




ISP CHINA STUDIES

August, 2025

Myanmar's Key Stakeholders and their Perceptions of

SINO-MYANMAR RELATIONS A SURVEY

2024





Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar

Established in 2016.

“Myanmar’s Key Stakeholders and their Perceptions of Sino-Myanmar Relations - A Survey (2024),” was published in August, 2025, as a translation of the original Burmese version published in June, 2025. This survey is a part of research conducted by the ISP-Myanmar’s China Studies. ISP-Myanmar has been conducting this annual survey since 2022, making the 2024 survey the third iteration.



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ABOUT THE SURVEY



Since 2022, the Institute of Strategy and Policy-Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar) has been conducting an annual survey titled “Myanmar’s Key Stakeholders and Their Perceptions of Sino-Myanmar Relations.” The 2024 survey, which marks the third iteration, aims to analyze how key figures within Myanmar’s policy community from various sectors perceive the fundamental factors shaping Sino-Myanmar relations. Through the survey findings, ISP-Myanmar explores gaps between perceptions of different groups and connections within these dynamics. This year’s survey includes 92 questions, divided into eight sections: (1) general perceptions of China, (2) perceptions of the role of China in Myanmar’s political crisis, (3) perceptions of the role of China in Myanmar’s peace processes, (4) perceptions of Sino-Myanmar economic relations, (5) perceptions of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) projects, (6) perceptions of China’s regional integration plans through Myanmar, (7) perceptions of China’s soft power, and (8) perceptions of the use of Chinese technology.

Survey respondents consisted of six key stakeholder groups:

- (1) the political community
- (2) the business community
- (3) civil society organizations (CSOs)
- (4) prominent individuals, including scholars, activists and pundits who are





■ Respondents and Percentage of Stakeholders Surveyed from Six Key Communities

Community	Respondents	Percentage
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)	105	40%
Political Society	16	6%
Business Community	42	16%
Prominent Individuals	66	25%
Ethnic Armed Organizations (EOs)	15	6%
People's Defense Forces (PDFs) and Local Defense Forces (LDFs)	16	6%

Total

260

100%*



- ▶ knowledgeable about China's political, economic, and international affairs
- (5) leaders and members of ethnic armed organizations (EOs)
- (6) leaders and members of the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) and Local Defense Forces (LDFs), which emerged during the Spring Revolution and operate in areas where Chinese investments are located.

A distinctive feature of this survey is the inclusion of questions exploring Myanmar key stakeholders' perceptions on China's stance, positions, and policies regarding conflict resolution in Myanmar. The survey aimed to reach 300 individuals across six stakeholder groups and successfully collected responses from 260 participants, including 193 male, 64 female, and three individuals who identified as other

* Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.

► genders. This represents an increase of 10 respondents compared to the 2023 survey and 45 more than the 2022 survey, with female participation also rising steadily each year. To ensure clarity and ease of interpretation, the numerical data in this survey have been rounded to the nearest whole number. As a result, percentages may not total 100 percent. This does not affect the overall reliability, validity, or accuracy of the survey results. The survey received technical support from the People's Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE). Detailed methodologies and topics covered can be explored in the appendices.

To make sense of the survey responses from Myanmar's six policy communities, it is essential to consider the broader political and conflict dynamics context during the data collection period. The Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) resumed the second phase of Operation 1027 a few months before the survey commenced. Prior to this, the 3BHA had already overrun 240 military outposts and key border trade stations held by the State Administration Council (SAC), dealing a significant blow to the regime. In response, Beijing brokered ceasefire talks between the SAC and 3BHA in Kunming, Yunnan Province—dubbed the “Haigeng Talks” after the hotel where the talks took place. These talks reflected China's strategy of “conflict de-escalation through economic incentives.” The

Haigeng Agreement produced a temporary ceasefire in northern Shan State, effective January 11, 2024. In a parallel diplomatic move, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Naypyitaw on August 14, meeting SAC leadership, former Senior General Than Shwe and former President Thein Sein.

The Haigeng Talks period marked a turning point in China's diplomatic strategy toward Myanmar. Foreign Minister Wang Yi also laid out three “bottom lines” for Myanmar: the country must not descend into civil war, sever ties with ASEAN, or fall under the sway of foreign powers. Beijing also reaffirmed support for elections as a political exit for the SAC. Soon after, China exerted pressure on both the SAC and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) to restore a ceasefire, paving the way for the regime's reoccupation of Lashio, which had previously been controlled by the MNDAA. During the survey period, October 2024, meeting records between Deng Xijun, China's Special Envoy to Myanmar, and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) were also leaked. Later, following the powerful earthquake in Mandalay and Sagaing on March 28, 2025, China provided swift humanitarian assistance. These developments form the backdrop against which Myanmar's policy community has assessed China's role—adding critical nuances to the survey findings. ■

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY




The 2024 survey reveals a significant rise in negative perceptions of China within Myanmar's policy community. Most notably, perceptions of China as "not a good neighbor" have increased significantly. This year's most striking finding is a shift in concern: where economic dominance once topped the list, a majority of respondents now said China's interference in Myanmar's internal armed conflicts and security sector as the greatest challenge in bilateral relations.

Among Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), there is a prevalent belief that China seeks to position Myanmar as a client state. Pessimism has also grown regarding China's involvement in Myanmar's peace process and its outcomes. Many respondents view China's policies on resolving Myanmar's crisis regarding the Three Bottom Lines as impractical, with a rising number believing that China is actively interfering in Myanmar's affairs and prefers an authoritarian governance system for the country.

