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Myanmar's Key Stakeholders and their Perceptions of
SINO-MYANMAR RELATIONS
A SURVEY
2022





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Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar



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About ISP-Myanmar

Established in 2016, the Institute for Strategy and Policy (ISP) - Myanmar is an independent, non-partisan, and non-governmental think tank. ISP-Myanmar promotes democratic leadership and public participation in public affairs as a mean to encourage a resilient and tolerant society. Its goals are the advancement of democracy, the building of a federal union, and the strengthening of civil society in Myanmar.

The institute's three core activities are policy-oriented research program, capacity-building and leadership engagement program, and communications and outreach program. ISP-Myanmar also runs two initiatives: the China Desk, which focuses on the political economy of Sino-Myanmar relations and the Peace Desk, which covers security concerns for Myanmar. ISP-Myanmar recently launched its Bridge Education Program to fill the gap in learning opportunities caused by the 2021 military coup. For more information about ISP-Myanmar, visit our website at www.ispmyanmar.com.



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Myanmar's Key Stakeholders and their Perceptions of Sino-Myanmar Relations – A Survey (2022)

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Myanmar's Key Stakeholders and their Perceptions of Sino-Myanmar Relations – A Survey

One year after the 2021 military coup, ISP-Myanmar initiated a research survey of **Myanmar's Key Stakeholders and their Perceptions of Sino-Myanmar relations** with technical support from the People's Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE). The initiative aims to collect specific knowledge of key individuals from the Myanmar policy communities to identify similarities and differences in their views about the key factors shaping Sino-Myanmar relations. In particular, the study aims to comprehend the different interpretations of 1) the roles played by China in Myanmar's political arena after the military coup, 2) the long-running deadlock in the peace process in which China remains involved, 3) the impacts of China's investment and trade, 4) China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) projects, and 5) humanitarian aid provided by China during Covid pandemic.

In addition, it also sets out to understand how various stakeholders in Myanmar perceive China's efforts to develop its soft power and the prevalence of China produced technology (mobile phones, applications, and security threat of the electronic devices) in Myanmar.

The key stakeholders include civil society organizations, members of political parties, the business sector, scholars, activists, leaders of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and others well versed in China's political, economic and international affairs. ISP-Myanmar's findings aim to contribute to the policy-making and program implementation of organizations involved in Sino-Myanmar relations.



Data Collection Methods

In this research survey, ISP-Myanmar employed a quantitative research methodology implemented in three steps. The first step of pre-survey preparation involved constructing of a sampling frame, identifying potential participants, and collecting information about selected participants, formulating research questions, and training interviewers. The second step involved conducting survey interviews with voluntary participants from different policy communities. The third step involved data compilation, data entry, data analysis process, and writing.

For the pre-survey preparation and construction of the sampling frame, ISP-Myanmar and PACE worked together to formulate the survey's objectives and its framework, to select methods for analysis, as well as to prepare survey questions. Then, the team selected a sampling frame for the sample population of survey participants and developed a schemata for classifying them according to their backgrounds. This stage involved in-person and online consultations (at least 20 online) with experts and leaders from civil society organizations, political parties and the business sector to discuss the selection of potential survey participants. These meetings included more than 30 individuals from different sectors.

Awareness of Sino- Myanmar relations was the main criteria for selecting survey participants. For this reason, it was impossible to randomly sample the survey population, which is a common method for surveys. Therefore, ISP-Myanmar applied a purposive sampling method to categorize survey participants, and the sampling was based on one's capacity to influence policies related to Sino-Myanmar relations. Using this selection framework, 340 participants were initially selected to take the survey. However, due to the political situation in Myanmar, not all of these individuals could participate. Prospective interviewees were selected again according to the same standards. Out of total of 501 individuals who were approached for the survey, **215** completed the survey.

The table presents four communities involved in Sino-Myanmar relations. They are (1) Civil Society Organizations, (2) Political Parties, (3) Business Associations/Organizations and (4) Prominent Individuals, Scholars, Professionals, and Leaders of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), as well as influential people from social and religious organizations. To select the survey participants, the survey team considered the recommendations made by the key experts after consulting with them at least 20 times with 30 individ-

■ **Background of stakeholders approached from four key communities (selected according to ISP-Myanmar research standards)**

Communities	Population	Percentage
Civil Society Organizations	212	42%
Political Parties	47	9%
Business Associations/Organizations	125	25%
Prominent Individuals from different sectors and EAOs*	117	23%
Total	501	100%

* Prominent Individuals include civil society organizations, members of political parties, the business sector, scholars, activists and others well versed in China's political, economic and international affairs and leaders of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).

uals from different sectors. These key experts made their recommendations based on the individual's professional background, level of expertise in Sino-Myanmar relations, and level of engagement with China and their influence on Sino-Myanmar policy issues.

The survey team selected members from 47 political parties that won seats in national and local legislatures (*Hluttaw*) in 2015 and 2020 and that are located in Kachin State, Shan State, Mandalay Region, Magway Region and Rakhine State. The latter are from areas where the Chinese-government-financed China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) project will take place.



The team also selected 212 individuals from civil society organizations that are 1) working on research projects related to Sino-Myanmar relations; 2) monitoring Chinese-financed projects and their impacts on environmental and land issues; and 3) supporting the rights of local communities.

The research team also approached a total of 125 business associations/organizations directly involved in the CMEC (especially those involved in investment and trade projects). This selection was based on data received from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI).

Moreover, the survey team selected 117 individuals working on research related to Sino-Myanmar relations, well-known scholars and professionals

influencing policy issues, activists, leaders of EAOs and influential persons from social and religious groups.

To carefully analyze the role of China in different sectors of Myanmar, survey participants were selected from areas with the following features, areas where CMEC projects are slated to take place, areas with strong economic ties to China, and areas where projects strategic to China already exist. Therefore, the number of participants from each area are not evenly distributed.



■ Population and Proportion of Survey Respondents from Four Communities

Communities	Population	Percentage
Civil Society Organizations	101	47%
Political Parties	17	7.9%
Business Associations/Organizations	40	18.6%
Prominent Individuals from different sectors and EAOs	57	26.5%
Total	215	100%

In the survey, the selection of participants was aimed to ensure gender parity. However, an equal gender balance amongst survey participants was not possible due to the following conditions: the majority of the community leaders selected based on the China expertise criteria are men, and surveyors were not able to reach many women leaders because of the need to take precautions following the military coup. Despite these unfavorable conditions, among the 501 contacts, 215 people participated in the survey – 166 men (77.2 percent) and 49 women (22.8 percent).

The preparations to mitigate against potential biases in interviews, any risks posed by post-coup security situation, and the COVID-19 pandemic included the following: 1) The development of a manual for survey enumerators and their supervisors to follow and 2) 9 out of 11 enumerators received in-person training before their deployment for the survey.

During the second stage, individual interviews were conducted from 17 February 2022 to 12 March 2022. ISP-Myanmar interviewed 215 individuals out of 501 individuals, who were initially selected from four communities.

Among them, 47 percent are from CSOs, 26.5 percent are prominent individuals such as scholars, professionals, activists, respected individuals from social and religious groups, and leaders of EAOs. 20 percent are from Business Associations/Organizations and 7.4 percent are from political parties.

Although ISP-Myanmar's team initially decided to conduct interviews in person, (but given concerns posed) by Covid-19 and instability relating to the coup, the survey team decided that online interviews, using Zoom, were appropriate. Those unable to attend an interview via Zoom were asked to

fill out a form. Of 215 survey respondents, 187 were interviewed via Zoom, and 28 respondents answered by a form.

In the third stage of data collection, from 13-25 March 2022, the data from respondents was first recorded on the response sheets, then later stored as digital records in a database. Later data assistants from ISP-Myanmar and PACE independently checked and verified the data twice. The responses of each interviewee were codified and reviewed using specialized software. If an error was detected, a full review of the original documents was conducted and corrected if necessary. ■





Research Process and Ethics

The team faced a challenging situation with threats posed by the military coup, compounded by frequent internet and telecommunications shutdowns, and electricity outages. Meanwhile, the Omicron variant of COVID-19 posed further challenges. Moreover, activists from the political and policy communities faced security concerns including the risk of arrest for exercising their right to expression. Therefore, the survey team strictly followed security protocols and health-related measures while implementing this survey in line with ethical guidelines developed by ISP-Myanmar and PACE for researchers.

