


# 2

## Perceptions of the Role of China in Myanmar's Political Crisis

## Question-15

## To what extent does China's involvement bring a positive influence in resolving Myanmar's political crisis?

For survey question No. 15, respondents were asked to what extent China's involvement has a positive influence on resolving Myanmar's political crisis. Respondents were asked to rank their views on a four-point scale, ranging from 1. Not positive at all to 4. Very positive.



Overall, **45 percent** of respondents perceived no positivity in China's involvement in resolving Myanmar's political crisis, and **40 percent** perceived it to have a positive influence. Additionally, **eight percent** perceived it as not positive at all, and **four percent** perceived it as very positive.

Compared to perceptions from the 2022 survey, several changes were observed in this year's survey. There was a **six percent** increase in respondents answering "not positive," with **39 percent** perceiving this way in the previous survey. Additionally, there was a **seven percent** decrease in respondents perceiving China's involvement as "not positive at all," dropping from **15 percent** last year to **eight percent** this year. Conversely, there was a **three percent** rise in respondents viewing the involvement as "positive," increasing from **37 percent** last year to **40 percent** this year.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Zooming in on the perspectives of different groups, **72 percent** of political society members and **61 percent** of the business community perceived that China's involvement in resolving Myanmar's political crisis is positive (represented by the responses "positive" and "very positive"). Civil society organizations (**63 percent**), EAOs (**60 percent**), and PDFs/LDFs (**54 percent**) perceived that China's involvement was not positive (represented by the responses "not positive at all" and "not positive"). Interestingly, the responses from the PDFs/LDFs are divided, as the remaining **46 percent** of them perceived that China's involvement was positive (represented by the responses "positive" and "very positive").

Question-15

To what extent does China's involvement bring a positive influence in resolving Myanmar's political crisis?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not positive at all	8%	9%	0%	5%	7%	7%	27%
Not positive	45%	54%	18%	32%	49%	53%	27%
Positive	40%	33%	62%	54%	41%	40%	19%
Very positive	4%	2%	10%	7%	0%	0%	27%
Do not know	1%	1%	5%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	1%	5%	0%	3%	0%	0%

Questions-16 to 21


### How are the relations between key actors in Myanmar and China?

For survey questions No. 16 to 21, respondents were asked about relations between key Myanmar and China actors in a post-coup setting and were given a four-point scale to rank them (from 1. Not good at all to 4. Very good). Although the option "neutral" was included in last year's survey, it was removed for 2023. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) were newly added for this year.

- Not good at all
- Good
- Do not know
- Neutral
- Not good
- Very good
- Prefer not to answer

**Question-16**

How are the relations between the State Administration Council (SAC) and China?




**Question-17**

How are the relations between the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and China?



**Question-18**

How are the relations between the National League for Democracy (NLD) and China?




**Question-19**

How are the relations between the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and China?




**Question-20**

How are the relations between northern Shan State EAOs and China?



**Question-21**

How are the relations between the National Unity Government (NUG) and China?



Among the respondents, **54 percent** answered that relations between China's government and the State Administration Council (SAC) are good, while **19 percent** answered not good. Comparing with the data from the previous survey, this year shows a **26 percent** increase in respondents who believe that the relations are good. Meanwhile, **35 percent** of respondents answered that the relations between the NLD and China's government are good, indicating a **27 percent** increase compared to the previous survey. Likewise, there is a **seven percent** decrease in respondents who answered that the relations between the NLD and China are not good, as **39 percent** answered this way. This year, **54 percent** of the respondents answered that the relations between China and northern Shan State EAOs are good and increased by **16 percent** compared to last year's result. An additional question to measure China's relations with the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) was included this year. Among the respondents, **58 percent** and **38 percent** answered that relations are good with the USDP and SNLD, respectively. On the question of the NUG's relations with China, **20 percent** answered good, a **15 percent** increase compared to last year. Similarly, there were no significant differences in perceiving that NUG has no good relations with the Chinese government, as **50 percent** of respondents chose this answer.

### Analysis of the Survey Results

EAOs and PDFs/LDFs, in contrast to the other communities surveyed, exhibited a notably higher perception of positive relations between China and the SAC. In the survey, **86 percent** of EAOs perceived the relations between the Chinese government and the SAC as good, while **82 percent** of PDFs/LDFs shared the same view. The majority of civil society organization respondents (**65 percent**), PDFs/LDFs respondents (**64 percent**), and EAO respondents (**60 percent**) answered that the relations between the NLD and China are not good. A good relationship between the SNLD and China is also perceived by **49 percent** of the prominent individuals and **47 percent** of the EAOs. However, **46 percent** of civil society organizations respondents believe that the relations are not good.