Additionally, there is widespread disapproval of the implementation of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) projects. Findings indicated that Chinese companies have reached out to EAOs to ensure the continued operation of these projects. At the same time, China has also contacted People's Defense Forces and Local Defense Forces (PDFs/LDFs) in attempts to safeguard China-backed ventures. Regarding regional integration initiatives, awareness remains low—most respondents are unfamiliar with these projects, except for the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC). Additionally, China's economic development model, 'Democracy with Chinese Characteristics', governance model, and related systems are increasingly disfavored. ■


KEY FINDINGS

- 1. Elections considered unlikely to resolve Myanmar’s conflict in the long run




A strong majority of respondents—81 percent—viewed the State Administration Council’s (SAC) proposed elections, as encouraged by China as a path toward political settlement, as unlikely to help resolve Myanmar’s conflicts in the long run. This reflects an eight percentage point rise from last year, when 73 percent held a similar perspective. Only 16 percent believe the election could pave a constructive path.

- 2. Democracy with Chinese characteristics widely unfavored for Myanmar




When asked whether a model of democracy with Chinese characteristics was suitable for Myanmar, 90 percent of respondents said it was not, while seven percent supported the idea. The group disfavoring the Chinese model has grown by three percentage points since the 2022 and 2023 surveys. Support, meanwhile, has declined—by one point compared to 2022 and two points compared to 2023.

3. China's efforts in Myanmar's crisis seen as protection of its strategic interests




A majority of respondents—63 percent—believed that China's increased involvement in Myanmar's crisis stems primarily from the attacks on, and seizure of, its strategic projects. Military gains by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) were also cited by 58 percent of respondents as a key factor. Meanwhile, 37 percent attributed China's growing attention to the rising unity among Myanmar's opposition forces.

4. Negative views of China continue to rise



Three-quarters of respondents said their views of China have become more negative—a trend that has grown steadily year by year.

5. Chinese firms' consultations on project continuations



Half of respondents (50 percent) who were contacted by Chinese companies involved in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) said the main reason they were contacted was to request cooperation to continue project implementation. Many also reported being warned against disrupting China's initiatives.




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General Perceptions of China

Question-1

Is China a good neighbor for Myanmar?

Respondents were asked whether China is a good neighbor for Myanmar or not by providing a set of responses based on a four-point scale- (1) Not good at all, (2) Not a good neighbor, (3) Good neighbor, and (4) A very good neighbor.



Negative opinions of China among Myanmar's key stakeholders have risen compared to the results of the previous two years. A majority of key stakeholders surveyed (**68 percent**) think that China is not a good neighbor. On the other hand, **30 percent** considered it a good neighbor. Negative sentiment has grown steadily, rising by **14 percentage points** since the 2023 survey and **13 points** since 2022. In contrast, those who see China as a good neighbor—whether very good or simply good—have declined by **12 percentage points** compared to 2023 and **10 percentage points** compared to 2022.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

When comparing results across different policy communities, **CSOs** showed the highest negative attitude, with **83 percent** perceiving China as “not a good neighbor.” Similarly, **73 percent** of prominent figures, **63 percent** of PDFs/LDFs, and **53 percent** of EAOs shared this view. However, **63 percent** of the political society and **60 percent** of the business community considered China a good neighbor.

Question-1

Is China a good neighbor for Myanmar?


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	18%	24%	6%	7%	15%	20%	25%
Not a good neighbor	50%	59%	25%	33%	58%	33%	38%
Good neighbor	29%	15%	50%	60%	21%	47%	31%
A very good neighbor	1%	0%	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	3%	2%	0%	0%	6%	0%	6%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of 'Not good at all' and 'Not a good neighbor' are grouped together as 'Not a good neighbor,' while 'A good neighbor' and 'A very good neighbor' are grouped as 'A good neighbor' for the purpose of analysis.

Question-2

What is the main challenge Myanmar faces in its relations with China?

Respondents were asked to select only one option from a list of challenges that Myanmar faces in its relations with China.



Myanmar key stakeholders' views on the main challenge Myanmar faces in its bilateral relations with China have changed since last year. This year, nearly half of the respondents—**46 percent**—picked **“China’s interference in Myanmar’s armed conflict and security sector”** as the most pressing challenge in bilateral relations. In past years, **“China’s interference in Myanmar’s armed conflict”** and **“China’s influence in the security sector”** were asked as separate questions. In the 2023 survey, **21 percent** of respondents chose **“China’s interference in Myanmar’s armed conflict”** while **six percent** chose **“China’s influence in the security sector.”** In the 2022 survey, **19 percent** selected **“China’s interference in Myanmar’s armed conflict”** while **four percent** chose **“China’s influence in the security sector.”** In this year’s survey, answers relating to **geopolitical influence** ranked second at **32 percent**, with **economic influence** ranking third at **17 percent**—both down sharply by **21 and 22 percentage points** respectively compared to 2023 and 2022.

Analysis of the Survey Results

In analyzing the responses from the six surveyed community groups, "China's interference in Myanmar's armed conflict and security sector" were selected by **prominent figures at 52 percent** and **CSOs at 50 percent**, the highest compared to other groups' answers. **EAOs at 47 percent** and **PDFs/LDFs at 44 percent** selected both "China's interference in Myanmar's armed conflict and security sector" and "China's geopolitical influence." Meanwhile, **half of the political society group** chose "China's geopolitical influence" as the main challenge.

Question-2


What is the main challenge Myanmar faces in its relations with China?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
No challenge at all	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
China's economic influence	17%	22%	0%	26%	11%	7%	13%
China's geopolitical influence	32%	25%	50%	29%	33%	47%	44%
China's interference in Myanmar's armed conflict and security sector	46%	50%	44%	31%	52%	47%	44%
China's cultural and demographic influence	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Others	5%	4%	0%	12%	5%	0%	0%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question-3

What is the main benefit Myanmar gains from its relations with China?