In doing so, an ethics board of ISP-Myanmar members reviewed the methods with attention to possible risks and developed measures to ensure good research practices, depending on the requirements. Crucially, they managed to minimize the possible negative impacts by considering potential security risks for survey participants in advance, including the possible leakage of personal information about participants and the impact of conflicts of interest on research findings. The survey was conducted in such a way as to minimize the risk of any further spread of the Omicron variant of COVID-19, as well as to safeguard the physical and mental health of survey participants.


ISP-Myanmar provided all participants with a guarantee that their personal information, such as their names, would not be published, so that they could express their opinions freely when answering survey questions. Potential survey participants were informed of these precautions when invited to take part. Even before the survey was conducted, enumerators, supervisors, and trainers were tested for COVID-19 with Rapid Antigen Tests and provided the required equipment to prevent infection.

Several measures were developed by recording whether people directly involved in the survey or their family members were infected with COVID one week before the training, as well as daily temperature checks for each enumerator, trainer, and supervisor during the training and survey period. Throughout the survey period and data entry processes, various safety measures, such as the provision of separate rooms for each interview, as well as the rules and regulations regarding the risk of COVID-19 infections were issued.



Significant Survey Findings


1 Perceptions of China as not a good neighbor



55%

The majority (55 percent) of the survey participants expressed a negative view of China as a neighbor, while a significant proportion (40 percent) viewed China as a good neighbor.


2 Economic dominance is a major challenge



39%

Survey results show the respondents view the major challenges posed by China to Myanmar are economic dominance (39 percent) followed by its geopolitical influence (31 percent). China's interference in internal armed conflict ranked third (19 percent).


3 Interest in gaining geopolitical influence over the Indian Ocean



46%

46 percent of the survey participants indicated that China's interests in Myanmar is aimed at gaining geopolitical influence over the Indian Ocean.


4 Assume China wants Myanmar to be an authoritarian state



55%

When presented with question of China's interest in Myanmar, over half the participants (55 percent) indicated that 'China wants Myanmar to be an authoritarian state.' 22 percent of the respondents refused to answer the question. Whereas 15 percent selected that 'China wants to see Myanmar as a democratic state.'

5 Perceptions of China's status as Myanmar's largest economic partner




58%

When asked about China's status as Myanmar's largest trading partner, more than half (58 percent) of respondents indicated a concern, whereas 26 percent responded that it was welcomed.



6 Do not know when China and Myanmar economic relations will be better




24%



Regarding prospects for the improvement in China-Myanmar economic relations, 20 percent of the survey participants indicated that economic relations with China will improve only after 2025, while 24 percent of the participants felt that they have no idea.

7 The economic corridor would bring more benefits to China



83%

The survey participants answered that the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor will bring more benefits to China than to Myanmar; while only 12 percent saw that the project could bring mutual benefits to both countries.




8 China-Myanmar Economic Corridor project would not be conducive to Myanmar's peace



59%

A majority of respondents (59 percent) answered that the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor project would not be conducive to Myanmar's peace process; while 30 percent of them saw some positive impacts.

9 Shows little trust on China's COVID vaccine




40%

The survey indicated that majority of the respondents held ambivalent view on China's COVID vaccines. While 26 percent of the respondents answered that they had confidence in China's COVID vaccines, 30 percent of them answered that they did not. 40 percent of participants responded with 'neutral.'



10 China economic development: Not a model to emulate




47%

Respondents also held divided view on whether China's model of economic development is suitable for Myanmar. 47 percent of survey respondents felt that China's economic development is not a good model for Myanmar to follow, while 45 percent answered that is a good model.



11 Democracy with Chinese characteristics: Not a model to emulate



87%

The respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that democracy with Chinese characteristics is appropriate for Myanmar to follow.




Findings



General Perceptions of China

- Question 1
Is China a good neighbor for Myanmar or not?



Among the survey participants, a majority indicated a negative view of China. In response to the question of 'Is China a good neighbor for Myanmar or not?', **42 percent** indicated that China was 'no good' and **13 percent** responded that it was 'no good at all.' At the same time, **40 percent** expressed a positive view of China with **38 percent** answering 'good' and two percent replying 'very good.'

For survey question No. 1, the participants were asked about whether China is a good neighbor for Myanmar or not? and given a set of responses based on a four-point scale. (1. No good at all, 2. No good, 3. Good and 4. Very good.)


Comparison of the results

When comparing sentiments on China as a neighbor expressed by different policy communities, negative attitudes were strongest among civil society organizations, as 70 percent indicated either 'no good at all' or 'no good.' Among prominent individuals and members of EAOs, 53 percent responded either 'no good at all' or 'no good.' As for political parties and the business community, their views on China were more positive, as **59 percent of political parties**, indicated 'good' and **68 percent of the business community** answered either 'very good' or 'good.'

■ **Question 1**
 Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'Is China a good neighbor for Myanmar or not?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No good at all	13%	20%	0%	8%	11%
No good	42%	50%	35%	23%	42%
Good	38%	25%	59%	60%	39%
Very good	2%	1%	0%	8%	0%
Do not know	2%	1%	0%	0%	5%
Refused to answer	3%	3%	6%	3%	4%

● Question 2
Challenges that Myanmar faces in its relations with China




Note: For this question, respondents were offered a list of answers that included 'no challenges' and 'Chinese influence in culture and demography,' but no one selected it.

Survey participants were asked to select from a list of challenges posed by China to Myanmar related to economic and geopolitical issues. **39 percent** selected **China's economic domination** as the biggest challenge; **31 percent** pointed to its **geopolitical influence**. **19 percent** of respondents selected **China's involvement in Myanmar's armed conflict**. Only four percent chose China's domination in Myanmar's security sector as the main challenge. No one selected **Chinese influence in culture and demography** as a challenge.

For survey question No. 2, the participants were asked to select an option from a list of challenges that Myanmar faces in its relations with China.

● Question 3

The main benefit Myanmar gains from its relations with China



Regarding the main benefits gained by Myanmar from its relations with China, **37 percent** of the respondents replied **market access**, while **33 percent** felt it was **foreign direct investment**. Only **nine percent** selected **infrastructure development**. **11 percent** answered that Myanmar gained 'no benefit at all' as a result of its relations with China. Only **four percent** of respondents indicated **development aid** from China was a benefit.

Comparison of the results

One significant finding is that majority of respondents from Myanmar's policy communities view **market access** as the main benefit gained by its engagements with China. **47 percent** of political parties and **40 percent** of both civil society organizations and business associations share this view. Since there is little difference between these numbers, it is clear that the perceptions among respondents from these three policy communities are effectively similar. However, **37 percent** of prominent individuals and EAOs leaders chose **foreign direct investment**. Overall, only **one percent** and **four percent** of respondents selected **technology transfer** and **development aid**, respectively. This suggests that there was not much difference in the responses of the four communities surveyed.

■ Question 3


Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'The main opportunity Myanmar gains from its relations with China'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No benefit at all	11%	15%	0%	8%	11%
Market access	37%	40%	47%	40%	26%
Foreign direct investment	33%	32%	18%	38%	37%
Technological transfer	1%	0%	6%	3%	0%
Development aid	4%	4%	0%	3%	5%
Infrastructure development	9%	7%	12%	8%	12%
Other	1%	2%	0%	0%	2%
Do not know	3%	1%	12%	3%	5%
Refused to answer	1%	0%	6%	0%	2%


• Questions 4-13
How much does Myanmar depend on China?

■ No dependency ■ Dependent ■ Neutral ■ Do not know ■ Refused to answer


Q4 in trade




Q5 in investment



Q6 in the peace process



Q7 in development




For survey questions from No. 4 to 13, the participants were asked to select from a list of options about their views on several issues related to Myanmar's dependence on China. The options are on a five-point scale (1, 'No dependency,' 5, 'Totally dependent.')


● Questions 4-13
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■ No dependency ■ Dependent ■ Neutral ■ Do not know ■ Refuse to answer


Q8 in politics




Q9 in education




Q10 in health



Q11 in technology





In terms of **trade**, **67 percent**, the largest proportion of the respondents, ranked Myanmar as dependent on China; only six percent perceived that Myanmar does not depend on China. Regarding **investment** sector, **47 percent** perceived Myanmar as dependent on China; 12 percent answered that Myanmar is not. Regarding **Myanmar’s peace process**, **52 percent** perceived Myanmar as dependent on China; 12 percent held the opposite opinion. In terms of **development**, 36 percent answered that Myanmar does not depend on China - only 23 percent viewed that Myanmar as dependent on China for development; the majority (40 percent) remained neutral.

