Photo – AFP
In a small village in Mizoram, a state in India’s Northeast, families are sheltering people who do not feel like strangers at all. Despite living in different countries, they speak a similar language, share the same faith, and call each other kin. As Myanmar continues to be embroiled in the civil war, the line between the borders of the two nations has begun to blur- not through diplomacy, but through displacement and solidarity. For Chin communities fleeing violence in Myanmar, and for Mizo families receiving them in India, India-Myanmar relations are no longer defined solely by New Delhi’s approach, but by long-standing cross-border ties.
This lived reality along the border contrasts with India’s official approach to Myanmar. Since the 2021 military coup, New Delhi has maintained a cautious engagement with the Myanmar junta, guided by its security concerns, strategic and economic stakes, and the need to counter China’s growing influence in the country. Yet on the ground, a different relationship is unfolding, one that is shaped by borderland communities and deeply interdependent local economies.
This is most visible in India’s Mizoram state. Despite directives from India’s central government to restrict cross-border influx and repatriate the Myanmar refugees, the state government has welcomed and sheltered thousands fleeing, especially from the Chin State. This response is rooted in the deep ethnic and cultural affinities between the Mizo people of Mizoram and the Chin communities in Chin state, both of whom identify under the Chin-Kuki-Mizo ethnolinguistic family. Official estimates suggest over 32,000 refugees are currently in Mizoram, though the actual number may be higher. Local organizations and church groups have been central in providing food, shelter, and basic healthcare despite limited resources. In towns like Zokhawthar in Mizoram, just across from Myanmar’s Rikhawdar, the movement of people has remained steady since violence intensified in Chin state following Operation 1027 and the subsequent airstrikes by the junta. Many displaced families fleeing the atrocities under the military junta have settled in border districts such as Lawngtlai and Zokhawthar. For Mizoram, extending asylum and aid is not seen merely as humanitarian assistance, but as a responsibility toward an extended community bound by history and identity.
Since the 2021 military coup, New Delhi has maintained a cautious engagement with the Myanmar junta, guided by its security concerns, strategic and economic stakes, and the need to counter China’s growing influence in the country. Yet on the ground, a different relationship is unfolding, one that is shaped by borderland communities and deeply interdependent local economies.
Moreover, this response also carries subtle political significance. While the Mizoram government has selectively complied with central government directives, such as initiating the biometric registration of refugees following instructions from the Ministry of Home Affairs, it has simultaneously demonstrated a willingness to resist policies that conflict with local priorities. Chief Minister Lalduhoma, for instance, has openly opposed the central government’s proposal to fence the Indo-Myanmar border, citing that it will disrupt the cross-border ties. This reflects how ethnic identity and shared historical bonds can shape cross-border relations in ways that formal diplomacy cannot easily replicate. As a result, India’s Myanmar policy – at least in this region – is being interpreted and, at times, quietly reshaped by state government and local actors.
Beyond cultural ties, particularly in states like Mizoram and Manipur, local economies are deeply interconnected and have long relied on access to goods through designated trading points. For decades, small traders, transporters, and households have made frequent trips across these trading points, building livelihoods around a steady flow of informal and semi-formal trade. This interdependence is deeply embedded in day-to-day life in these states. In Manipur, I recall how families, including my own, would often travel to Moreh-Namphalong trading point to purchase essential goods, especially during major events such as weddings. Markets on the Indian side are filled with Burmese teak, handcrafted furniture, plastic products, electronics, and ready-made garments, valued for both affordability and familiarity. At the same time, everyday consumables – from Shwe Nan Taw rice cakes, Sunday Instant Coffee, Mikko, to processed mackerel tins, dried fish, and Joker biscuits – have become staples in these states rather than imports. Even now, states in India’s Northeast have designated market areas for Burmese snacks and products. Therefore, any disruption along the border, whether due to conflict, tighter regulations, or security concerns, has immediate consequences, not just for trade but for daily life. For local populations, these are not abstract geopolitical shifts, but tangible economic challenges.
This evolving dynamic between official policy and ground realities presents a complex landscape for India. While New Delhi continues its engagement with the Tatmadaw, it is also increasingly attentive to developments along its border. These overlapping layers of engagement reflect India’s broader challenge of navigating a fluid and evolving situation. What emerges from the India-Myanmar border is not only a story of crisis but also one that shows how relationships can evolve beyond conventional frameworks of diplomacy. In this context, the borderlands offer valuable insights into how regional ties are sustained during periods of uncertainty.For India, this underscores the need to complement its broader strategic approach with sustained sensitivity to local realities. Recognizing the role of border communities and the changing dynamics on the ground can help ensure that its engagement remains responsive and forward-looking, particularly as Myanmar’s political situation evolves. The extent to which these connections are recognized and integrated into future policy frameworks will be critical in shaping bilateral relations, particularly since the bordering states in Myanmar are now under the control of local ethnic armed groups.
Ophelia Yumlembam is a Research Associate at Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA) - a New Delhi-based think tank, focusing on Chinese politics and geopolitics.
[The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of ISP-Myanmar. Readers wishing to share reflections or offer counterarguments are welcome to write and submit a rebuttal article.]