Respondents were asked to select only one option from a list of possible benefits Myanmar gains from its relations with China.



Foreign direct investment was seen as the main benefit that Myanmar gains from China, with **30 percent** of key stakeholders selecting this option. **Market access** followed closely at **28 percent**, while **13 percent** said there were **no benefits at all**. This marks a shift of opinions from the 2022 and 2023 surveys, when **market access** topped the list at **37 percent** in both years, a **nine percentage point** decline this year.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

In comparing responses across the six surveyed stakeholder groups, most EAOs and CSOs identified “foreign direct investment” as the main benefit Myanmar gains from its relationship with China. Specifically, **47 percent of EAO** and **35 percent of CSO respondents** selected this option. Similarly, **33 percent of business community respondents** and **31 percent of political society respondents** also viewed foreign direct investment as the main benefit. Among those who cited “market access” as the key benefit, **PDFs/LDFs** has the largest share at **38 percent**, followed by **33 percent of business community respondents** and **26 percent of prominent public figures**.

Question-3

What is the main benefit Myanmar gains from its relations with China?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
No benefit at all	13%	19%	6%	2%	14%	7%	13%
Market access	28%	29%	19%	33%	26%	20%	38%
Foreign direct investment	30%	35%	31%	33%	18%	47%	25%
Technology transfer	2%	2%	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%
Development aid	9%	4%	13%	14%	12%	7%	19%
Infrastructure development	9%	4%	13%	10%	15%	20%	6%
Others	6%	4%	13%	7%	9%	0%	0%
Do not know	1%	2%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	2%	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%


Questions-4 to 7

How dependent is Myanmar on China?


For survey questions No. 4 to 7, respondents were asked to rate their views on the level of Myanmar’s dependence on China in specific key areas. The options were provided on a four-point scale (from 1. Not dependent at all to 4. Completely dependent).

- Not dependent at all
- Dependent
- Do not know
- Not dependent
- Completely dependent
- Prefer not to answer


■ Question-4




■ Question-5



■ Question-6



■ Question-7




Questions-8 to 11

How dependent is Myanmar on China?


For survey questions No. 8 to 11, respondents were asked to rate their views on the level of Myanmar's dependence on China in specific key areas. The options were provided on a four-point scale (from 1. Not dependent at all to 4. Completely dependent).

- Not dependent at all
- Dependent
- Do not know
- Not dependent
- Completely dependent
- Prefer not to answer


■ Question-8




■ Question-9



■ Question-10



■ Question-11




Questions-12 and 13

How dependent is Myanmar on China?


For survey questions No. 12 and 13, respondents were asked to rate their views on the level of Myanmar’s dependence on China in specific key areas. The options were provided on a four-point scale (from 1. Not dependent at all to 4. Completely dependent).

- Not dependent at all
- Dependent
- Do not know
- Not dependent
- Completely dependent
- Prefer not to answer

■ Question-12



■ Question-13



Survey respondents overwhelmingly viewed that Myanmar remains heavily dependent on China in various areas except education and healthcare. In particular, respondents indicated that Myanmar is dependent on China for **trade** (96 percent), **investment** (89 percent), **diplomacy** (83 percent), the **peace process** (80 percent), and **politics** (74 percent). These figures closely mirror last year’s findings, with the top three categories—trade, investment, and diplomacy—retaining their rankings. However, perceptions of dependency in **security** and **politics** declined by 10 and 5 percentage points respectively.

Analysis of the Survey Results

In analyzing responses from the six communities surveyed, all communities agreed that Myanmar is dependent on China in terms of trade. Notably, **all respondents** from **EAOs** and the **political community** shared this view. Regarding politics, the peace process, investment, technology, and diplomacy, all communities shared similar views, agreeing that Myanmar is dependent on China for these sectors. However, the groups presented differing views on infrastructure development, healthcare and security. Over half of **EAO respondents (53 percent)**, the highest among the six communities, viewed that Myanmar does not depend on China for infrastructure development. In the healthcare sector, while other communities indicated no dependency on China, **50 percent of PDF respondents** reported dependency. While all other communities indicated dependency on China for security, **75 percent of PDF respondents** stated that Myanmar does not depend on China.

Question-4 Trade		Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not dependent at all		1%	0%	6%	0%	2%	0%	0%
Not dependent		3%	4%	0%	0%	5%	0%	6%
Dependent		78%	79%	81%	76%	74%	87%	75%
Completely dependent		18%	17%	6%	24%	18%	13%	19%
Do not know		0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer		0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of 'Not dependent at all' and 'Not dependent' are grouped together as 'Not dependent,' while 'Dependent' and 'Completely dependent' are grouped as 'Dependent' for the purpose of analysis.