In the case of **politics**, **51 percent** of the respondents perceived Myanmar as dependent on China. **24 percent** of the respondents were **neutral**, which is more than those who answered 'Myanmar does not depend on China' (20 percent). In the **education** sector, the majority (**82 percent**) felt that Myanmar does not depend on China, and only two percent answered that Myanmar was dependent on China.

As for **healthcare** sector, **62 percent** of respondents felt that Myanmar **does not depend** on China, while 14 percent of respondents viewed Myanmar as dependent on China. 23 percent of respondents answered 'neutral' to this question. As for **technology**, those who viewed Myanmar as **not dependent** on China and those who answered no position totaled **36 percent**; 25 percent perceived Myanmar as dependent on China. In the **security** sector, **38 percent** viewed Myanmar as dependent on China, whereas 28 percent answered that there was no dependency. As for **diplomacy**, **54 percent** noted that Myanmar was dependent on China, while only 11 percent who answered that Myanmar was not dependent on China for diplomatic support.

Question 4

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'How much does Myanmar depend on China for trade?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No dependency	6%	7%	6%	5%	4%
Neutral	27%	31%	18%	18%	33%
Dependent	67%	62%	76%	77%	63%
Do not know	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Refused to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question 5

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'How much does Myanmar depend on China for investment?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No dependency	12%	15%	6%	13%	7%
Neutral	40%	40%	53%	43%	35%
Dependent	47%	45%	41%	43%	56%
Do not know	1%	0%	0%	1%	2%
Refused to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question 6

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'How much does Myanmar depend on China for the peace process?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No dependency	12%	10%	24%	13%	13%
Neutral	33%	32%	41%	25%	40%
Dependent	52%	57%	35%	50%	47%
Do not know	2%	1%	0%	5%	0%
Refused to answer	1%	0%	0%	7%	0%

Question 7

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'How much does Myanmar depend on China for development?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No dependency	36%	48%	35%	18%	26%
Neutral	40%	33%	35%	43%	51%
Dependent	23%	19%	24%	39%	18%
Do not know	1%	0%	6%	0%	4%
Refused to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%

Question 8

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'How much does Myanmar depend on China in politics?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No dependency	20%	19%	53%	15%	14%
Neutral	24%	25%	24%	18%	26%
Dependent	51%	54%	12%	53%	56%
Do not know	3%	2%	11%	7%	0%
Refused to answer	2%	0%	0%	7%	4%

Question 12

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'How much does Myanmar depend on China in security sector?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No dependency	28%	38%	47%	23%	11%
Neutral	27%	24%	24%	23%	37%
Dependent	38%	36%	29%	38%	46%
Do not know	3%	2%	0%	4%	3%
Refused to answer	4%	0%	0%	12%	3%

Comparison of the results


In analyzing the views of Myanmar's dependence on China from each community, there was no difference when it came to **investment**; **47 percent** felt that Myanmar is dependent on China, while **40 percent** remained **neutral**.

Regarding the **peace process**, although the number of respondents who viewed that Myanmar is dependent on China was the largest, when looking at each community, 40 percent of the respondents from prominent individuals and EAOs leaders and **41 percent** of the respondents from **political parties** were 'neutral.'

Among the communities, **53 percent** of respondents from **political parties** indicated that Myanmar **does not depend** on China when it comes to politics. 46 percent of the prominent individuals from different sectors and EAOs members, the largest proportion, answered that Myanmar is dependent on China for its security sector. 38 percent of respondents from civil society groups and 47 percent of respondents from political parties expressed the opinion that Myanmar does not depend on China in the security sector.

Among the communities expressing the view that Myanmar is dependent on China for **trade**, the highest were the **business community (77 percent)** and **political parties (76 percent)**. With regard to the question of Myanmar's dependence on China for development, civil society groups scored the highest with 48 percent, while **35 percent** of respondents from **political parties** indicated that Myanmar **does not depend** on China. Another **35 percent** from political parties took a **neutral** position.

● Question 14
China’s interests in its relations with Myanmar



Note : In the lists of answers, 'no interest at all' and 'making an alliance in ASEAN,' were options, but none of the respondents chose either of them.

Regarding the question of what interest does China pursues in Myanmar, the majority (46 percent) of respondents selected 'to gain geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean.' Gaining natural resources from Myanmar ranked second (28 percent), the gaining sea access for Yunnan Province (16 percent), and then China wants to expand the market for its products (four percent). Among the listed responses was 'no interest at all' and 'making an alliance in ASEAN,' but none of the respondents selected either of these. All respondents answered this question.

For survey question No. 14, the participants were given a list of responses to China’s interests in its relations with Myanmar and asked to choose the main interest.

Comparison of the results

In analyzing the perceptions of each community for Question No. 14, civil society organizations and prominent individuals from different sectors and EAOs leaders exhibited the strongest support – both at 49 percent - for **gaining geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean as China's main interest**. Whereas, 41 percent of respondents from political parties and 35 percent of business associations also shared this view.

Similarly, the communities of civil society organizations, political parties, prominent individuals group, and EAOs leaders indicated the view that **China's engagement reflects an interest in Myanmar's natural resources**, the second largest. 33 percent of the respondents from the business community answered **sea access for Yunnan province**.

■ Question 14 Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'China's pursuing interests in its relations with Myanmar'


	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No interest at all	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Access to Indian Ocean for Yunnan province	16%	10%	12%	33%	16%
Geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean	46%	49%	41%	35%	49%
To access natural resources from Myanmar	28%	32%	29%	25%	23%
Making an alliance in ASEAN	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Extension of market for Chinese products	4%	5%	6%	3%	2%
Other	1%	1%	0%	3%	2%
Do not know	5%	4%	12%	3%	7%
Refused to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%



The Role of China in Myanmar's Political Crisis

● Question 15

To what extent does Chinese involvement bring a positive influence in resolving Myanmar's political crisis?



Among the respondents, **54 percent** perceived China's role in Myanmar's political crisis as **no positive** (a combination of 'no positive at all' and 'no positive'), and **40 percent** perceived it as positive influence (a combination of 'very positive' and 'positive'). Many respondents (**39 percent**) indicated that China's role in solving Myanmar's political crisis following the coup, is **negative**. Among respondents, 37 percent expressed that China's involvement is positive; while 15 percent answered that it is 'no positive at all.' Four percent indicated that they would rather not answer this question, while two percent answered that they do not know. Only three percent answered that China's role in this matter is 'very positive.'

For survey question No. 15, respondents were asked to what extent does Chinese involvement bring a positive influence on resolving Myanmar's political crisis. Respondents were asked to rank their views on a four-point scale. With 1 signifying 'No positive at all,' 4 indicating 'Very positively influence.'

Comparison of the results


Comparisons by policy communities showed that civil society organizations tend to view China's role in Myanmar's political crisis as 'no positive' with more than **73 percent** (a combination of 'no positive at all' and 'no positive'). Respondents from the **political parties**, with **88 percent** of positive responses (combination of 'very positive' and 'somewhat positive') were more optimistic about China's role in political crisis.

■ **Question 15**

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'To what extent does Chinese involvement bring a positive influence in resolving Myanmar's political crisis?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No positive at all	15%	24%	0%	13%	7%
No positive	39%	50%	12%	23%	40%
Positively influence	37%	25%	82%	43%	42%
Very positively influence	3%	1%	6%	10%	0%
Do not know	2%	0%	0%	3%	5%
Refused to answer	4%	1%	0%	10%	5%

- Question 16
 To what extent is China's intervention effective in solving Myanmar's political crisis?



In regards to Question 16, 59 percent of respondents presumed that China's intervention plays an effective role in solving Myanmar's political crisis (a combination of 'effective' and 'very effective'). The majority, 46 percent, felt that China's intervention plays an effective role in solving Myanmar's political crisis, while 29 percent of respondents felt it was not effective. 13 percent of respondents answered that it is very effective, and eight percent felt that it is not effective at all.

For survey question No. 16, participants were asked to select from a list of responses to what extent is China's intervention effective in solving Myanmar's political crisis on a four-point scale, (1 for 'Not effective at all' to 4 for 'Very effective.')

