implies that the plan will be implemented only in areas where elections were held. Regions afflicted by armed conflict and territories under the control of resistance forces are entirely excluded.

Third, the plan attempts to showcase cooperation with China. It prominently features collaboration with China for prevention and treatment of cardiovascular diseases. Plans to expand trade and infrastructure (such as port warehouses and railway sections) also point to this strategic signaling.On the other hand, there are clear indications of plans to increase repression through the legal system. There is no mention of press freedom or freedom of expression. As of today, one-third of printing and publishing businesses 

have been closed down. Offenses under the News Media Law and the Printing and Publishing Enterprise Law remain included in the list of crimes to be tried by military tribunals (in martial law areas). Moreover, political charges that have been weaponized to detain the public since the coup have not yet been repealed. The Anti-Money Laundering Law and the Myanmar Passport Law, both enacted before the convening of parliament, serve as prime examples of tightened restrictions on public security.

▪️Scenario Forecast

The Min Aung Hlaing administration is attempting to project the image of governing in accordance with the 2008 Constitution and of being a legitimately elected government. Consequently, policies like the “100-Day Plan” carry symbolic importance. Examining the sector-specific promises within the plan individually, some are feasible. In fact, some projects are merely ongoing implementations carried over from the State Administration Council (SAC) period. In reality, however, immense challenges persist. Economic pillars are crumbling, and armed conflicts are still ongoing. The administration has also made little headway in reintegrating into the international community. Ultimately, the Min Aung Hlaing administration’s “100-Day Plan” is mediocre. Formulated during a period of severely limited administrative capacity, these policies are vague and lack concrete foundations. Crucially, they omit any strategies for economic recovery. It will be highly improbable for the administration to successfully implement these centrally focused, limited-sector promises comprehensively across the entire country within a three-month timeframe.