Question-5

Investment

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not dependent at all	3%	2%	6%	0%	3%	0%	13%
Not dependent	8%	10%	0%	5%	3%	20%	19%
Dependent	80%	78%	81%	88%	83%	67%	63%
Completely dependent	9%	10%	6%	7%	9%	13%	6%
Do not know	1%	1%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%

Question-6

Peace Process

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not dependent at all	4%	6%	0%	0%	5%	0%	13%
Not dependent	13%	16%	13%	10%	8%	33%	6%
Dependent	63%	54%	69%	64%	74%	47%	75%
Completely dependent	17%	20%	13%	24%	11%	20%	6%
Do not know	1%	1%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	3%	0%	2%	3%	0%	0%

Question-7

Infrastructure Development

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not dependent at all	5%	7%	0%	0%	6%	0%	19%
Not dependent	32%	39%	19%	26%	30%	53%	6%
Dependent	57%	50%	69%	69%	58%	47%	63%
Completely dependent	4%	5%	6%	5%	2%	0%	13%
Do not know	1%	0%	6%	0%	2%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%

Question-8

Politics

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not dependent at all	4%	5%	13%	0%	2%	7%	6%
Not dependent	19%	17%	25%	12%	20%	20%	38%
Dependent	63%	62%	56%	71%	65%	67%	44%
Completely dependent	11%	14%	0%	12%	9%	7%	6%
Do not know	1%	0%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	3%	2%	0%	2%	5%	0%	6%

Question-9

Education

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not dependent at all	18%	19%	13%	12%	17%	33%	25%
Not dependent	64%	63%	63%	64%	67%	67%	63%
Dependent	15%	17%	19%	21%	11%	0%	13%
Completely dependent	1%	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	2%	0%	6%	0%	5%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%

Question-10

Healthcare

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not dependent at all	13%	15%	19%	7%	11%	20%	6%
Not dependent	54%	50%	50%	62%	58%	67%	38%
Dependent	31%	33%	31%	26%	30%	13%	50%
Completely dependent	1%	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	0%	2%	2%	0%	0%

Question-11

Technology

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not dependent at all	7%	10%	6%	0%	9%	7%	0%
Not dependent	22%	24%	19%	21%	17%	33%	19%
Dependent	60%	54%	69%	69%	62%	53%	69%
Completely dependent	8%	10%	0%	10%	6%	7%	6%
Do not know	2%	1%	6%	0%	3%	0%	6%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%

Question-12

Security

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not dependent at all	7%	9%	6%	0%	8%	7%	19%
Not dependent	30%	29%	31%	26%	26%	33%	56%
Dependent	52%	51%	56%	57%	58%	47%	19%
Completely dependent	8%	9%	0%	12%	6%	13%	0%
Do not know	1%	1%	6%	0%	0%	0%	6%
Prefer not to answer	2%	2%	0%	5%	3%	0%	0%

Question-13


Diplomacy

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not dependent at all	3%	4%	6%	0%	2%	0%	13%
Not dependent	13%	9%	25%	7%	12%	27%	31%
Dependent	66%	70%	50%	69%	71%	53%	44%
Completely dependent	17%	18%	13%	21%	14%	20%	13%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	0%	2%	2%	0%	0%

Question-14

What is China's major interest in its relations with Myanmar?

From the list of responses regarding China's key interest in its relations with Myanmar respondents were asked to select only one option. The choices "Indian Ocean access for Yunnan Province," "Forming an alliance with ASEAN," and "Expansion of the market for China's basic industrial products," which were included in previous surveys, were not included in this round. Meanwhile, "demonstrating a superpower's capacity to help resolve the Myanmar crisis" and "market expansion for the eight western provinces of China" were newly added in this survey.



Among Myanmar's key stakeholders, to gain geopolitical influence in the **Indian Ocean** was viewed as **China's primary interest** in its relationship with Myanmar, with **40 percent** selecting this option. This was followed by **"to position Myanmar under China's sphere of influence"** (20 percent) and **"to access to Myanmar's natural resources"** (19 percent). Geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean remains unchanged as the **top response** over the 2022, 2023 and 2024 surveys. However, the share of respondents who chose **China's intent to position Myanmar within its sphere of influence** rose by **seven percentage points** this year.

Analysis of the Survey Results

The biggest proportion of all policy communities agreed that China's interest in Myanmar is to gain geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean. This perspective was shared among **48 percent of prominent figures, 47 percent of EAOs, 44 percent of PDFs, 43 percent of business communities, and 34 percent of CSOs.** For the response “to position Myanmar under China's sphere of influence,” **27 percent of EAOs**—the highest among the six groups—indicated agreement. “To access to Myanmar's natural resources” was most frequently cited by **CSOs, at 30 percent.** “To demonstrate capability as a superpower to resolve the Myanmar crisis” was cited by the **political society** the most (**19 percent**) compared to other groups.

Question-14


What is China's major interest in its relations with Myanmar?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
No interest at all	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
To gain geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean	40%	34%	25%	43%	48%	47%	44%
To access to Myanmar's natural resources	19%	30%	19%	12%	9%	7%	19%
To expand market for the eight western provinces of China	7%	5%	13%	10%	8%	7%	6%
To position Myanmar under China's sphere of influence	20%	25%	13%	7%	20%	27%	25%
To demonstrate a superpower's capacity to help resolve the Myanmar crisis	7%	5%	19%	14%	3%	13%	6%
Others	6%	1%	6%	12%	12%	0%	0%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%

Question-15

How have Myanmar policy communities' perceptions toward China shifted since the coup?

Respondents were asked, "Compared to the period before the 2021 coup, have you developed a more positive view of China, or a more negative view?" The response option "no change," which had been included in previous surveys, was excluded in this year's survey.



Since the 2021 coup, a clear majority—**75 percent**—said they now hold **a more negative view** of China. Only **11 percent** reported **a more positive view**, while **13 percent** avoided answering this question. The proportion of those expressing a more negative sentiment has risen sharply—by **41 percentage points** since 2022 and **47 points** since 2023. Notably, however, those reporting **a more positive view** also increased, though marginally: **up nine points** from 2022 and **five** from 2023. In previous surveys, a majority had reported "no change" in their perception of China—**64 percent** in 2023 and **59 percent** in 2022.