Comparison of the results

When comparing policy communities, no significant differences are found in their views about the effectiveness of China's interventions in Myanmar. More than 82 percent of the participants from **political parties** responded that **China's intervention is effective** (a combination of 'effective' and 'very effective'), which was the highest. Among those who responded it is **not effective**, **civil society organizations** were the largest at **46 percent** (a combination of 'not effective at all' and 'not effective').


■ Question 16

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'To what extent is China's intervention effective in solving Myanmar's political crisis?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Not effective at all	8%	10%	6%	8%	5%
Not effective	29%	37%	12%	15%	30%
Effective	46%	35%	71%	48%	56%
Very effective	13%	17%	12%	18%	4%
Do not know	1%	1%	0%	3%	2%
Refused to answer	3%	0%	0%	10%	4%

● Questions 17-20


Relations between key actors in Myanmar and China in post-coup setting



The large proportion of respondents indicated that Chinese government maintains good relations with both the State Administration Council (SAC) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) based in northern Shan State after the coup. However, many view that China appeared hesitant with regard to engagement with the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the National Unity Government (NUG). The majority of respondents (**47 percent**) viewed that **China's relations with the SAC is 'good,'** 37 percent were neutral, and roughly ten percent answered 'no good.' Nearly **55 percent** felt that **China's relations with the NLD is not good,** while nine percent indicated the opposite. On the other hand, almost **53 percent** of respondents felt that **relations between China and northern Shan State EAOs were good,** 10 percent viewed their relations as 'no good,' and 29 percent viewed neutral. The majority of respondents (**65 percent**) viewed that **China's relations with the NUG is not good.** Over five percent expressed a view that China-NUG relations are 'good,' roughly 18 percent responded 'neutral' and seven percent said they did not know.

For survey questions No. 17 to 20, respondents were asked about relations between key Myanmar and China actors in post-coup setting and given a four-point scale to rank them. (1 'No good at all' and 4 'Very good')

● Question 21
What type of regime does China want for Myanmar?



Individuals from Myanmar's policy communities generally held the view that China wants Myanmar to become an authoritarian state, as opposed to a democratic one. Those who responded that **China would prefer Myanmar to be an authoritarian state** made up **55 percent** of respondents. 15 percent answered that China wants Myanmar to be a democratic state, while 22 percent refused to answer the question and eight percent answered that they did not know.

For survey question No. 21, the participants were asked to pick from among responses to questions about 'China's attitudes towards Myanmar.' The respondents were asked to select which response best matched their opinion.

Comparison of the results


Although more than half of respondents (55 percent) answered that China wants to see Myanmar remains under an authoritarian regime, **22 percent** refused to answer the question. Among policy communities, **75 percent** of the members of civil society organizations answered that China wants to see Myanmar under an authoritarian regime. Almost **43 percent** of respondents from business organizations also shared this view. Among the communities who refused to answer the question, the highest percentage was from political parties (**41 percent**). The community with the second largest rate of refusal to respond was the one made up of prominent individuals and EAOs leaders (**30 percent**). **16 percent** of participants from civil society organizations and **18 percent** of those from the business sectors also refused to answer.

■ Question 21

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'What type of regime does China want for Myanmar?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Myanmar to be a democratic state	15%	6%	24%	28%	21%
Myanmar under an authoritarian regime	55%	75%	29%	43%	35%
Do not know	8%	3%	6%	12%	14%
Refused to answer	22%	16%	41%	17%	30%

● Question 22
How China should involve in Myanmar's political crisis?



Among policy communities, the most popular view for China's approach to resolving Myanmar's crisis was **cooperation with the United Nations Special Envoy (32 percent)**. The second most popular answer was cooperation with the ASEAN Special Envoy (30 percent). 19 percent selected China's direct involvement, and nine percent indicated no involvement at all.

For survey question No. 22, the participants were presented with a list of possible intervention models for China to use in solving Myanmar's political crisis and asked to select the most effective one.

Comparison of the results

Responses to Question No. 22 indicate a lack of consensus among communities about China's involvement in solving Myanmar's political crisis. **39 percent** of participants from civil society organizations selected cooperation with the United Nations Special Envoy. On the other hand, roughly **35 percent** of the respondents from political parties favored China's direct involvement, while **42 percent** of prominent individuals and leaders of EAOs and **30 percent** of business associations considered China intervention through the ASEAN Special Envoy as the most effective. 35 percent of respondents from political parties selected the option of China's direct involvement and 25 percent of the business associations supported the same option. However, nearly **18 percent** of business community refused to answer the question, having the most non-responses.


■ Question 22

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'How China should intervene in Myanmar's political crisis'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No involvement at all	9%	13%	12%	3%	5%
Direct involvement	19%	16%	35%	25%	14%
Cooperate with the UN special envoy	32%	40%	29%	20%	26%
Cooperate with the ASEAN special envoy	30%	26%	18%	30%	42%
Other	4%	4%	0%	3%	7%
Do not know	3%	1%	6%	2%	4%
Refused to answer	3%	0%	0%	17%	2%

● Question 23

Do you think China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar's domestic affairs?



The majority of participants (67 percent) responded that China does not practice a policy of non-interference in Myanmar affairs. 25 percent indicated that China follows a policy of non-interference.

For survey question No. 23, the participants were asked do you think China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar's domestic affairs?

Comparison of the results

The survey shows that the view that China does not practice a policy of non-interference with regard to Myanmar is widespread as **77 percent** of respondents who are prominent individuals and EAOs. **67 percent** of the civil society organizations and **63 percent** of those from business associations also shared this view. However, roughly **30 percent** of the civil society organizations and almost **29 percent** of political party representatives, **25 percent** of the business community, and almost **16 percent** of prominent individuals and EAOs leaders indicated that China is practicing a non-interference policy. Notably, **seven percent** of the business community participants in the survey refused to answer the question.


■ Question 23

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'Do you think China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar's domestic affairs?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Yes	25%	30%	29%	25%	16%
No	67%	67%	47%	63%	77%
Do not know	5%	2%	18%	5%	4%
Refused to answer	3%	1%	6%	7%	3%

● Question 24


Has the political crisis brought China and Myanmar closer together?



60 percent of participants did not think that Myanmar and China have developed closer ties since the coup. On the other hand, 31 percent held the opposite view that the two had become closer. The number of respondents who answered that they do not know was five percent, while the number who refused to answer was four percent.

For survey question No. 24, the participants were asked whether the political crisis after February 1, 2022, brought China and Myanmar closer together.


● Question 25
Will China use its influence to defend Myanmar in international organizations?



Regarding the question about human rights issues in Myanmar, whether China will staunchly defend Myanmar on the international stage, including the United Nations and ASEAN, **56 percent** of respondents answered 'no'; while **33 percent** indicated that China will do so.

For survey question No. 25, survey participants were asked, 'Will China take a staunch defense of Myanmar's human rights issues on the international stage, including the United Nations and ASEAN?'

● Question 26
How have Myanmar's policy communities' perceptions towards China shifted since the coup?



Regarding changes in people’s perception of China after the military coup, **59 percent** of respondents answered there was **no change**. **34 percent** took a **more negative view**. Whereas **two percent** shifted towards a **more positive view** of China. **Two percent** responded that they 'do not know,' while **three percent** chose not to answer the question.

For survey question No. 26, the participants were asked whether they had changed their views of China since the coup and asked to choose from among the following responses: a more negative view, a more positive view, no change, do not know and refused to answer.

Comparison of the results

The most common answer by respondents was that their perception of China had not changed. **70 percent** of the prominent individuals and EAOs leaders answered that their perception had not changed – the largest proportion amongst all groups. Those who answered that their perception had shifted towards a **more negative view** were mainly from **civil society organizations (44 percent)**. Moreover, the perception of the participants from the business community (**32 percent**) also shifted towards a more negative view.


■ Question 26

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'Changing perceptions of China after the coup'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
More negative view	34%	44%	12%	32%	25%
No change	59%	55%	64%	50%	70%
More positive view	2%	0%	12%	5%	2%
Do not know	2%	1%	0%	3%	3%
Refused to answer	3%	0%	12%	10%	0%

● Question 27

What factors primarily influence China's policy towards Myanmar?



The vast majority of respondents (79 percent) indicated that China emphasizes smooth relations with whoever is in power when it considers Myanmar policies. This response ranks among the survey's highest in terms of broad level of support. Only 11 percent of respondents answered that China carefully considers Myanmar's public opinions, while seven percent of participants did not answer. Three percent responded that they do not know.

