

ISPON POINT

No. 17, November 10, 2023

Operation 1027:

Will All Roads Lead to Laukkai or Naypyitaw?



ISP-Myanmar is planning to release a series of three OnPoint analyses that will shed light on 'Operation 1027', the military offensive launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) and their allies on October 27, 2023. The first report will provide an in-depth analysis of the context of the offensive and its 'signaling effects'. The second report will focus on the economic significance of the offensive, while the final report will assess how the situation could potentially impact Myanmar's future landscape.



Event

On October 27, 2023, the three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), namely the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA), along with other allied forces launched the military 'Operation 1027'1. Within a few days, the initial phase of the operation resulted in effective 3BHA control of five towns along the China-Myanmar border including the Chinshwehaw border checkpoint. By November 8, the 3BHA's forces had seized more than 150 military camps including some strategic positions and base camps, along with at least five police stations. 3BHA and allied forces reportedly seized six tanks, four military trucks, two howitzers, and a large stock of ammunition and weapons from State Administration Council. Tatmadaw Infantry Battalion No 143 based in Kunlong surrendered to 3BHA and allied forces amidst heavy fighting. The resistance forces seized two important bridges and effectively cut off national highway access to the region. A 3BHA statement lists the military objectives of 'Operation 1027' as combatting widespread online fraud and gambling, asserting their right to self-defense, maintaining control over their territory, and ultimately eradicating oppressive junta military rule.

Preliminary Analysis

Recent conflict history in northern Shan State has shown that significant shifts often occur rapidly when China's interests in Myanmar reach a pivotal point. Conflict actors in Myanmar, whether they are state or non-state actors vying for complete or partial power, can capitalize on this opportune moment by acting decisively. Essentially, the key is for Myanmar conflict actors to take action when China's interest in Myanmar is at its peak.

To demonstrate, in 1988-89, when Kokang and Wa ethnic armed forces rebelled against the leadership of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), >

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
¹In 'Operation 1027', along with 3BHA forces, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) (Myanmar), Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA), People's Defence Force (Mandalay), and Moe Goke Tactical Command PDF forces are all collaborating with the 3BHA in the military operation.



ISP Mapping No.22, November 10, 2023

'Operation 1027' and Concerning Context (October 27 - November 9, 2023)

Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) forces launched the military 'Operation 1027' on October 27, 2023, and simultaneously attacked junta bases in northern Shan State. Within a few days, the Allied forces had seized four towns, including Chinshwehaw, on the China-Myanmar border, and claimed control of Hsenwi. Up to November 8, 2023, 3BHA forces have occupied at least 150 military positions including some major junta bases and other strategically important positions, as well as at least five police stations. As the map demonstrates, the major objective of 'Operation 1027' appears to be the re-occupation of Laukkai and cutting off the potential for reinforcements from the Myanmar military to the operation theatre. On November 7, the Allied forces seized the Tapakyo bridge connecting the Laukkai and Kutkai-Tamoenye-Mongsi areas. Laukkai was then effectively cut off and isolated from other towns in Shan State. 3BHA forces announced they are



Reference: Data is collected by ISP-Myanmar's system for documenting information in armed conflicts and is cross-checked with reports from various independent organizations. Actual military camps' positions and control areas may differ from the situation on the ground.



Deng Xiaoping's China, which had been recently successful with reforming towards a market-based economy system and experimental opening to international trade, reversing their previous patronage with the CPB leadership. The person who most effectively seized the moment of this watershed opportunity presented by China's backflip was the intelligence chief of the former junta, State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), Brig. Gen. Khin Nyunt. At this critical juncture. Khin Nyunt made a groundbreaking proposition to the Kokang and Wa forces-an unprecedented move in Myanmar's history. He made a proposal to the armed groups in northern Myanmar, that they be permitted to continue to hold their weapons but enter into ceasefire, collaborating with the junta for regional development, and that in return they would be permitted to engage in any business activities they liked to raise revenue, whether that be illicit drug trafficking or money laundering, they would be free from interference from the ruling junta. This new ceasefire initiative of the military intelligence developed into an institutionalized 'ceasefire crony capitalism' in the period that followed. This new attempt at a form of ceasefire changed the landscape of conflict not only in northern Myanmar but also across the whole nation.