All respondents perceived the relations between China and northern Shan State EAOs as good, as EAOs (**94 percent**), prominent individuals (**86 percent**), and PDFs/LDFs (**82 percent**) responded in this way. All five communities, other than PDFs/LDFs, answered that the relations between China's government and the NUG are not good. Respondents from PDFs/LDFs (**54 percent**) assumed the relations are good between China and the NUG.

Question-16

How are the relations between the State Administration Council (SAC) and China?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	5%	7%	0%	2%	5%	0%	18%
Not good	19%	14%	19%	12%	38%	7%	0%
Good	54%	54%	57%	59%	44%	73%	55%
Very good	15%	20%	14%	12%	7%	13%	27%
Prefer not to answer	2%	1%	10%	3%	1%	0%	0%
Do not know	5%	4%	0%	12%	5%	7%	0%

Question-17

How are the relations between the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and China?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	6%	10%	5%	3%	2%	0%	9%
Not good	16%	13%	19%	12%	20%	27%	18%
Good	58%	54%	62%	59%	62%	53%	55%
Very good	8%	9%	5%	7%	3%	13%	18%
Prefer not to answer	9%	10%	9%	7%	11%	7%	0%
Do not know	3%	4%	0%	12%	2%	0%	0%

Question-18

How are the relations between the National League for Democracy (NLD) and China?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	10%	19%	5%	7%	2%	0%	0%
Not good	39%	46%	29%	27%	31%	60%	64%
Good	35%	24%	48%	34%	51%	33%	27%
Very good	1%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	9%
Prefer not to answer	10%	9%	13%	17%	10%	0%	0%
Do not know	5%	2%	5%	15%	3%	7%	0%

Question-19

How are the relations between the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and China?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	5%	10%	0%	0%	2%	7%	0%
Not good	31%	36%	24%	29%	26%	32%	27%
Good	38%	35%	43%	34%	46%	47%	27%
Very good	2%	1%	0%	3%	3%	0%	9%
Prefer not to answer	18%	16%	24%	17%	21%	7%	37%
Do not know	6%	2%	9%	17%	2%	7%	0%

Question-20

How are the relations between northern Shan State EAOs and China?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	2%	4%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Not good	10%	14%	0%	5%	10%	6%	0%
Good	54%	52%	52%	41%	66%	47%	64%
Very good	21%	18%	24%	22%	20%	47%	18%
Prefer not to answer	8%	9%	19%	13%	2%	0%	9%
Do not know	5%	3%	5%	17%	2%	0%	9%

Question-21

How are the relations between the National Unity Government (NUG) and China?


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	9%	15%	5%	10%	2%	7%	9%
Not good	50%	45%	57%	44%	61%	67%	28%
Good	20%	19%	14%	15%	23%	19%	45%
Very good	2%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	9%
Prefer not to answer	12%	12%	19%	15%	12%	0%	0%
Do not know	7%	6%	5%	16%	2%	7%	9%



## Question-22

## What political system does China want to see in Myanmar?

For survey question No. 22, respondents were asked to select which response best matched their opinion among the two options.



Individuals from Myanmar's policy communities generally held the view that China prefers to see Myanmar as an authoritarian state rather than a democratic one. Those who responded, "China wants to see Myanmar as an authoritarian state" made up **60 percent** of respondents, while **26 percent** answered, "China wants to see Myanmar as a democratic state."

The results show certain changes as compared to the 2022 survey. **Five percent** more respondents expressed the view that China wants to see Myanmar as an authoritarian state. Likewise, there was a **11 percent** increase in the view that China wants to see Myanmar as a democratic state.

Analysis of the Survey Results

To analyze the perspectives of different groups, **80 percent** of civil society organizations answered, "China wants to see Myanmar as an authoritarian state." PDFs/LDFs (**64 percent**) also answered the same. In contrast, EAO and business community respondents perceived that China wants to see Myanmar as a democratic state, with **53 percent** and **46 percent** respectively. Notably, political society was evenly split, with **43 percent** believing that China wants to see Myanmar as a democratic state and an equal **43 percent** believing that China wants to see Myanmar as an authoritarian state. Meanwhile, some political society respondents (**ten percent**) and prominent individuals (**19 percent**) preferred not to answer.