Analysis of the Survey Results

A more negative view of China was prevalent across all key stakeholder groups, with CSOs and EAOs reporting the highest percentage, at 90 percent and 87 percent, respectively. Among the remaining groups, 68 percent of prominent figures and 63 percent of PDFs/LDFs held a more negative view. For “a more positive view,” the political society community had the highest response rate at 25 percent. The business community had the highest rate of respondents choosing “prefer not to answer,” at 21 percent.

Question-15

How have Myanmar policy communities' perceptions toward China shifted since the coup?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
A more negative view	75%	90%	56%	57%	68%	87%	63%
A more positive view	11%	6%	25%	19%	11%	7%	13%
Do not know	2%	0%	6%	2%	2%	0%	6%
Prefer not to answer	13%	5%	13%	21%	20%	7%	19%



◀ See the previous surveys



2

Perceptions of China's Role in Myanmar's Political Crisis

Questions-16 and 17


How are the relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China?

For survey questions 16 and 17, respondents were asked about their perceived relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China following the 2021 coup, using a four-point scale to rank them (from 1: “Not good at all” to 4: “Very good”). Although the “neutral” option was included in the 2022 survey, it was not included in the 2023 or current surveys. The inquiry on Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) was newly added to this year’s survey.

- Not good at all
- Good
- Do not know
- Not good
- Very good
- Prefer not to answer


■ Question-16

What do you think of relations between China and the State Administration Council (SAC)?



■ Question-17

What do you think of relations between China and the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)?



◀ See the previous surveys

Questions-18 and 19


How are the relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China?

For survey questions 18 and 19, respondents were asked about their perceived relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China following the 2021 coup, using a four-point scale to rank them (from 1: “Not good at all” to 4: “Very good”). Although the “neutral” option was included in the 2022 survey, it was not included in the 2023 or current surveys. The inquiry on Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) was newly added to this year’s survey.

- Not good at all
- Good
- Do not know
- Not good
- Very good
- Prefer not to answer


■ Question-18

What do you think of relations between China and the National League for Democracy (NLD)?



■ Question-19

What do you think of relations between China and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD)?



◀ See the previous surveys

Questions-20 and 21


How are the relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China?

For survey questions 20 and 21, respondents were asked about their perceived relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China following the 2021 coup, using a four-point scale to rank them (from 1: “Not good at all” to 4: “Very good”). Although the “neutral” option was included in the 2022 survey, it was not included in the 2023 or current surveys.

- Not good at all
- Good
- Do not know
- Not good
- Very good
- Prefer not to answer


■ Question-20

What do you think of relations between China and Northern Shan State EAOs (FPNCC)?



■ Question-21

What do you think of relations between China and the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA)?



◀ See the previous surveys

Question-22


How are the relations between Myanmar's key actors and China?

For survey question 22, respondents were asked about their perceived relations between Myanmar's key actors and China following the 2021 coup, using a four-point scale to rank them (from 1: "Not good at all" to 4: "Very good"). Although the "neutral" option was included in the 2022 survey, it was not included in the 2023 or current surveys.

- Not good at all
- Good
- Do not know
- Not good
- Very good
- Prefer not to answer

■ Question-22

What do you think of relations between China and the National Unity Government (NUG)?



Among respondents, **80 percent** perceived relations between China and the State Administration Council (SAC) as **good**. Similarly, **79 percent** viewed China as having **good relations** with the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). On the other hand, **69 percent** saw relations between China and the National League for Democracy (NLD) as **not good**. Over half—**52 percent**—also believed relations between China and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) were **not good while 61 percent of respondents** viewed China's relations with the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) in northern Shan State as **good**. Meanwhile, **58 percent** assessed relations with the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) **positively**, while **34 percent** saw them as **not good**. Just over three quarters of respondents (**76 percent**) characterised China's relationship with the National Unity Government (NUG) as **not good**. Overall, key stakeholders viewed China as maintaining good relations with the SAC, USDP, FPNCC, and 3BHA, while having less favorable—or not good—relations with the NLD, SNLD, and NUG, to varying degrees.

Since the previous annual survey, there has been a moderate shift in key stakeholders' views regarding relations between China and Myanmar's various key actors. Responses citing relations between China and the SAC as **good** increased by **11 percentage points** from 2023 and by **33 points** from 2022. More respondents also perceived relations between China and the USDP as **good** with a **13-point** increase from 2023. However, fewer respondents viewed relations between China and the NLD as **good**, with a **13-point** decrease from 2023 responding "**good**" and a **20-point** increase from 2023 and **14-point** increase from 2022 responding "**not good**". Respondents who viewed relations between China and the SNLD as "**not good**" increased by **16 percentage points** from 2023. Moreover, fewer respondents viewed relations between China and the FPNCC as **good** with a **14-point** decrease from 2023. Similarly, more respondents perceived relations between China and the NUG as **not good** with a **17-point** increase from 2023 and an **11-point** increase from 2022.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

In comparing responses from the six surveyed community groups, **EOs** and **political society** reported the highest perception of “good” relations between China and the SAC, with **93 percent** and **88 percent**, respectively. All community groups viewed relations between China and the USDP as “good,” particularly **PDFs/LDFs at 88 percent** and **EOs at 86 percent** being the highest. All groups perceived relations between China and the NLD as “not good,” with **CSOs at 78 percent** and **PDFs/LDFs at 75 percent** reporting the highest levels. Similarly, relations between China and the SNLD were viewed as “not good” by **61 percent of CSOs** and **55 percent of business communities**, the highest reported of all the groups. All groups considered relations between China and northern Shan State EOs (FPNCC) as “good,” with **EOs at 67 percent** and **prominent figures at 64 percent** being the highest. Likewise, all groups viewed relations between China and the 3BHA as “good,” with **PDFs/LDFs at 69 percent** and the **business community at 62 percent** reporting the highest rates. All groups perceived relations between China and the NUG as “not good,” with **EOs at 87 percent** and the **prominent individuals** category at **86 percent** being the highest.