The rapid growth of the Arakan Army (AA) can also be understood through this 'China opportunity' lens. After Myanmar's 2010-11 political transition, the hybrid civilian government in September 2011 unexpectedly suspended billions of dollars worth of Chinese investment dam project at the Myitkyina site at the Ayeyarwaddy River confluence in Kachin State. More importantly, China's concerns grew as U Thein Sein's administration became more friendly with various Western governments. China had previously been pursuing deep strategic interests with Myanmar, particularly through the Kyauk Phyu deep-water seaport, which also included a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), as a form of Chinese access to the Indian Ocean, as well as China's oil and gas pipeline which passes through Rakhine State to inland China's Yunnan Province. China could probably foresee strategic opportunities northern Shan State and in Rakhine State, not only to expand its economic interests but also to expand its state reach in order to guarantee security to its projects. The conflict actor who took advantage of this situation was Gen. Twan Mrat Naing, chief of the Arakan Army (AA). When the AA was founded in 2009, its force numbered only 29 men, but after the event of suspension of the Myitsone Dam project in 2011, and after relocating their major forces into Rakhine State in 2014, the AA subsequently strengthened and its numbers




swelled to several thousand troops. The AA has since become the secondlargest ethnic armed organization (EAO) after the UWSA.

In analyzing 'Operation 1027,' the Kokang forces and their allies, and specifically the three Brotherhood Alliance, have effectively mobilized themselves and embarked upon a mission-centric objective which does align with China's own concerns over the eradication of 'Kyar Phyant' (注 骗)— online fraud, and gambling. China's rhetorical intolerance towards cyber-scams, which have victimised thousands of its citizens, is a driving force behind China's agenda. Within Chinese society, the issue of online scams and slavery within illicit border-zone cartels gained prominence immediately after the release of the blockbuster film 'No More Bets.' Chinese citizens' concerns and criticism created a hot issue for Chinese authorities. While Chinese officials have raised the issue seriously with the Myanmar junta many times, the junta has seemingly been either inattentive or has treated the problem lightly. Moreover, Chinese authorities have given time to Bai Xuoqiang of the Kokang Self-

■ Sharp Rise of Clashes in Shan State Following 'Operation 1027' (Feb 1, 2021 - Nov 7, 2023)

At least 666 clashes broke out across Shan State since the coup. Over half of these were between the State Administration Council (SAC) and three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA). Moreover, 162 of these erupted between the SAC and 3BHA within the past 12 days since the commencement of 'Operation 1027'. This number is equivalent to 25 percent of all clashes since the coup.



Source: Data is collected in accordance with ISP-Myanmar's system for documenting information in armed conflicts and is cross-checked with reports from various independent organizations. Actual figures may differ.



Administered Zone, however no results have materialized. Worse still, up to October 20, 2023, reportedly about 60 Chinese citizens have been killed in the Kokang area, including undercover Chinese police. Bai Xuoqiang has seemingly defied Chinese warnings, by emphasizing his association with the SAC Chief in political and business matters. This is tantamount to Bai challenging China's attempts to impose pressure on the Kokang leader.

In terms of the Wa region, China is seemingly disgruntled with the rise of new generational leadership in the UWSP, as these new leaders seem more nationalistically inclined. China may feel that the new Wa leadership might become less open to listening to China's perspectives and wishes in the region. This could be the main reason behind why Chinese authorities themselves have become involved in extra-territorial arrests of Kokang, and some Wa, leaders, and issuing warrants against those who are alleged to have committed criminal activities under Chinese law. These arrests aimed to shake up Wa's leadership under the claim of their involvement in the *Kyar Phyant* online gambling industry. China appears to selectively target only Kokang and Wa leaders, while appearing satisfied with Mong La leaders, suggesting reliance on Mong La. In a broader perspective, while Kyar Phyant is now an immediate issue in northern Myanmar, the longer-term horizon, raises a hypothesized scenario in which China is actively engaged in reconfiguring its power projection capabilities in the area. The immediate focus on Kyar Phyant could be a strategy to address multiple concerns simultaneously. To comprehend the interplay between China's short-term and long-term strategies in northern Myanmar, attention must be directed not only to security matters but also to the intertwining economic interests of China in the region. (The upcoming ISP-Myanmar OnPoint No. 18 will discuss these economic linkages).