Question-22


What political system does China want to see in Myanmar?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Myanmar as a democratic state	26%	12%	43%	46%	25%	53%	18%
Myanmar as an authoritarian state	60%	80%	43%	37%	54%	40%	64%
Do not know	4%	3%	4%	7%	2%	7%	0%
Prefer not to answer	10%	5%	10%	10%	19%	0%	18%

Question-23

### How should China be involved in resolving Myanmar's post-coup political crisis?

For survey question No. 23, respondents were presented with a list of possible intervention strategies for China to use in solving Myanmar's post-coup political crisis and asked to select the most effective one in their opinion.



Among the key stakeholders, the most popular views of how China should be involved in resolving Myanmar's political crisis were cooperation with the United Nations Special Envoy and cooperation with the ASEAN Special Envoy (**both 32 percent**). Moreover, **22 percent** selected China's direct involvement.

Compared to the 2022 survey results, minimal changes were observed. While there were no changes in respondents who selected "cooperation with the United Nations Special Envoy," there was a **three percent** decrease in those who selected "no involvement at all." Additionally, there was a **three percent** increase in respondents selecting "direct involvement," and a **two percent** increase in respondents who chose "cooperation with the ASEAN Special Envoy."

**Analysis of the Survey Results**

Different perspectives yielded varying results upon analysis. Cooperation with the ASEAN Special Envoy was perceived by the business community (**39 percent**), prominent individuals (**34 percent**), and EAOs (**33 percent**) as the way China should be involved in resolving Myanmar's political crisis. Civil society organizations (**40 percent**) and political society (**29 percent**) answered "cooperation with the United Nations Special Envoy." The survey revealed a significant finding that **36 percent** of respondents from PDFs/LDFs and **33 percent** from EAOs perceived that China should involve directly.

Question-23


How should China be involved in resolving Myanmar's post-coup political crisis?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
No involvement at all	6%	10%	0%	0%	3%	7%	10%
Direct involvement	22%	15%	24%	22%	28%	33%	36%
Cooperation with the UN Special Envoy	32%	40%	29%	29%	23%	27%	27%
Cooperation with the ASEAN Special Envoy	32%	31%	14%	39%	34%	33%	27%
Other involvements	4%	2%	23%	0%	8%	0%	0%
Do not know	2%	1%	5%	3%	4%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	1%	5%	7%	0%	0%	0%

Question-24

### Do you think China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar's domestic affairs?

For survey question No. 24, respondents were presented with the question, "Do you think China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar's domestic affairs?" and asked to respond either in the affirmative or negative way.



The majority of respondents (**73 percent**) responded that China does not practice a policy of non-interference in Myanmar affairs. **Twenty-four percent** averred that China follows a policy of non-interference.

Some changes were found compared with the 2022 survey results. Additional **six percent** of respondents perceived that "China does not practice a non-interference policy in Myanmar's domestic affairs."

Analysis of the Survey Results

The survey shows that the view of China not practicing a policy of non-interference with regard to Myanmar is widespread among all surveyed key stakeholders communities. Members of political society (**86 percent**), prominent individuals (**79 percent**), business community members (**71 percent**), civil society organizations (**70 percent**), EAOs (**67 percent**), and PDFs/LDFs (**64 percent**) responded in this way. Significantly, there were not many differences between the responses of EAOs and PDFs/LDFs respondents, and no respondents picked “do not know” nor “prefer not to answer.”

Question-24


Do you think China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar's domestic affairs?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
China practices a non-interference policy	24%	26%	10%	27%	20%	33%	36%
China does not practice a non-interference policy	73%	70%	86%	71%	79%	67%	64%
Do not know	1%	2%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	2%	0%	2%	1%	0%	0%

## Question-25

## Has the post-coup political crisis brought China and Myanmar closer together?

For survey question No. 25, respondents were asked either to respond in the affirmative or the negative way to whether the political crisis following the 2021 coup brought China and Myanmar closer together.



Most respondents did not think China and Myanmar developed closer ties since the coup. **Fifty-four percent** responded in this way (answered, “the political crisis has not brought China and Myanmar closer together”), while **42 percent** answered that the two countries became closer (answered, “the political crisis brought China and Myanmar closer together”).