Question-16

Relations between China and the State Administration Council (SAC).

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	2%	2%	0%	2%	2%	0%	0%
Not good	15%	12%	6%	21%	20%	7%	6%
Good	66%	72%	75%	67%	61%	60%	44%
Very good	14%	12%	13%	5%	12%	33%	38%
Do not know	1%	1%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	3%	0%	0%	2%	6%	0%	13%

For analysis, responses of “Not good at all” and “Not good” were grouped under “Not good,” while “Good” and “Very good” were grouped under “Good.”

Question-17

Relations between China and the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	3%	4%	0%	2%	0%	0%	13%
Not good	11%	12%	6%	14%	9%	13%	0%
Good	68%	69%	63%	62%	73%	73%	69%
Very good	11%	10%	13%	14%	8%	13%	19%
Do not know	5%	4%	13%	2%	8%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	1%	6%	5%	3%	0%	0%

Question-18

Relations between China and the National League for Democracy (NLD).

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	15%	22%	6%	19%	8%	0%	6%
Not good	54%	56%	50%	45%	52%	60%	69%
Good	22%	16%	13%	24%	29%	27%	25%
Very good	1%	1%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	5%	5%	6%	5%	5%	7%	0%
Prefer not to answer	4%	0%	19%	5%	8%	7%	0%

Question-19

Relations between China and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD).

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	8%	10%	0%	10%	6%	7%	0%
Not good	44%	51%	31%	45%	36%	47%	38%
Good	27%	24%	25%	29%	29%	33%	31%
Very good	2%	2%	6%	0%	2%	0%	6%
Do not know	15%	11%	19%	12%	20%	7%	25%
Prefer not to answer	5%	1%	19%	5%	8%	7%	0%

Question-20

Relations between China and Northern Shan State EAOs (FPNCC).

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	2%	2%	0%	2%	2%	0%	6%
Not good	27%	30%	31%	21%	26%	27%	19%
Good	54%	53%	50%	60%	56%	60%	31%
Very good	7%	8%	6%	0%	8%	7%	19%
Do not know	7%	4%	13%	12%	3%	7%	25%
Prefer not to answer	3%	3%	0%	5%	6%	0%	0%

Question-21

Relations between China and the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA).

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	3%	5%	0%	0%	3%	7%	6%
Not good	31%	32%	31%	21%	36%	33%	19%
Good	51%	55%	38%	52%	47%	47%	56%
Very good	7%	4%	19%	10%	8%	7%	13%
Do not know	5%	3%	13%	12%	2%	7%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	1%	0%	5%	5%	0%	0%

Question-22


Relations between China and the National Unity Government (NUG).

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not good at all	19%	17%	13%	17%	27%	27%	6%
Not good	57%	61%	44%	48%	59%	60%	63%
Good	12%	15%	19%	14%	3%	7%	13%
Very good	1%	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%	6%
Do not know	6%	3%	6%	14%	8%	7%	0%
Prefer not to answer	5%	3%	19%	5%	3%	0%	13%

Question-23

What political system does China want to see in Myanmar?

Respondents were asked to select which option best matched their opinion among the two options for the political system that China wants to see in Myanmar where ethnic issues and armed conflicts are rampant.



Seventy-two percent of respondents said they believed that China considers an “authoritarian political system” to be suitable for Myanmar, while only 15 percent thought that China favours a democratic model for Myanmar. A further 12 percent declined to answer. This perception has strengthened over time. The proportion viewing China as favouring authoritarianism for Myanmar rose by 12 percentage points from 2023 and 17 points from 2022. Meanwhile, the share believing that China prefers a democratic system for Myanmar fell by 11 points compared with last year’s survey.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

In comparing responses from the six surveyed community groups, all groups believed that “China wants to see Myanmar as an authoritarian state.” Specifically, **82 percent of CSOs, 81 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 73 percent of EAOs, 67 percent of prominent individuals, 60 percent of the business community, and 44 percent of political society** expressed this view.

Question-23

What political system does China want to see in Myanmar?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
China wants to see Myanmar as a democratic state	15%	10%	25%	29%	14%	20%	6%
China wants to see Myanmar as an authoritarian state	72%	82%	44%	60%	67%	73%	81%
Do not know	1%	1%	6%	0%	2%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	12%	8%	25%	12%	18%	7%	13%




See the previous surveys

Question-24

How do you think China will engage in efforts to resolve Myanmar's post-coup political crisis?

A list of countries and organizations that China could cooperate with in its involvement in Myanmar were presented to our respondents, and asked to select the most likely partner for cooperation.



Asked how China is likely to engage in Myanmar's ongoing political crisis, 34 percent of respondents, the highest proportion, said that Myanmar should cooperate with ASEAN's Special Envoy. Another 26 percent expected China to act unilaterally, while 20 percent anticipated cooperation with neighbouring countries. Just 13 percent believed China would develop a new international framework involving both regional and global actors.



See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

The perception that China will collaborate with the ASEAN Special Envoy was most prevalent in four out of six groups. Specifically, **43 percent of CSOs**, **38 percent of the political society group**, **36 percent of the business community**, and **33 percent of EAOs** expressed this view. Meanwhile, **38 percent of PDFs/LDFs** and **33 percent of EAOs** believed China will act unilaterally. Additionally, **33 percent of prominent figures** expected China to cooperate with neighboring countries.