A more thorough analysis of the assumption of China's role in internal power reconfigurations in northern Shan State could consider the following scenarios and projections: 1) China may intend to replace the present Kokang leader Bai Xuoqiang with new leadership; 2) China may send a 'Do and Do Not' message to the UWSA leadership, using the immediate issue of *Kyar Phyant* online gambling against the background context of rising Wa nationalism; and finally, 3) China could strengthen its interests east of the Salween River, by reinforcing demographic (ethnic population ratios) and economic power. In conclusion, the ongoing


'Operation 1027' in Kokang is a convergence of China's interests and the MNDAA's goal of reclaiming control over Laukkai. The strategic aim of the operation may involve reoccupying Laukkai as a base, while the stated objective of 'eradicating the oppressive military rule in Myanmar' could serve as a tactical agenda—a shrewd preemptive measure to garner popular support.

China may provide a 'green light' to 'Operation 1027', but it should be noted that conflict actors in Myanmar are not so passive or subjective as to act on signals from China. Myanmar actors have consistently demonstrated their own agency, and that they can reinvent their positions within the given situation to maximize their strategic options, from the strategic management of Khin Nyunt in 1989, to the strategic-sophisticated Twan Mrat Naing of the AA after 2011, to the recent military maneuvers of the 3BHA. History has demonstrated that these forces have the ability to seize opportunities, remold their positions to achieve more favorable conditions and that they are more than capable of producing results on their own terms.

Over 11,000 Clashes Broke Out Nationwide

(Feb 2021 - Nov 7, 2023)

At least 11,468 clashes broke out across the country since the coup. At least 3,161 clashes of these happened in 2023 up until Nov 7, with over 44 percent between the SAC forces and the joint forces of EAOs and PDFs. Another 40 percent broke out between the SAC forces and the joint forces of PDFs. Following the commencement of 'Operation 1027', the clashes between the SAC forces and the joint forces of EAOs and PDFs amounted to 169 times.



Source: Data is collected in accordance with ISP-Myanmar's system for documenting information in armed conflicts and is cross-checked with reports from various independent organizations. Actual figures may differ.



While conflicts as part of the current 'Operation 1027' have been raging broadly in at least eleven townships, the main target of the operation remains the re-occupation of Laukkai, while other battles' objectives are to cut off supplies and reinforcements to the Myanmar military (Please see ISP Mapping No. 22).

Scenario Forecast

How can we initially assess whether 'Operation 1027' will expand its scope in terms of objectives, tactics, and ambition? Could the offensive ultimately lead all the way to Naypyitaw, as the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) has claimed? To engage with these aspects and more, we should analyze the 'signaling effects' of the ongoing operation.

Firstly, what signal is the 'Operation 1027' offensive sending to the Myanmar military? The success of the operation demonstrates Myanmar's military weakness and loss of popular support in northern Shan State. The Tatmadaw may be materially superior to the resistance forces, but is facing intelligence and security failure at the same time losing the will to fight. 'Operation 1027' also signals that top Tatmadaw leadership lacks suitable withdrawal options for regular troops caught up in this crisis. Considering external pressures, 'Operation 1027' calls into question whether the junta military might face internal implosion depending on whether the theatre of war can expand beyond northern Shan State.

Secondly, 3BHA's 'Operation 1027' offensive sends strong signals to other armed resistance groups on the capabilities of the junta's state power. These other resistance forces can then make their own assessments on whether the Tatmadaw is in a vulnerable position or not, and whether they can risk entering into an all-out war or not. These third-party armed resistance forces can for now stay uninvolved in the conflict while assessing the cost-effectiveness of joining the fray. It can already be observed that other armed resistance groups in Sagaing Region, including the KIA, NUG's PDFs, and local defense forces (LDF) have already begun launching simultaneous attacks, and that resistance groups from Karenni are also coordinating attacks under the codename 'Operation 1107.' However the Arakan Army (AA), one of the three constituent 3BHA forces, is still holding to an informal ceasefire in its home Rakhine State and is



reluctant to join the all-out fight.² Future expansion of the war theatre thus depends upon the internal calculations of the larger EAOs.

Thirdly, the 3BHA offensive also sends signals to fellow EAOs to observe each other's actions cautiously. While many young Bamar are eager to fight and dedicated to ending the military dictatorship, many EAOs have been considering their own historical experiences of territorial disputes based on ethnic demographics, frictions between forces emerging as external actors expand into their area, and historical distrust of one another. If an EAO force expands into a disputed land in the name of resistance and hoists a popular flag, the response of other EAOs will become an interesting question. The internal limitations of each EAO will contribute to their decisions on whether to expand the theatre of war.