Compared with the 2022 survey results, there were some changes. **Eleven percent** more respondents perceived that the two countries' ties grew closer, while respondents believing the contrary decreased by **six percent**.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Based on the survey, the majority of five communities did not think that China and Myanmar had been closer in the post-coup period. PDFs/LDFs respondents (**91 percent**), prominent individuals (**66 percent**) and members of political society (**62 percent**) indicated this. In contrast, a majority (**53 percent**) of civil society organization respondents answered, "the political crisis has brought China and Myanmar closer together."

Question-25

Has the post-coup political crisis brought China and Myanmar closer together?


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Closer ties	42%	53%	33%	39%	33%	40%	9%
No closer ties	54%	42%	62%	56%	66%	53%	91%
Do not know	2%	4%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	1%	0%	5%	1%	7%	0%



## Question-26

## How have Myanmar policy communities' perceptions toward China shifted since the coup?

For survey question No. 26, respondents were asked whether they had developed a more negative or positive view of China since the coup or their views had not changed.



On the question of a change in perceptions of China after the coup, **64 percent** of respondents answered “no change,” while **28 percent** have developed a more negative view. **Six percent** have shifted towards a more positive view of China.

Compared to the 2022 results, there has been a **five percent** increase in respondents whose perceptions regarding China remain unchanged after the coup. Conversely, there has been a **six percent** decline in respondents expressing a more negative view of China, alongside a **four percent** increase in those viewing China more positively.

Analysis of the Survey Results

When examining different communities' perspectives, a majority indicated no change in perception towards China since the coup. Most PDFs/LDFs (**82 percent**) and political society respondents (**81 percent**) answered that their views had undergone no change. Significantly, among civil society organizations, **47 percent** of respondents reported a shift towards a more negative view.

Question-26


How have Myanmar policy communities' perceptions toward China shifted since the coup?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
A more negative view	28%	47%	5%	12%	16%	27%	18%
No change	64%	50%	81%	72%	72%	67%	82%
A more positive view	6%	2%	9%	12%	10%	6%	0%
Do not know	1%	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	5%	2%	2%	0%	0%

Question-27

### How does China primarily decide on its policies for Myanmar in the post-coup period?

For survey question No. 27, respondents were asked to choose only one from the two options: 1. China carefully considers Myanmar's public opinion, and 2. China directly engages with whoever is in power.



The vast majority of respondents (**82 percent**) indicated that China directly engages with anyone whoever is in power when it considers Myanmar policies. Only **12 percent** of respondents answered that China carefully considers Myanmar's public opinions.

A slight difference is noted compared with the 2022 survey: a **three percent** increase in respondents who perceived that China directly engages with whoever is in power.

Analysis of the Survey Results

The survey shows the salience of the view that China directly engages with anyone whoever is in power when it considers its policy towards Myanmar. EAOs (**93 percent**), civil society organizations (**90 percent**), prominent individuals (**84 percent**), and PDFs/LDFs (**82 percent**) answered in this way. Meanwhile, some of the business community (**22 percent**) answered that China carefully considers Myanmar's public opinions, the highest proportion among all six communities.

Question-27


How does China primarily decide on its policies for Myanmar in the post-coup period?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
China carefully considers Myanmar's public opinion	12%	7%	14%	22%	11%	7%	18%
China directly engages with whoever is in power	82%	90%	62%	66%	84%	93%	82%
Do not know	2%	2%	5%	5%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	4%	1%	19%	7%	5%	0%	0%

## Question-28

## What is the motive behind China's approach to Myanmar's post-coup political crisis as a regional issue?

For survey question No. 28, respondents were asked to choose only one between the two options: 1. China intends to limit Western and international influence, and 2. China genuinely intends to solve Myanmar's crisis in a practical manner.



The 2023 survey included a new question regarding the narrative of China's approach to resolving Myanmar's political crisis as a regional issue. When asking key stakeholders on their views on the possible motive behind adopting this approach, **74 percent** of the respondents selected "China intends to limit Western and international influence." Meanwhile, only **20 percent** answered, "China genuinely intends to solve Myanmar's crisis in a practical matter." **Four percent** of respondents answered "do not know" and **two percent** refused to answer.

Analysis of the Survey Results

The survey reveals the view that China intends to limit Western and international influence in its solution to Myanmar's crisis, with the majority of civil society organizations (**85 percent**) and prominent individuals (**80 percent**) holding this perception. EAOs and PDFs/LDFs (**both 73 percent**), and members of political society (**62 percent**) and the business community (**44 percent**) similarly perceived China's intentions in this manner. In contrast, a large minority of the business community (**37 percent**) believe that China genuinely seeks to address Myanmar's crisis. Political society respondents (**33 percent**) are the second-most group expressing this belief.

