Justice Under Martial Law Reloaded

Photo – AFP

This On Point No. 4 (2026 Series) was published on May 11, 2026, as an English translation of the original Burmese version released on May 6, 2026.

▪️Events

Shortly after assuming the presidency, former junta leader Min Aung Hlaing declared a state of emergency in 60 townships and issued a martial law order on April 23, 2026. Prior to this, martial law was implemented in 63 townships. Min Aung Hlaing delegated executive and judicial powers for these 60 townships to his close confidant, the new Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services General Ye Win Oo. In effect, this keeps judicial authority vested in the hands of the Regional Military Commanders [See ISP Mapping (ISP-M2026-017)].

▪️Preliminary Analysis

The townships where martial law has been declared are areas predominantly controlled or contested by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs/LDFs). Because of the martial law order, everything in these townships—from security, social affairs, trade, and transportation to the judiciary—will fall under the jurisdiction of the regime’s Regional Military Commanders. This will impact not only the local resistance forces but also the civilian population. This development is analyzed based on three aspects: (1) which offenses can be tried under martial law, (2) how it differs from the civilian judicial due process, and (3) how it might affect the judiciary in townships not currently under martial law.

The offenses subject to trial under martial law can be broadly categorized into 12 types of political offenses, nine types of criminal offenses, and two types of offenses related to press freedom [See ISP Data Matters (ISP-DM2026-039)]. This list reintroduces many of the legal sections typically weaponized to oppress and prosecute political activists, alongside the most common criminal offenses. Regional Military Commanders will possess the authority to adjudicate these cases either in existing courts or by convening military tribunals. Civilian courts in martial law areas will essentially be restricted to hearing only civil cases.

The judicial process under martial law differs significantly from the civilian system. While civilian courts utilize summary trials only for minor offenses, martial law permits summary trials for any case. Even major offenses carrying the death penalty or life imprisonment are decided swiftly, bypassing the standard stages of calling witnesses and hearing pleadings. The penalties imposed are severe, and the right to appeal is explicitly prohibited. Even the Union Supreme Court, the country’s highest judicial body, lacks the authority to overrule the decisions of these military tribunals.

In practice, there is unlikely to be a significant difference in the judicial reality between townships under martial law and those that are not. Some of the offenses triable by military tribunals in martial law townships are identical to the types of crimes categorized as related offenses under the Anti-Money Laundering Law, which Min Aung Hlaing enacted before convening the parliament. Under that law, for related offenses, the Ministry of Home Affairs can conduct investigations, take action, and make arrests without a court warrant (even though it lacks direct judicial authority). This grants the ministry the power to monitor and investigate everyone, from ordinary citizens to current government employees and political officeholders [See ISP OnPoint No. 2/2026: Myanmar’s New Anti-Money-Laundering Law: Targeting Scammers or Political Opponents?]. Therefore, just as the judiciary is controlled via Regional Military Commanders in martial law areas, it will be controlled via the Ministry of Home Affairs in non-martial law areas.

▪️Scenario Forecast

As the Min Aung Hlaing administration attempts to position itself as a civilian government, there must be a framework of accountability for the past actions and decisions through military tribunals. Similarly, the new Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services, who was delegated this authority, should report to and be accountable to the parliament regarding his actions. Decisions by military tribunals should not be absolute; for severe sentences, there should be an avenue to appeal to the Union Supreme Court. Without these safeguards, the impact on the public’s daily security will be catastrophic. The range of offenses under the jurisdiction of military tribunals is exceptionally broad. They possess the power to impose prison sentences for infractions as minor as failing to register overnight guests. The risk of individuals being subjected to maximum penalties without the right to an adequate defense or appeal is deeply alarming.

Another critical risk is the potential collapse of the country’s independent judicial pillar. Among the three pillars of government—legislative, executive, and judicial—the judiciary is the one institution that could, in theory, check military interference. However, under martial law, the judicial pillar has fallen into the hands of Regional Military Commanders, and even the highest court, the Union Supreme Court, offers no reliable recourse. Of the current nine justices of the Union Supreme Court, five are men, and four are women; critically, four of the male justices are former military officers. Furthermore, the Constitutional Tribunal Law was amended to Min Aung Hlaing’s exact preferences before the parliament was even convened. While it may not yet be practically feasible to appoint military officers to township courts, which interact most closely with ordinary citizens, Min Aung Hlaing is clearly attempting to dominate the judicial pillar through martial law orders and preemptively enacted laws. As projected in State of Myanmar: ISP–Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025–2026, these maneuvers align with conditions allowing him to expand his sphere of power not only across the executive and legislative pillars but also deeply into the judiciary. Ultimately, this trajectory could result in limitless presidential power, effectively breathing life into a consolidated system of personalistic dictatorship.