Fourthly, as the offensive progresses, it will send a signal to city dwellers on whether they could expect to encounter war and whether to prepare for insurrection or not. Some existing underground units in cities are capable of igniting conflicts within cities, and/or civilians in the general population could mobilize themselves to raise an insurrection. It is hard to speculate on details of such a scenario, but the possibility of the existing war theatre expanding brings into play the possibility of city insurrections against the junta.

Finally, this offensive sends signals to neighboring countries, including China. Conversely, if a non-neighboring country, such as the U.S. or Russia, were to become perceivably involved in the conflict in some form, the war theatre could expand internationally and become more complicated through geopolitical involvement. It seems obvious that the 3BHA forces are determined to take back Laukkai before February 2024, the anniversary of Kokang leader Peng's death. Questions will arise about whether the Myanmar military, perhaps with Chinese mediation, could accept the initial losses from 'Operation 1027' or opt to risk taking higher losses by extending the conflict through launching counter-offensives against 3BHA forces. Roads marked by the smoke and scent of war will converge on at least Laukkai and maybe even Naypyitaw, their trajectory influenced by the 'signaling effects' of 'Operation 1027.' Whatever the next stage of operations, the unfolding scenario warrants thorough and continuous investigation.

² Editor's note: Since the publication of this OnPoint No. 17 Burmese version, Arakan Army (AA) initiated offensive attacks against SAC forces in many townships of Rakhine State on Nov 13, 2023.

November 10, 2023

Historical Synopsis of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)
(March 12, 1989 - February 16, 2022)

Kokang forces led by Peng Jiasheng revolted against Communist Party of Burma (CPB) leadership and founded the MNDAA 1991 1993 Yang's leadership surrendered to the junta. Peng Jiasheng returned to Kokang and reclaimed rule. Mong Sala, an ethnic 994 Kachin, rebelled against Kokang leadership and formed the Mong Ko Defence Army (MDA) in Phaung Sai, Mong Ko, Mong Hao, and Mong Ya areas west of the Salween River. 997 After summoning them to a meeting, the junta arrested MDA leaders Mong Sala and Zaw La, accusing them of being involved in illicit drug smuggling, and sent them to Maung Daw prison in Rakhine State. Some MDA soldiers were killed and the force finally collapsed. Junta forces occupied Mong Ko, Phaung Sai, Mong Hao, and Mong Ya areas. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) then re-entered the area and began operations again.

1989 March 31

The rebellious Kokang group agreed on a ceasefire with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and was allowed to control the area as Shan State Special Region No. 1. At the time of the MNDAA's founding, forces led by Peng Jiasheng began administering the region with 2,706 armed men with 1,345 weapons. Myanmar's ruling junta allowed the MNDAA to control the area covering the Kokang region east of the Salween River and the Mong Ko (Monekoe) area west of the Salween, where mostly ethnically Kachin are residing.

1992 November 29

The Peng and Yang clans, led by Peng Jiasheng and Yang Molian, who had led the Kokang region, descended into an internal power struggle which ended in armed conflict between the rivals. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) militarily supported the Yang faction. After a brief war, Peng was forced into temporary exile in China.

1994

Yang Muxian, the younger brother of the new Kokang warlord Yang Molian, was arrested by Chinese officials and executed in Kunming, China, for trafficking heroin to China. The incident led to a waning of Chinese support for Yang's leadership and precipitated a crisis in the Yang clan's rule of the region. Myanmar junta forces then entered the Kokang area, saying to mediate the Peng-Yang conflict, and established military bases, exploiting the political weaknesses within Kokang.



SLORC's Chairman Snr. Gen. Saw Maung met with Peng Jiasheng



SLORC's Deputy Chair Gen. Than Shwe and Secretary, Maj. Gen. Khin Nyunt greeted ethnic leaders including Peng Jiasheng.

(Photo Credit: Constructive Efforts of the SLORC Historic Records: 1988 to 1991)

November 10, 2023

All forces under ceasefire agreements with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) were forced to transform into Border Guard Forces (BGF) according to the 2008 constitution. The MNDAA under Peng Jiasheng was also put under pressure to comply.