Question-28

What is the motive behind China's approach to Myanmar's post-coup political crisis as a regional issue?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
China intends to limit Western and international influence	74%	85%	62%	44%	80%	73%	73%
China genuinely intends to solve Myanmar's crisis in a practical matter	20%	12%	33%	37%	15%	27%	27%
Do not know	4%	3%	5%	10%	2%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	0%	0%	9%	3%	0%	0%

Questions-29 to 32


## How helpful is China's advocated election process in solving Myanmar's crisis?

For survey questions No. 29 to 32, respondents were asked to choose one answer from the given options on how helpful China's advocated election process is in solving Myanmar's crisis. The responses ranged from 1. Not helpful at all to 4. Very helpful.

- Not helpful at all
- Not helpful
- Helpful
- Very helpful
- Do not know
- Prefer not to answer

**Question-29**

How helpful is China's advocated election process in solving Myanmar's crisis in the long run?



**Question-30**

How helpful is China's advocated election process in solving Myanmar's crisis through ASEAN's effort?




**Question-31**

How does China's advocated election process benefit the Myanmar Armed Forces?



**Question-32**

How helpful is China's advocated election process in solving Myanmar's current crisis?



A prevalent belief is that China is urging the SAC to seek a political exit through the electoral process. However, **35 percent** of respondents did not consider this approach helpful for long-term conflict resolution, and **38 percent** responded "not helpful at all." Regarding ASEAN's efforts in Myanmar's affairs, **37 percent** of respondents answered "not helpful," whereas **18 percent** answered "not helpful at all." Regarding how beneficial the China-advocated election process is for the Myanmar Armed Forces, **49 percent** answered "helpful," while **32 percent** selected "very helpful." Finally, **40 percent** expressed skepticism that the election process would provide a good resolution for the current crisis, answering "not helpful at all," while an additional **31 percent** responded "not helpful."

### Analysis of the Survey Results

The survey shows that **91 percent** of PDFs/LDFs did not find China's advocated election process for the SAC's escape as helpful (represented by the responses "not helpful at all" and "not helpful") to conflict resolution in the long run. A similar perspective is shared by **86 percent** of EAO respondents, **84 percent** of civil society organization respondents, and **80 percent** of prominent individuals surveyed. PDFs/LDFs respondents (**72 percent**), EAO respondents (**67 percent**), prominent individuals (**64 percent**) and CSO respondents (**61 percent**) also believed that China's push for election exit was not helpful towards ASEAN's efforts (represented by the responses "not helpful at all" or "not helpful"). All groups perceived that the advocacy was beneficial only to the Myanmar Armed Forces and the SAC. This perspective was predominantly shared among all EAO respondents (**100 percent**). Political society respondents (**86 percent**), CSO respondents (**85 percent**), PDFs/LDFs respondents (**81 percent**), prominent individuals (**79 percent**), and business community respondents (**66 percent**) also agreed with this sentiment.



Question-29

How helpful is China's advocated election process in solving Myanmar's crisis in the long run?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not helpful at all	38%	45%	29%	17%	44%	33%	55%
Not helpful	35%	39%	19%	24%	36%	53%	36%
Helpful	18%	12%	43%	29%	13%	14%	9%
Very helpful	4%	2%	5%	15%	3%	0%	0%
Do not know	2%	1%	4%	5%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	3%	1%	0%	10%	4%	0%	0%

Question-31

How does China's advocated election process benefit the Myanmar Armed Forces?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not helpful at all	3%	4%	5%	2%	5%	0%	0%
Not helpful	10%	8%	5%	15%	11%	0%	19%
Helpful	49%	45%	57%	54%	48%	67%	45%
Very helpful	32%	40%	29%	12%	31%	33%	36%
Do not know	3%	2%	4%	7%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	3%	1%	0%	10%	5%	0%	0%

Question-32

How helpful is China's advocated election process in solving Myanmar's current crisis?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not helpful at all	40%	49%	24%	15%	46%	40%	55%
Not helpful	31%	33%	38%	29%	28%	40%	18%
Helpful	19%	13%	29%	29%	18%	20%	18%
Very helpful	5%	3%	5%	12%	3%	0%	9%
Do not know	2%	1%	4%	5%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	3%	1%	0%	10%	5%	0%	0%

Note: Detailed survey results on Question No. 30 can be viewed on Appendix 3.