For survey question No. 27, participants were asked the question of what has China emphasized in its approach to Myanmar after February 1, 2022? The list of possible responses were as follows: 1. Emphasizes the public opinion of the Myanmar people, 2. Emphasizes a smooth relations with whoever is in power, 3. Do not know, and 4. Refused to answer.

Comparison of the results

In answering Question No. 27, **89 percent** of the participants from **civil society organizations**, the largest number, responded that **China emphasizes smooth relations with whoever is in power**. The other groups sharing this response are as follows: **political parties (82 percent)**, business associations (67 percent), and prominent individuals and members of EAOs (67 percent).

■ Question 27

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'What has China emphasized in its approach to Myanmar after the coup?'


	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Emphasizes the public opinion of the Myanmar people	11%	9%	6%	15%	14%
Emphasizes smooth relations with whoever is in power	79%	89%	82%	68%	67%
Do not know	3%	0%	0%	3%	9%
Refused to answer	7%	2%	12%	14%	10%



Sino - Myanmar Economic Relations

● Question 28

To what extent do Chinese economic investments bring benefits to the Myanmar people?



50 percent of respondents answered that Chinese economic investments in Myanmar are beneficial to the public, while 36 percent responded that there were no benefits. Six percent chose 'no benefit at all.' Two percent indicated that they viewed Chinese investments as 'very beneficial.'

For survey question No. 28, the participants were asked to assess the extent which Chinese economic investments have brought benefits to the Myanmar population, on a four-point scale. The options on the scale are: No benefit at all, Not beneficial, Beneficial, Very beneficial, Do not know and Refused to answer.

Comparison of the results


Looking at the responses across policy communities to Question No. 28, **63 percent** of the respondents from the **civil society organizations** viewed that **Chinese economic investments** as offering no benefits to Myanmar (a combination of 'not beneficial' and 'no benefit at all'). On the other hand, a majority of respondents from **business associations (80 percent)** answered that **chinese investments are beneficial** (a combination of 'beneficial' and 'very beneficial'). Among **political parties, 76 percent** (a combination of 'beneficial' and 'very beneficial') responded that the **Chinese investments are beneficial**.

■ **Question 28**

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'To what extent do Chinese economic investments bring benefits to the Myanmar people?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No benefit at all	6%	10%	0%	3%	2%
Not beneficial	36%	53%	18%	15%	26%
Beneficial	50%	29%	70%	77%	63%
Very beneficial	2%	3%	6%	3%	0%
Do not know	3%	3%	0%	2%	5%
Refused to answer	2%	2%	6%	0%	4%

- Question 29
How do the respondents view China's status as Myanmar's largest economic partner?



58 percent of respondents expressed 'concern' that China is Myanmar's largest economic partner, while 26 percent showed appreciation. Nine percent answered that they do not know and seven percent refused to answer the question.

For survey question No. 29, the participants were asked their views about China's status as Myanmar's largest economic partner. They were asked to choose from two options, whether they are concerned or appreciative.

Comparison of the results

Analysis of Question No. 29 shows that it is clear that the majority of those from **civil society organizations (78 percent)** expressed 'concern' for China's status as Myanmar's largest economic partner, while **55 percent** from the **business community** appreciated this status. 41 percent from the political party community answered 'concern.' Another 41 percent of respondents from political parties indicated as their appreciation. 12 percent of respondents from both political parties and prominent individuals and members of EAOs did not answer the question.

■ **Question 29**


Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'Perceptions of China's status as Myanmar's largest economic partner'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Concerned	58%	78%	41%	27%	47%
Appreciative	26%	13%	41%	55%	25%
Do not know	9%	5%	6%	10%	16%
Refused to answer	7%	4%	12%	8%	12%

● Question 30-31
 Perception of trade and investment relations
 between China and Myanmar

■ Decreasing
 ■ No change
 ■ Increasing
 ■ Do not know
 ■ Refused to answer

Q30 in trade



Q31 in investment



The majority of the respondents answered that there had been a **decrease in both trade and investment** between China and Myanmar since the coup. While **73 percent** responded there had been a decrease in trade, **12 percent** felt that it had remained the same. **11 percent** of respondents felt that there had been an increase in trade. While **42 percent** considered there had been a decrease in investment, **28 percent** felt that it had remained the same. **21 percent** felt that there had been an increase in investment; **six percent** said that they do not know.

For survey questions No. 30 and 31, the participants were asked about their perceptions of economic relations (trade and investment) between China and Myanmar since February 1, 2022. They were asked to choose from among the following options: Decreasing, No change, Increasing, Do not know and Refused to answer.

● Question 32-35
The Impact of China’s control of border gates on different groups

■ Extremely negative
 ■ Moderately negative
 ■ No affect
■ Moderately positive
 ■ Extremely positive
 ■ Do not know
 ■ Refused to answer

Q32 On State Administration Council (SAC)



Q33 On Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)



Q34 On Business persons in Myanmar



Q35 On General population




Note : Though the choice of 'extremely positive' is included in the question, no one selected it.

China closed its trade gates along its border with Myanmar due to the COVID-19 pandemic during the 2021 political crisis. The majority of respondents felt that China’s closure of its border significantly reduced bilateral border trade, which negatively affected several actors, such as the SAC, EAOs, business persons in Myanmar and the general public. **66 percent** of respondents felt there was a **moderately negative** impact on the **SAC** while **54 percent** of respondents viewed that there was also a **moderately negative** impact on **ethnic armed organizations**. **Half** of the respondents indicated that **business people** experienced a **moderately negative** impact. Whereas **56 percent** responded that the **general population** also experienced **moderately negative** impact.

For survey questions No. 32 to 35, the participants were asked to assess the extent to which China’s attempts to control its border gates with Myanmar and the ensuing drop in bilateral border trade during the 2021 political crises impacted four different groups in Myanmar (the State Administration Council (SAC), Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), business persons and the general population). They were asked to select from a five-point scale with options ranging from 'Extremely negative' to 'Extremely positive'.

● Question 36

When will economic relations between China and Myanmar be likely to improve?



Most respondents (24 percent) indicated that they do not know when economic relations between the two countries are likely to improve. Among the responses, 20 percent of respondents felt that economic relations would improve only after 2025. The replies for 2024 was 19 percent. 14 percent answered that there will be no improvement. 11 percent answered that economic relations would improve in 2023; six percent felt that economic relations would improve in 2025. Only one percent felt this improvement would happen in 2022.

For survey question No. 36, the participants were asked when economic relations between China and Myanmar will likely to improve. They were asked to select from among the following options: 1. In 2022 2. In 2023 3. In 2024 4. In 2025 5. Beyond 2025 6. No improvement 7. Do not know 8. Refused to answer.

Comparison of the results

None of the respondents from political parties and business organizations felt that economic relations would improve in 2022. One percent of prominent individuals and EAOs community groups and members of civil society organizations felt that economic relations would improve in 2022. Most of respondents from political parties (35 percent) said that economic relations would improve after 2025.

Question 36

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'When will economic relations between China and Myanmar likely improve?'


	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
In 2022	1%	1%	0%	0%	2%
In 2023	11%	10%	0%	12%	16%
In 2024	19%	13%	29%	27%	21%
In 2025	6%	7%	6%	3%	5%
Beyond 2025	20%	26%	35%	5%	18%
No improvement	14%	20%	0%	10%	12%
Do not know	24%	22%	24%	33%	21%
Refused to answer	5%	1%	6%	10%	5%



The Role of China in Myanmar's Peace Process

● Question 37

To what extent China is willing to achieve peace in Myanmar?



75 percent of survey respondents viewed that China is keen to achieve peace in Myanmar (a combination of 'to some extent willing' and 'very interested'), while 15 percent of them answered that China does not want peace; eight percent indicated that China is very interested in achieving peace in Myanmar.

For survey question No. 37, the participants were asked to select a response to the question of what level of interest does China have in achieving peace in Myanmar. There was a four-point scale ranging from 1, 'Totally not interested' to 4, 'Very interested.'

Comparison of the results


In answering Question No. 37, all four policy communities perceived that, to a certain extent (67 percent), China is keen to achieve peace in Myanmar. Over 88 percent of respondents from political parties indicated that China wants to achieve peace in Myanmar at least to a certain extent (including 'very interested'). Almost 88 percent of prominent individuals and EAOs leaders group shared this view.