After the 2010 General Elections, a civilian government emerged in Myanmar and through President's Office Order No. 22/2011 appointed the Chairman of Kokang Self-Administered Zone leading body. Bai Xuoqiang became Chairman of the leading body.

2015 Kokang offensive

After Peng Jiasheng declared his intention to regain control of the Kokang region in December 2014, fighting started on February 9, 2015. The 2015 Kokang Offensive lasted for five months and the MNDAA declared a unilateral ceasefire in June. The 2015 Kokang Offensive did not result in Peng's desired control of the region. At the beginning of the conflict, the Myanmar military encountered heavy losses but later regained the upper hand through the use of advanced weapons. In a press conference held on February 21, 2015, at the Myanmar military Commander-in-Chief's Office, Lt. Gen. Mya Tun Oo stated that 'Chinese mercenaries are involved in the fighting with Kokang forces, there are Chinese operating in Kokang area.' Pen Jiasheng denied the allegation. In fact, the TNLA and AA sided with the MNDAA and reportedly sent approximately 5,000 soldiers. The fighting resulted in 126 deaths on the Myanmar military side and at least 90 combatants from the MNDAA and its allies. At least 40,000 people were displaced by the fighting and four Chinese nationals died due to a stray rocket falling on the Chinese side of the border. China's government condemned the act and the Myanmar government had to apologize for the incident

2016

As the term of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone leading body Chairman runs parallel to the State President, Bai Xuoqiang resigned from the position of Chairman, and Zhao Deqiang became Chairman. Bai Xuoqiang's son, Khin Maung Lwin (a.k.a) Bai Yingneng became a member of the leading body.

2017 March 6

The MNDAA conducted a dawn attack against Yanlonekyine police station and the residence of U Wai San, a member of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone leading body. Fighting continued with the Myanmar military as MNDAA forces attacked the Kyintin and Fully Light Hotels at noon. At least 20,000 people were forced to flee from the fighting.

2019 February 8

Myanmar's military initiated an offensive against MNDÁA headquarters in Hong Ai alleging that the MNDAA was forcefully recruiting soldiers. Heavy fighting occurred around Mong Ko, Naung Cho, Mong Si, and Hsenwi areas.

2019 February 25

With China's mediation, Myanmar government's peace commission held talks with leaders of the MNDAA, KIA, AA, and TNI A

2019 August 15

Northern Alliance forces attacked Pyin Oo Lwin Defense Technology Institute with rockets and heavy fighting occurred around Naung Cho and Kyutkai.

2009 August 8

Junta forces attacked the residence of Peng Jiasheng after accusations of illicit drug trafficking and possession of an arms factory. A Kokang forces faction led by Bai Xuoqiang sided with the Myanmar military and deposed Peng and his clan from the Kokang area. The incident is known by the Peng clan as 'The August 8 Event.'

2009 August 25

Junta commanders held a meeting in Laukkai with the remaining Kokang force led by Bai Xuoqiang and decided to reorganize the Kokang force. The meeting also declared Peng Jiafu, Peng Daxun, and Peng Dali as outlaws.

2009 September 1

Bai Xuoqiang became Chairman of the temporary leading committee administering the Kokang region. Peng Jiasheng was forced to retreat and revitalize his forces in the Mong La area, led by U Sai Lin, Peng's son-in-law.

2014 December

Peng Jiasheng gave an exclusive interview with The Global Times, the mouthpiece of the China Communist Party, stating that he would try to regain the Kokang Region.

2015 February 9

2012

2016

2018

The MNDAA attacked the militia camp in the Tauk-shwe village of Laukkai and resumed heavy fighting in Konkyan, Mawhtike, Nyan Kwan, Tashwehtan, and in the 18-Mile border post camp around Laukkai Township. During the fighting, the AA and KIA militarily assisted the MNDAA. Some artillery shells landed on Chinese soil during the fighting.

2015 June 10

The MNDAA declared a unilateral ceasefire

2021

After the military coup, the MNDAA began training and arming youth coming in from cities.

2021 July 28

MNDAA provided Covid-19 vaccination in Mong Ko region's to garner popular support and establish administrative mechanism. The junta forces launched attacks to block and disturb the MNDAA plan/implementation. The first clash was broke out in Mang Yang village of Mong Ko region.

2021 August 19

MNDAA's commander-in-chief sent a letter to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Chairman Gen. N'Ban La stating that the MNDAA intends to establish an administrative mechanism in the Mong Ko region.