Question-24

How do you think China will engage in efforts to resolve Myanmar's post-coup political crisis?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
No involvement at all	2%	2%	0%	5%	0%	0%	6%
Cooperation with the UN Special Envoy	4%	7%	0%	0%	5%	0%	0%
Cooperation with the ASEAN Special Envoy	34%	43%	38%	36%	20%	33%	25%
Cooperation with neighboring countries	20%	10%	31%	19%	33%	13%	19%
Creating a new international framework	13%	12%	19%	12%	14%	20%	13%
Acting unilaterally	26%	24%	6%	29%	29%	33%	38%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%




◀ See the previous surveys

Question-25

Do you think China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar’s domestic affairs?

Respondents were presented with the question, “Do you think China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar’s domestic affairs?” and asked to respond either in the affirmative or negative.



A large majority—**85 percent**—of respondents said China does not adhere to a policy of non-interference in Myanmar’s political crisis. Just **13 percent** believed Beijing maintains such a policy. The perception of China’s interference has grown steadily. Compared to the 2022 survey, the share of respondents rejecting China’s non-interference claim rose by **18 percentage points**, and by **12 points** compared to 2023. Meanwhile, the view that China does follow a non-interference policy declined by **11 points** from the previous year.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Across all six surveyed community groups, most respondents rejected the notion that China is adhering to a policy of non-interference in Myanmar's political crisis. Specifically, **92 percent of prominent figures, 89 percent of CSOs, 87 percent of EAOs, 74 percent of the business community, and 69 percent of both the political society group and PDFs/LDFs** expressed this view.

Question-25

Do you think China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar's domestic affairs?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar	13%	11%	19%	24%	6%	13%	25%
China does not practice a non-interference policy in Myanmar	85%	89%	69%	74%	92%	87%	69%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	0%	6%	2%	2%	0%	6%




◀ See the previous surveys

Question-26

Do you think the post-coup political crisis brought China and Myanmar closer together?

Respondents were asked if they thought that the political crisis following the 2021 coup brought China and Myanmar closer together or not.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

The majority of most groups, except the political society group, stated that Myanmar and China have not grown closer due to the political crises and conflicts since the 2021 coup. Specifically, **88 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 79 percent of the business community, 73 percent of both EAOs and prominent figures, and 70 percent of CSOs** expressed this view. Notably, the views among the political community were divided; **half** believe the two countries were brought closer while **44 percent** believe otherwise.

Question-26

Do you think the post-coup political crisis brought China and Myanmar closer together?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Yes, I think it brought the two countries closer	26%	30%	50%	19%	21%	27%	13%
No, I do not think it brought the two countries closer	72%	70%	44%	79%	73%	73%	88%
Do not know	1%	1%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%




◀ See the previous surveys

Question-27

In your opinion, what has shaped China's policies toward Myanmar in the post-coup period?

The question asked what factor they believe China primarily considers when formulating policies toward Myanmar following the 2021 coup: (1) China takes Myanmar public opinion into serious consideration, or (2) China mainly considers engagement with whoever is in power. Respondents were asked to select one of two factors that best match their opinion.



The vast majority of respondents (91 percent) thought that China prioritizes engaging with whoever holds power in shaping its policies toward Myanmar. Only five percent held the view that China takes Myanmar public opinions into serious consideration. Some shifts in perception have emerged since the last survey. The proportion of respondents who view China as favoring those in power increased by 12 percentage points from 2022 and by nine points from 2023. Conversely, the share of people who believed China takes public opinions in Myanmar into consideration fell by six points from 2022 and seven from 2023.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Across all six community groups surveyed, respondents overwhelmingly agreed that China prioritises engagement with those in power in shaping its Myanmar policy. This view was unanimous among **EAOs (100 percent)** and was similarly high among **CSOs (96 percent)**, **PDFs and LDFs (94 percent)**, and **prominent individuals (92 percent)**. Although relatively lower, the majority of the **business community (76 percent)** and **political society (75 percent)** also agree with this view. Among those who believe that China takes Myanmar public opinions into serious consideration in its policy toward the country, the **business community** shows the highest level of agreement, at **13 percent**.

Question-27

In your opinion, what has shaped China's policies toward Myanmar in the post-coup period?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
China takes Myanmar public opinions into serious consideration	5%	2%	13%	12%	3%	0%	6%
China mainly considers engagement with whoever is in power	91%	96%	75%	76%	92%	100%	94%
Do not know	2%	1%	6%	2%	2%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	3%	1%	6%	10%	3%	0%	0%




See the previous surveys

Question-28

How effective is China's push to resolve Myanmar's political crisis within the 2008 constitutional framework?

Respondents were asked to evaluate the level of effectiveness of China's support for resolving Myanmar's political crisis within the 2008 constitutional framework. Given options ranged from 1. Not effective at all to 4. Very effective. This question was newly introduced in this round of survey.



China has urged that Myanmar's political crisis be resolved within the framework of the 2008 Constitution. A majority of respondents (**81 percent**) viewed this approach unfavourably: **42 percent** said it was not effective at all, while **39 percent** said it was not effective. Only **17 percent** considered the approach effective.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

All stakeholder groups viewed China's push to resolve Myanmar's political crisis within the framework of the 2008 Constitution as not effective, to varying degrees. Specifically, **87 percent of CSO respondents, 83 percent of prominent individuals, 82 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 80 percent of EAOs, 66 percent of the business community group, and 56 percent of the political community group** expressed this view. Among those who viewed China's push as effective, the **political society group** showed the highest percentage with **31 percent**, followed by the **business community** with **26 percent**.