■ Question 37

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'To what extent China is willing to achieve peace in Myanmar?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Totally not interested	5%	7%	0%	5%	4%
Not interested	15%	23%	6%	12%	5%
To some extent willing	67%	60%	82%	55%	83%
Very interested	8%	8%	6%	15%	5%
Do not know	4%	2%	0%	8%	3%
Refused to answer	1%	0%	6%	5%	0%

● Question 38
How capable is China in achieving peace in Myanmar?




The majority of respondents (**70 percent**) viewed that China is capable to some extent (Somewhat capable), wielding its efforts towards peace in Myanmar. **14 percent** felt that China is fully capable of facilitating peace in Myanmar - the second most popular response. **11 percent** of respondents felt that China does not have the capability to wield its influence for Myanmar's peace, and **two percent** felt China could do nothing at all to promote peace in Myanmar.

For survey question No. 38, the participants were asked to assess China's capabilities in achieving peace in Myanmar using a four-point scale ranging from 1, 'Not capable at all' to 4, 'Very capable.'

● Question 39

What impact does China's involvement have on Myanmar's peace process?




The majority of respondents (**56 percent**) viewed that China's involvement in Myanmar's peace process has had a moderately positive impact. **25 percent** held opposing views, namely, that China's involvement had a moderately negative impact. **Four percent** answered that China's impact is very positive, while four percent selected that it had a very negative impact. **Seven percent** said they do not know.

For survey question No. 39, the participants were asked to assess the impact of China's involvement on Myanmar's peace process using a four-point scale ranging from 1, 'Very negative impact' to 4, 'Very positive impact.'

● Question 40

How much influence does China have over ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in northern Shan State?



The majority of respondents (**60 percent**) answered that China maintains some influence over EAOs in the northern Shan State. But **35 percent** of respondents thought that China maintains a significant level of influence over the EAOs in northern Shan State. Notably, none of the participants indicated that China had either minimal influence or no influence.

For survey question No. 40, the participants were asked how much influence does China have over ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in northern Shan State? and asked to rank the degree. Scale 1 is 'No influence at all' and scale 4 is 'Significant influence.'

Comparison of the results


All respondents from political parties, prominent individuals and EAOs members perceived that China has **some influence** (including those who answered having significant influence). **97 percent** of civil society organizations and **77 percent** of business associations shared the same insight.

■ **Question 40**

Perception of four policy communities on the question, 'How much influence does China have over Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) in northern Shan State?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
No influence at all	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
No influence	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Some influence	60%	59%	88%	43%	63%
Significant influence	35%	38%	12%	35%	37%
Do not know	3%	2%	0%	12%	0%
Refused to answer	2%	0%	0%	10%	0%

● Question 41
How much does influence China have over Myanmar's military?




The majority of respondents – **64 percent** – answered that China wields some influence over Myanmar's military. **23 percent** felt that China could wield a significant level of influence over Myanmar's military; while **seven percent** felt that China had no influence. Significantly, only **one percent** of respondents viewed that China has no influence at all over Myanmar's military.

For survey question No. 41, the participants were asked to assess how much influence does China has over Myanmar's military using a four-point scale ranging from 1, 'No influence at all' to 4, 'Significant influence.'

● Question 42


How should China help Myanmar's peace process succeed?



46 percent of respondents – the largest proportion – viewed that China should cooperate more with the international community to help Myanmar's peace process to succeed. 16 percent felt that China should encourage various stakeholders to engage in meaningful peace talks, as well as participate as a mediator. Only five percent felt that China should not be involved at all in Myanmar's peace process.

For survey question No. 42, the participants were asked how China should help Myanmar's peace process succeed and asked them to choose one from among several options.

● Question 43
The two plausible strategies to achieve peace in Myanmar




When respondents were asked about plausible strategies to achieve peace in Myanmar, the majority – **70 percent** – chose the option of democratization and strengthening political institutions for reforms. Only **13 percent** chose economic development.

For survey question No. 43, the participants were asked to choose one option for two plausible strategies to achieve peace in Myanmar.



China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) Projects

- Question 44
Which country benefits more from the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) projects?



Note : Among the possible responses listed for this question was 'more benefits (of the CMEC) go to Myanmar,' but no one selected this answer.

The majority – **83 percent** of participants – answered that the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) projects brings **more economic advantages to China**. This is **one of the questions that received the largest majority consensus** among the respondents. While 12 percent viewed the projects as mutually beneficial to both countries, no one answered that the projects could deliver more benefits to Myanmar.

For survey question No. 44, the participants were asked to identify whether the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) project will be mutually beneficial, more beneficial to China, more beneficial to Myanmar.

Comparison of the results


Regarding Question No. 44, a few respondents selected that the CMEC brings mutual benefits to both sides. However, among the respondents who answered 'mutually beneficial', business community scored the highest rate with 33 percent.

■ Question 44

Perception of four policy communities to the question, 'Which country benefits more from the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) projects?'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Mutually beneficial to both countries	12%	4%	6%	33%	12%
More benefits to China	83%	93%	82%	62%	81%
More benefits to Myanmar	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	3%	1%	6%	5%	5%
Refused to answer	2%	2%	6%	0%	2%


● Question 45
 Perceptions of the purpose of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)



Across all communities, the view that the purpose of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) projects was for China to **assert its control over geopolitically strategic locations** received the most response (**65 percent**). **14 percent** indicated that the aim of the CMEC is for China to expand its influence over Myanmar and other regional countries, while **15 percent** felt that it is for China's economic benefits.

For survey question No. 45, the participants were asked for their opinion on China's purpose of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).

● Question 46
Public concerns regarding the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)



The most common public concern regarding the CMEC among the participants was **China’s growing geopolitical influence over the region (34 percent)**. The second most common concern was a **debt trap (18 percent)** followed by concerns over socio-environmental impacts (**17 percent**) and then China’s economic domination (**16 percent**). Only **six percent** answered political influence, while three percent indicated they had no concerns over the CMEC.


For survey question No. 46, the participants were asked to select the public’s biggest concern for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) from a list.

• Questions 47-50


Views on the potential impacts of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)

■ Strongly disagree
 ■ Disagree
 ■ Agree
 ■ Strongly agree
 ■ Do not know
 ■ Refused to answer


Q47
CMEC will bring positive impact on the peace process




Q48
CMEC will contribute to Myanmar's economic development



Q49
CMEC will improve Myanmar peoples' socio-economic lives



Q50
CMEC will be a solution to escape from economic and political crises that Myanmar people are facing



Note: In questions No. 49 and 50, there is an option for 'strongly agree,' but no one selected it.

For survey questions from No. 47 to 50, the participants were asked to what extent they agree with a series of statements regarding the impacts of CMEC on the peace process, economic development, socio-economic lives, and the means for people to escape from the economic and political crises.

Generally, **respondents disagreed** with the view that the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) could have a **positive impact on the peace process**, with **48 percent** so indicating as much. While **29 percent** agreed that the CMEC could have a positive impact on Myanmar's peace process, **11 percent** answered that they 'strongly disagree' and **seven percent** answered that they do not know.

However, CMEC project was widely considered **conducive to Myanmar's economic development**. **60 percent** of respondents agreed with this idea, while **29 percent** did not agree. And **four percent** strongly disagreed.

42 percent of respondents indicated that the CMEC will have **positive impacts for the socio-economic situation of Myanmar's citizens**. However, another **42 percent** responded that it will have negative impact. **Eight percent** answered that they strongly disagree with the statement. **Four percent** answered that they do not know.

59 percent of respondents, the largest consensus among the respondents for this question, **did not agree** that the CMEC could help the economic and political crises faced by the population. Another **19 percent** answered that they agree with the statement and **15 percent** answered 'strongly disagree.'

Comparison of the results

Comparing responses for Questions 47 to 50 shows the following: **55 percent** of respondents from the **business community** indicated that the CMEC project could have a **positive impact on Myanmar's peace process**. Moreover, **85 percent** of respondents from the **business community** agreed with the statement that the **CMEC will be conducive to Myanmar's economic development** (including respondents who answered 'strongly agree').

76 percent of political parties and 72 percent of prominent individuals and members of EAOs also agreed with the statement (including respondents who answered 'strongly agree'). Among those who answered that they **disagree** (including selecting the answers for 'strongly disagree'), the **majority** were from **civil society organizations** (52 percent).