2021 August 28

Fighting continued to occur in the Mong Ko area between junta forces and the MNDAA.

2021 August 30

MNDAA forces intercepted SAC military column Light Infantry Battalion 575 advancing from Pang Seng sub-township to Mong Ko.

2021 September 1

An SAC base camp close to Phaung Sai village was occupied by the MNDAA.

2022

MNDAA trained and formed Brigade 611 in Lashio Township of northern Shan State comprised of new recruits. Members included combatants from the Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF), People's Liberation Army (PLA), Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA), PDF 602 Battalion, and some forces from the Sagaing Region.

2022 February 16

Peng Jiasheng died in Mong La. However his sons and MNDAA leaders have committed to re-claiming control of the Kokang region.

Information About Kokang Self-Administered Zone

According to the 2008 Constitution, Chapter 2, 'State Structure', Article 56 (e), 'Kokang Self-Administrative Zone' was formed by 'grouping Konkyan and Laukkai Townships in Shan State.' In Konkyan Township, Konkyan, and Maw Htike towns are incorporated into the self-administered zone, and in Laukkai Township, Laukkai, and Chinshwehaw towns are incorporated. Laukkai is the capital city of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone. Konkyan Township has a population of 45,013 residents, totaling 7,786 households, while Laukkai Township has a population of 84,998 in 13,833 households, according to General Administration Department (GAD) figures (up to July 2022). Kokang Self-administrative Zone management functions are divided between the administrative body and the military command.

Kokang Self-Administered Zone Leading Body

The leading body was formed on a temporary basis on September 1, 2009, led by Bai Xuoqiang as Chairman. On March 30, 2011, the position of Chairman of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (SAZ) body was officially appointed by the President's Office Order No. 22/2011. Bai Xuoqiang was appointed Chairman of the leading body. According to Kokang SAZ law, the term of the Chairman of the leading body is similar to that of the State President. The leading body is formally formed with at least ten representatives: elected representatives military personnel appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, and additional persons selected by those two groups of members. Since 2016, the appointed Chairman has been Zhao Degiang.

Based on data available up to 2020, retired Col. Wai San acted as central advisor and chair of the leading body to Border Command No. 1006 of Kokang SAZ. His son, U Maung Maung a.k.a U Wai Maung Maung involved as the member of the leading body.

Kokang Self-Administered Zone Leading Body

After the military coup in 2021, the SAC reformed the new leading body of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (SAZ) on March 4, 2021.

Chairman : U Myint Swe (a.k.a) Li Zhengfu

Member : Lt. Col. Kyaw Kyaw Oo

Member : U Khin Maung Lwin (a.k.a) Bai Yingneng (Son of Bai Xuoqiang)

Secretary : U Moe Zaw Latt

In the Laukkai Township of Kokang SAZ, along with Border Guard Force No. 1006, the junta's Tatmadaw military presence consists of the Regional Operation Command (ROC-Laukkai) bases composed of one division, and 13 battalions. In Konkyan Township, two Tatmadaw divisions and one battalion are in operation.

Regional Operation Command-ROC (Laukkai)

Commander : Brig. Gen. Moe Kyaw Thu Konkyan : Infantry Battalion (IB) 125

Laukkai : IB 128 (Parcen Kyaw), IB 129 (Nyan Kwan), IB 239, and IB 322

Border Guard Force No. 1006

Border Guard Force was formed on December 4, 2009.

Commander: Maj. Yan Shaokyin

Base area : Laukkai, Konkyan, Kwan Lone

Local militias are also based in Laukkai.

For background information on the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (SAZ), covering topics such as Kokang's inclusion into Myanmar territory, the Peng family, Yang family, Pe family, and the Kokang army in the past, as well as the modern-era MNDAA (Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army), please visit the ISP Gabyin Community.

