(This is an AI translation of the original Burmese ISP Column article authored by Htet Shein Lynn published on February 21, 2025.)
Since the coup, several Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) have chosen to sit on the sidelines, observing the junta rather than engaging it in direct combat. Some have labeled these groups “free riders.” Among them, there are groups like the United Wa State Army (UWSA) gaining territory and strength without firing a shot, while others, like the New Mon State Party and the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), saw their unity fracture and power wane due to their inaction.
Amid this landscape, the Kayan New Land Party emerges as a unique player. It, too, fits the “free rider” mold, refraining from direct confrontation with the junta. (One possible explanation is its proximity to Naypyitaw, the junta’s capital, raising fears of harsh suppression if it were to act. Historically, since the National Convention, the party has been excluded from both the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and the 21st Century Panglong Conference.) Yet, remarkably, it has neither lost strength nor splintered, maintaining a steady presence.
Analysis reveals three key points: (1) Party leaders adeptly adjust their military stance to suit the shifting situation; (2) They amplify a Kayan ethnic narrative to carve out political relevance; and (3) While avoiding direct combat under their own banner, they oversee and channel the revolutionary zeal of young fighters through proxies, offering them an outlet. In early May 2021, when clashes erupted in Demoso, Loikaw, and Moebye against the junta, the Kayan New Land Party joined forces with other Karenni groups. But months later, as the junta’s counteroffensives intensified, they withdrew from the fray—along with the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF)—citing the planting season as a pretext for a ceasefire. Meanwhile, the Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF) seized control of areas stretching from Moebye and Hpruso to the edges of Loikaw Township. These military successes ignited a surge of enthusiasm among Kayan youth. During the Spring Revolution, many Kayan individuals flocked to the newly formed KNDF, and even a majority of Kayan New Land Party fighters shed their insignia, donned civilian clothes, and fought alongside Karenni forces. Though the party leadership stepped back from military engagement, the grassroots fighters’ fervor ensured that revolutionary armed groups buzzed like bees within the party-controlled territory, unchecked by restrictions.
At the time, some Kayan New Land Party commanders remarked, “(We don’t fight under our name, but) we fully support the revolution from behind.” This “behind-the-scenes support” reflects a survival strategy: retreating when needed, yet poised to leap forward if the tide turns. Consequently, when the junta re-entered Moebye, Nanmeikhon, and Dawngankha, the party shifted its stance once more. Without consulting KNDF Chairman Khun Bedu, it ousted him from his role as Kayan National Party chair. Citing fears of junta airstrikes, it barred PDF and KNDF fighters from entering its controlled town of Hseebu and relocated those already present—a clear example of its adaptable military positioning.
Later, when KNPLF forces recaptured Mese from the junta, and the Karenni Interim Executive Council (IEC) gained international recognition—despite failing to take Loikaw in the 1111 Operation but securing a vital road from Demoso to the Thai border at Mese—these achievements bolstered the Karenni coalition’s military and political cohesion. This elevated the IEC’s Karenni identity narrative to the forefront. In essence, “Karenni” refers to a geographic entity encompassing diverse ethnic groups like the Kaya, Kayaw, and Kayan within its boundaries—an identity the IEC seeks to unify. The Kayan New Land Party, however, rejects this, pushing its own narrative: the establishment of a Kayan State for the older Kayan ethnic group, rallying its people under this banner.
Yet, to date, the party has neither waged war nor engaged in political talks with the junta. This suggests a stronger intent to counter the rising geography-based Karenni narrative with an ethnicity-based Kayan State vision—a move to shore up its waning influence among Kayan youth, who criticize its refusal to fight.
Following the 1027 Operation in northern Shan State, the junta’s humiliating defeats further energized the public. As the junta faltered, ethnic armed groups aligned with three conditions faced internal splits: (1) Other forces fighting the junta grew stronger near their territories; (2) Groups eager to resist established new units under ethnic banners within their areas; and (3) The mainstream political trajectory shifted. This dynamic saw the PNLO and New Mon State Party weaken as ethnic-based forces coalesced or broke apart. To avoid this fate, the Kayan New Land Party, true to form, adjusted its stance again. It organized People’s Defense Forces in areas it deems part of a Kayan State—Moebye, Hpruso, and western Demoso—into the Kayan National Army (KNA), providing backing. By forming a force under a Kayan ethnic identity, it positioned these territories as proposed Kayan territories, quelling youth criticism. Now, when asked if it fights the junta, it can say, “Yes, through the KNA,” or “No, we’re not fighting,” depending on the context.
This strategy is aided by the IEC leadership’s stance, which still views differences with the Kayan New Land Party as partnership disputes rather than irreconcilable conflicts. In sum, the party employs three tactics to balance its declining influence from military inaction against the strengthening Karenni narrative: a flexible military posture, an ethnic-based statehood narrative, and the creation of a supervised ethnic force for eager fighters. Through these, it seeks to reclaim the political relevance lost since the National Convention.
However, sustaining this indefinitely will be challenging. If neither the junta nor Karenni forces achieve a decisive victory, the Kayan region could become a negotiation table like Mong La in northern Shan—a temporary truce for talks. If the junta regains military dominance, the party may face a stark choice of allegiance. Should Karenni forces prevail, the competing Karenni and Kayan narratives in shared territories will require mutual bargaining to find common ground. How much political bargaining power the party holds—and where it will find it—remains a question its leaders must anticipate.
Htet Shein Lynn is a program associate at the Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar).
The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of ISP-Myanmar.