The statement that the **CMEC will improve the socio-economic lives of the Myanmar population** did not receive support from members of **civil society organizations**, as **74 percent** disagreed with this premise (including those who answered 'strongly disagree'). Among the three other communities, the majority agreed with the statement. Nevertheless, all communities disagreed with the statement that the economic corridor will be a solution to escape from Myanmar's ongoing political and economic crises.

■ Question 47

Perception of four policy communities to the statement, 'CMEC will bring positive impact on the peace process'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Strongly disagree	11%	18%	0%	3%	7%
Disagree	48%	61%	47%	20%	44%
Agree	29%	14%	41%	55%	35%
Strongly agree	1%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	7%	4%	0%	12%	10%
Refused to answer	4%	1%	12%	10%	4%

■ Question 48

Perception of four policy communities to the statement, 'CMEC will contribute to Myanmar's economic development'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Strongly disagree	4%	4%	12%	0%	5%
Disagree	29%	48%	12%	8%	16%
Agree	60%	43%	76%	82%	70%
Strongly agree	1%	1%	0%	3%	2%
Do not know	4%	1%	0%	7%	5%
Refused to answer	2%	3%	0%	0%	2%

■ Question 49

Perception of four policy communities to the statement, 'CMEC will improve Myanmar peoples' socio-economic lives'


	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Strongly disagree	8%	14%	0%	3%	5%
Disagree	42%	60%	35%	15%	32%
Agree	42%	24%	59%	72%	49%
Strongly agree	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Do not know	5%	1%	0%	7%	9%
Refused to answer	3%	1%	6%	3%	3%

■ Question 50

Perception of four policy communities to the statement, 'CMEC will be a solution to escape from economic and political crises that Myanmar people are facing'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Strongly disagree	15%	24%	6%	12%	3%
Disagree	59%	71%	53%	35%	54%
Agree	19%	4%	35%	37%	28%
Strongly agree	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Do not know	4%	0%	0%	8%	9%
Refused to answer	3%	1%	6%	8%	4%

● Question 51
 China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)'s socio-environmental impacts on Myanmar people




Note: In question No. 51, the options included 'no impact at all,' but no one selected it.

The majority of respondents (59 percent) felt that China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) would have **some negative impact on the socio-environmental lives of Myanmar people**. 32 percent felt that it could cause a significant negative impact and four percent of respondents respectively answered no impact and do not know. None of the respondents answered 'no impact.'

For survey question No. 51, the participants were asked to select from a list about the extent of the socio-environmental impact of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) on the lives of Myanmar people. Scale 1 is 'No impact at all' and scale 4 is 'Significant negative impact.'

● Question 52
Whether there is consultation in regards to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)



Note: In question No. 52, the participants are allowed to select more than one answer.


The question is about whether responsible authorities from Chinese companies, which will implement the CMEC projects, have ever contacted and consulted with key stakeholders in Myanmar. For this question, respondents could select more than one answer. **75 percent** of respondents answered that Chinese companies **did not contact and consult with them at all**, **11 percent** answered that **they were consulted**, and **nine percent** answered that **they were provided with information about the project**. **Five percent** answered that they do not know about any consultations.

For survey question No. 52, the participants were asked whether there is consultation in regards to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) by authorities of Chinese companies and asked to select more than one answer.



China's Assistance during the COVID-19 Pandemic


● Question 53
The extent of China's help during the COVID-19 pandemic



The number of respondents who answered that China's assistance to fight the COVID pandemic in Myanmar was **somewhat helpful** made up the majority of respondents (**76 percent**). **13 percent** felt that China's assistance was not helpful; **eight percent** answered that China's assistance was very helpful.

For survey question No. 53, the participants were asked how much extent to China's assistance for the COVID-19 pandemic helpful to Myanmar's response to it? and asked to rank the answer. Scale 1 is 'Not helpful at all' and scale 4 is 'Very helpful.'


- Question 54
By providing COVID-19 vaccines,
China has increased its influence over EAOs



54 percent of respondents selected that China can exert more influence by providing anti-COVID vaccines to the ethnic-controlled areas on the border. **27 percent** disagreed with this statement; **seven percent** answered that they did not know.

For survey question No. 54, the participants were asked their views about China's ability to exert more influence over EAOs by providing COVID vaccines to the ethnic controlled areas, and asked to select an option from a four-point scale. Scale 1 is 'Strongly disagree' and scale 4 is 'Strongly agree.'

● Question 55
 China's COVID-19 assistance has increased
 the legitimacy of State Administration Council (SAC)




43 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that China's aid to the SAC in fighting against COVID had strengthened its legitimacy. 35 percent answered that they agreed with this statement; while nine percent responded that they strongly agreed. Three percent disagreed with it strongly. Five percent answered that they did not know, and another five percent refused to answer.

For survey question No. 55, the participants were asked to select from a list of options about their views on whether China's COVID aid to Myanmar enhanced the legitimacy of the State Administration Council (SAC). Scale 1 is 'Strongly disagree' and scale 4 is 'Strongly agree.'

- Questions 56-60

Level of confidence in China-made COVID vaccines and vaccines produced by other countries

Q56 China-made vaccines




Note: There is no one who refused to answer questions No. 56 and 57.

Respondents exhibited little trust in Chinese and Russian-made vaccines, while they showed greater confidence in the vaccines made by the U.S., the UK, and India. Overall **74 percent** of respondents trusted U.S.-made vaccines, **69 percent** trusted UK-made vaccines, and **62 percent** trusted Indian-made vaccines. Only **26 percent** of the respondents answered that they trusted China-made vaccines, and **20 percent** said that they trusted Russian-made vaccines.


For survey questions from No. 56 to 60, the participants were asked to rank their levels of confidence for COVID vaccines on a five-point scale. Scale 1 is 'Not confident at all' and scale 5 is 'Strongly confident.'

■ Not confident ■ Neutral ■ Confident ■ Do not know ■ Refused to answer


Q57 Russian-made vaccines




Q59 Indian-made vaccines



Q58 U.K.-made vaccines



Q60 U.S.-made vaccines



Comparison of the results

Respondents indicated low levels of trust in Chinese-made vaccines. Civil society organizations expressed the highest level of 'not confident' (45 percent). The highest level of confidence (41 percent) was among political parties. On the other hand, 45 percent of respondents from the business community responded that they were neutral.

Question 56
Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'Level of confidence in China-made vaccines'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Not confident	30%	45%	18%	15%	19%
Neutral	40%	40%	29%	45%	42%
Confident	26%	14%	41%	35%	37%
Do not know	4%	1%	12%	5%	2%
Refused to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question 57
Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'Level of confidence in Russian-made vaccines'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Not confident	28%	30%	18%	25%	30%
Neutral	37%	43%	24%	38%	32%
Confident	20%	21%	29%	20%	14%
Do not know	15%	6%	29%	17%	24%
Refused to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question 58

Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'Level of confidence in U.K.-made vaccines'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Not confident	3%	5%	6%	0%	2%
Neutral	19%	19%	23%	14%	19%
Confident	69%	71%	47%	68%	72%
Do not know	8%	3%	24%	17%	5%
Refused to answer	1%	2%	0%	0%	2%

Question 59

Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'Level of confidence in Indian-made vaccines'


	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Not confident	6%	10%	6%	0%	2%
Neutral	28%	31%	29%	23%	28%
Confident	62%	57%	53%	73%	65%
Do not know	3%	1%	12%	14%	4%
Refused to answer	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%

Question 60

Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'Level of confidence in U.S.-made vaccines'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Not confident	3%	3%	6%	3%	2%
Neutral	15%	15%	18%	13%	16%
Confident	74%	77%	59%	73%	74%
Do not know	7%	3%	17%	11%	7%
Refused to answer	1%	2%	0%	0%	1%

● Question 61
Perceptions of China's COVID prevention and containment policy




68 percent of respondents view China's stringent COVID prevention and containment policy as positive (a combination of 'good to some extent' and 'very good'). **19 percent** felt that it was not good. **Six percent** said they did not know, while **five percent** answered that it was not good at all.

For survey question No. 61, the respondents were asked to assess whether China's centralized and stringent COVID policy is appropriate on a four-point scale. Scale 1 is 'No good at all' and scale 4 is 'Very good.'



China's Soft Power

● Question 62
Perceived level of effectiveness of China's development aid



Note: In question No. 62, there was a choice for 'very effective,' but no one selected the answer.

In regards to China's development aid to Myanmar, **42 percent** of respondents from Myanmar's policy communities viewed China's development aid as effective to some extent. **39 percent** viewed the aids as 'ineffective' and **13 percent** indicated that it was 'very ineffective.'