ISPTIMELINE

November 10, 2023

Timeline Relating to 'Operation 1027' (October 27 - November 8, 2023)



October 27, 2023

Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), namely the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA), announced that 'Operation 1027' has started in northern Shan State and simultaneously attacked several Tatmadaw military posts in Kokang Self-Administered Zone, including Chinshwehaw, Muse, Lashio, and Hsenwi Townships. Along with 3BHA forces, allied forces such as the People Liberation Army (PLA), Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA), People's Defence Force (Mandalay), and the Moe Goke Tactical Command (PDF) have joined the fight and participated in the attacks. On the first day of the offensive, 3BHA and allied forces seized 22 camps in total, including major military units. The forces also demolished the Phaung Seik bridge connecting Hopan and Kunlong Townships



October 28, 2023

3BHA and allied forces seized an additional 27 camps in Muse, Kutkai, and Lashio, as well as Hsenwi and Namsalap police stations. Among the occupied camps, the Majiadi Pauk base camp close to Chinshwehaw is a strategic position in the Kokang area. Police forces and the military in Hsenwi Township were attacked by 3BHA forces as a part of the offensive.



October 29, 2023

In Nawnghkio, Hseni, Mogok, Lashio, Chinshwehaw, and Mong Ko Townships, 3BHA forces seized 14 additional military posts as well as Nam Bwan police station Of the occupied military posts, Phaung Sai tactical command and two military bases close to Lashio are strategically important. 3BHA forces also captured a tank.



October 30, 2023

3BHA forces announced that they had asserted control over Chinshwehaw and the Hpawng Hseng area in Muse township. On the same day, at least ten more military posts were seized, mostly in the Mong Ko area. In the Kokang area, 3BHA forces seized a large military post close to Yan Taw San village, east of the Salween River. The 3BHA forces demolished a bridge connecting the Hseni-Kunlong Townships and announced that 40 soldiers and officers from Infantry Battalion 143 had surrendered to 3BHA forces and transferred control of their post to the 3BHA. Elsewhere, local PDF forces collaborated with the AA and attacked military camps in the Mawkun range of Tigyaing Township of Sagaing Region, asserting that the fighting was part of Operation 1027:



October 31, 2023

3BHA forces seized at least nine more military camps in Hseni, Namkham, Muse, and Kutkai Townships. Of the newly occupied camps, Mengpa camp, situated between Lashio and Hseni Townships was deserted by the Tatmadaw military after the 3BHA forces encircled the camp.



3BHA forces attacked more military posts in the Kokang SAZ and Nawnghkio Township. 3BHA forces seized Malilin military post in Laukkai Township.



November 7, 202

3BHA forces seized four more military posts, including Mong Kos tactical command, and claimed to be in control of the Muse border trade station at the China-Myanmar border. On another front, resistance forces in Kayah State attacked and seized two military posts close to Pantein village of Maese Township, claiming their operation was in support of 'Operation 1027.'



November 6, 2023

3BHA forces continued the fight in Nawngkhio, Nam Kham, Hseni, and Muse Townships, and Kokang area and seized at least five more military posts as well as Nam Kham police station. Additionally, combined forces of the KIA, AA, PDF, and local defense forces occupied Kawlin Town in Sagaing Region.



November 5, 2023

3BHA forces seized ten more military posts in the Mong Ko area, and Nam Kham, Kyaukme, Mongton, and Laukkai Townships. Of the newly occupied camps, Panlon tactical command is an important camp, SAC forces deserted Tashwehtan military camp in Laukkai Township leaving arms and subsequently occupied by the allied forces.



vember 4, 202

3BHA forces continue fighting in the Kokang area east of the Salween River and the Mong Ko area situated west of the river. 3BHA forces in the Kokang area, Mong Ko, Lashio, and Mongmit Townships seized eight more military posts.



lovember 3, 2023

3BHA forces seized eight more military posts as well as Mongton police station in Mongton, Mongmit, Laukkai, and Namhkam Townships. Of the newly occupied camps, Chaukpachaik and Shimeinkhai are major military camps of importance situated close to the Chinese border.



November 2, 2023

3BHA forces announced that they had asserted control over Chinshwehaw, Hseni, and Kyugoke (Pangseng). Four more military posts were seized including major camps in Nam Kham, Laukai, and Kunlong Townships.



November 1, 2023

3BHA forces continued to attack military camps in Hseni, Kunlong, Mong Ko, and Nawngkhio Townships and intercepted Tatmadaw military columns reinforcing the area. Four more military posts were occupied in Laukai, Kutkai, Muse townships, and camps situated along the Muse-Namkham highway. Of the newly occupied camps, Mang Ton Pa camp is strategically important to the area. The SAC Air Force conducted bombing operations against Ohnmakha, Sammasae villages, and area close to Laiza Town where KIA bases its headquarters.

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Promoting Shared Reality, Appreciating Diversity, and Imagining Possibilities