Myanmar has received development aid from China and other international organizations. For survey question No. 62, the participants were asked to assess the effectiveness of Chinese development aid individually and for the communities using a 4-point scale. Scale 1 is 'Very ineffective' and scale 4 is 'Very effective.'

Comparison of the results

The majority of respondents from the **business community** (60 percent) viewed China’s development aid as effective to a **certain extent** (including 'very effective'). Over **67 percent** of **civil society organizations** answered that it was **not effective** (including 'very ineffective').


■ **Question 62**

Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'Perceived level of effectiveness of China’s development aid'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Very ineffective	13%	23%	0%	8%	2%
Ineffective	39%	44%	29%	23%	42%
Effective to some extent	42%	30%	41%	57%	53%
Very effective	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%
Do not know	5%	3%	12%	10%	3%
Refused to answer	1%	0%	18%	0%	0%

● Question 63

Is China's economic development an ideal model for Myanmar to emulate?



The responses to the opinion that China's economic development is an ideal model for Myanmar was mixed. Among respondents, 47 percent answered that they disagreed, while 45 percent agreed. Those who responded that they do not know or refuse to answer each account for four percent.

For survey question No. 63, the participants were asked whether they agree or not China's economic development is an ideal model for Myanmar.

Comparison of the results

Regarding whether China's economic development is an ideal model for Myanmar, there was not much difference between the level of support between the respondents who agreed and those who disagreed. However, 58 percent from civil society organizations answered that they disagreed, while over 72 percent of the business community and almost 71 percent of the political parties indicated that they agreed with the statement.


■ Question 63

Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'China's economic development an ideal model for Myanmar'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Agree	45%	35%	71%	72%	37%
Disagree	47%	58%	23%	22%	51%
Do not know	4%	4%	0%	3%	5%
Refused to answer	4%	3%	6%	3%	7%

● Question 64


Is democracy with Chinese characteristics a model Myanmar should emulate?



87 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that democracy with Chinese characteristics is appropriate and should be practiced in Myanmar. The level of response was one of the highest of any of the questions in this survey. There were eight percent who agreed with this statement, while three percent refused to answer. Two percent said that they did not know.

For survey question No. 64, the participants were asked whether or not democracy with Chinese characteristics is appropriate and should be practiced in Myanmar.

- Question 65
Have you ever participated in trips or training programs organized by China?



When the respondents were asked whether they had participated in study tours or training programs organized by the Chinese government, businesses, or universities and other institutions, **66 percent** of respondents answered that **they had not**. While **17 percent** said that they had participated in two to five trips, **14 percent** said that they had participated in one. **Three percent** had been participated in more than six trips.

For survey question No. 65, the participants were asked to select from a list of options about their participation in study tours, training programs organized by Chinese government, businesses, or universities and other education institutions.

Comparison of the results

About one-third of the respondents for this survey had participated in study tours/programs organized by the Chinese government, business companies, universities, and other education institutions. Comparison across the policy communities showed that respondents from the **business community** have the highest rate of participation (**57 percent**) in tours organized by China. Most respondents (35 percent) from the business community who had taken the organized trip to China indicated that they had done so two to five trips. **Prominent individuals and members of EAOs** who had participated in tours were the **second largest group (44 percent)**. Most (28 percent) of them had taken between two to five trips.

■ Question 65

Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'Have you ever participated in trips or training programs organized by China?'


	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Never	66%	82%	59%	43%	56%
Once	14%	13%	29%	17%	9%
Two to five times	17%	5%	12%	35%	28%
Six or more times	3%	0%	0%	5%	7%
Do not know	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Refused to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%



Chinese Technology

● Question 66

Does the survey participant use information and communications technology and devices made by Chinese companies?



Note : In question No. 66, the participants were allowed to select more than one answer. But no respondents selected the options of either 'do not know' or 'refused to answer.'


Regarding the use of listed products made by Chinese companies, the most common (48 percent) was Chinese-made mobile phones. While 30 percent of the respondents answered that they do not use any of the Chinese made products, 27 percent indicated that they use Chinese CCTV security systems, 24 percent use WeChat, and eight percent use TikTok.

For survey question No. 66, the participants were asked to select from a list of communication and information technology and devices made by Chinese companies that they presently use. They were permitted to answer more than one option.


● Questions 67-70
The security and privacy of products made by Chinese technology companies

■ Not secure ■ Neutral ■ Secure ■ Do not know ■ Refused to answer


Q67
Chinese-made mobile phones




Q68
WeChat



Q69
TikTok



Q70
China's smart city technology



For survey questions No. 67 to 70, the participants were asked to assess the information security and privacy for individuals using Chinese made IT devices, including mobile phones using a five-point scale. (Scale 1 is 'Not secure at all' and scale 5 is 'Totally secure.')

Although the majority of participants are using Chinese companies made mobile phones, **63 percent** responded that they were **not secure**. 25 percent remained neutral, six percent answered that they do not know, and five percent felt that it was secure to use Chinese made mobile phone.

Regarding the use of WeChat, **51 percent** answered that it is **not secure**, while 27 percent answered that they did not know. 15 percent remained neutral. Five percent answered that it was secure. **46 percent** answered that TikTok is **not secure**, 39 percent answered that they did not know, and nine percent stayed neutral. Regarding the China's smart city technology - for example, traffic light control and security systems, **48 percent** felt that there is **no privacy**, and 24 percent stayed neutral. Those who answered that 'they are secure' and that they did not know made up 13 percent each.

Comparison of the results

Although **48 percent** of the survey participants use Chinese mobile phones, **63 percent** of them answered that they are not secure. Among the users of Chinese mobile phones, the **political parties** made up the largest proportion (**70 percent**). Chinese CCTV security systems were the most popular with the **business community** compared to other groups. More than **47 percent** of business community indicated their use of Chinese technology.

■ Question 67

Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'Security and privacy concerns over using Chinese mobile phones'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Not secure	63%	72%	53%	43%	63%
Neutral	25%	23%	24%	30%	26%
Secure	5%	2%	6%	15%	2%
Do not know	6%	2%	11%	12%	9%
Refused to answer	1%	1%	6%	0%	0%

■ Question 68

Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'Security and privacy concerns over using WeChat'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Not secure	51%	56%	41%	38%	54%
Neutral	15%	12%	6%	20%	21%
Secure	5%	4%	0%	13%	2%
Do not know	27%	26%	41%	29%	23%
Refused to answer	2%	2%	12%	0%	0%

■ Question 69

Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'Security and privacy concerns over using TikTok'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political Parties	Business Organizations	Prominent Individuals & EAOs
Not secure	46%	53%	35%	30%	47%
Neutral	9%	4%	6%	13%	16%
Secure	3%	4%	0%	5%	2%
Do not know	39%	38%	47%	48%	33%
Refused to answer	3%	1%	12%	4%	2%

■ Question 70

Perception of four policy communities on the question of 'Security and privacy concerns over using Chinese technology in urban development schemes'

	Total	Civil Society Organizations	Political parties	Business organizations	Prominent individuals & EAOs
Not secure	48%	63%	24%	23%	47%
Neutral	24%	18%	35%	28%	28%
Secure	13%	8%	18%	25%	12%
Do not know	13%	10%	18%	20%	13%
Refused to answer	2%	1%	5%	4%	0%



One year after the 2021 military coup, ISP-Myanmar initiated a research survey of **Myanmar's Key Stakeholders and their Perceptions of Sino-Myanmar relations** with technical support from the People's Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE). The initiative aims to collect specific knowledge of key individuals from the Myanmar policy communities to identify similarities and differences in their views about the key factors shaping Sino-Myanmar relations. In particular, the study aims to comprehend the different interpretations of 1) the roles played by China in Myanmar's political arena after the military coup, 2) the long-running deadlock in the peace process in which China remains involved, 3) the impacts of China's investment and trade, 4) China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) projects, and 5) humanitarian aid provided by China during Covid pandemic.

In addition, it also sets out to understand how various stakeholders in Myanmar perceive China's efforts to develop its soft power and the prevalence of China produced technology (mobile phones, applications, and security threat of the electronic devices) in Myanmar.

The key stakeholders include civil society organizations, members of political parties, the business sector, scholars, activists, leaders of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and others well versed in China's political, economic and international affairs. ISP-Myanmar's findings aim to contribute to the policy-making and program implementation of organizations involved in Sino-Myanmar relations.