Question-28

How effective is China's push to resolve Myanmar's political crisis within the 2008 constitutional framework?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not effective at all	42%	50%	6%	26%	48%	33%	38%
Not effective	39%	37%	50%	40%	35%	47%	44%
Effective	16%	12%	25%	24%	14%	20%	19%
Very effective	1%	0%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	1%	0%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	0%	6%	5%	3%	0%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of 'Not effective at all' and 'Not effective' are grouped together as 'Not effective,' while 'Effective' and 'Very effective' are grouped as 'Effective' for the purpose of analysis.


Questions-29 and 30

How practical are China's three bottom lines in contributing to the resolution of Myanmar's political crisis?

For survey questions No. 29 and 30, respondents were asked to assess the practicality of the "Three Bottom Lines" proposed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi for resolving Myanmar's political crisis, as stated during his visit to Myanmar. These bottom lines are: (1) Myanmar should not be subject to civil strife, (2) Myanmar should not be detached from the ASEAN family, and (3) Myanmar should not be infiltrated by and interfered with by external forces. This question is newly added this year.


■ Question-29

How practical is the bottom line that Myanmar should not be subject to civil strife?



■ Question-30

How practical is the bottom line that Myanmar should not be detached from the ASEAN family?




Question-31

How practical are China’s three bottom lines in contributing to the resolution of Myanmar’s political crisis?

For survey question No. 31, respondents were asked to assess the practicality of one of the “Three Bottom Lines” proposed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi for resolving Myanmar’s political crisis, as stated during his visit to Myanmar. These bottom lines are: (1) Myanmar should not be subject to civil strife, (2) Myanmar should not be detached from the ASEAN family, and (3) Myanmar should not be infiltrated by and interfered with by external forces. This question is newly added this year.

■ Question-31

How practical is the bottom line that Myanmar should not be infiltrated by external forces?



Of the three “bottom lines” proposed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his visit to Myanmar, two—namely that **Myanmar should not experience civil strife** and **should not be infiltrated by external forces**—were widely regarded as unrealistic. Three-fourths of respondents viewed these two bottom lines as impractical. In contrast, **61 percent** considered the third—**Myanmar remaining within the ASEAN fold**—as a practical goal.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Across the six surveyed community groups, all groups regarded the goal of preventing civil strife as impractical. Specifically, this view was shared by **85 percent of CSOs, 81 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 71 percent of prominent figures, 60 percent of EAOs, 57 percent of the business community group, and 50 percent of the political society group.** A similar pattern was observed regarding the impracticality of preventing arbitrary interference by external forces, with **82 percent of CSOs, 81 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 80 percent of EAOs, 68 percent of the prominent individuals group, and 64 percent of the business community group** expressing this view. However, half of the **political society group (50 percent)** considered this bottom line to be practical. In contrast, the majority of groups viewed maintaining Myanmar's engagement with ASEAN as a practical objective. This included **93 percent of EAOs, 67 percent of the business community group, 63 percent of the political society group, 59 percent of the prominent individuals group, 56 percent of CSOs, and 50 percent of PDFs/LDFs.**



◀ See the previous surveys

Question-29

How practical is the bottom line that Myanmar should not be subject to civil strife?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not practical	73%	85%	50%	57%	71%	60%	81%
Practical	25%	15%	44%	38%	24%	40%	19%
Do not know	1%	0%	6%	0%	2%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	0%	0%	5%	3%	0%	0%

Question-30

How practical is the bottom line that Myanmar should not be detached from the ASEAN family?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not practical	37%	43%	31%	26%	39%	7%	50%
Practical	61%	56%	63%	67%	59%	93%	50%
Do not know	1%	1%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	0%	5%	2%	0%	0%

Question-31

How practical is the bottom line that Myanmar should not be infiltrated by external forces?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not practical	73%	82%	44%	64%	68%	80%	81%
Practical	23%	15%	50%	31%	30%	20%	6%
Do not know	2%	1%	6%	0%	0%	0%	13%
Prefer not to answer	2%	2%	0%	5%	2%	0%	0%

Questions-32 to 34


How helpful has China's election process advocacy been?

For survey questions No. 32 to 34, respondents were asked to choose one answer from the given options. The questions asked how helpful China's advocated election process has been in solving Myanmar's conflict resolution long term; for ASEAN's effort to address Myanmar's crisis; for the interests of the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and in resolving the immediate political crisis in Myanmar. The responses ranged from 1. Not helpful at all to 4. Very helpful.

- Not helpful at all
- Helpful
- Do not know
- Not helpful
- Very helpful
- Prefer not to answer


■ Question-32

How helpful has China's election process advocacy been in resolving Myanmar's conflict in the long term?




■ Question-33

How helpful has China's election process advocacy been for ASEAN's efforts to address Myanmar's crisis?



■ Question-34

How helpful has China's election process advocacy been for the interest of Myanmar Armed Forces?



Question-35


How helpful has China's election process advocacy been?

The questions asked how helpful China's advocated election process has been in resolving the immediate political crisis in Myanmar. The responses ranged from 1. Not helpful at all to 4. Very helpful. Respondents were asked to choose one answer from the given options.

- Not helpful at all
- Helpful
- Do not know
- Not helpful
- Very helpful
- Prefer not to answer

■ Question-35

How helpful has China's election process advocacy been in addressing Myanmar's immediate political crisis?



China has encouraged the SAC to pursue a political exit via elections. However, **81 percent of respondents** answered that this approach is **not helpful for long-term conflict resolution**. Regarding how helpful the election process has been for ASEAN's efforts to address Myanmar's crisis, **64 percent of respondents** answered "**not helpful**." Similarly, **77 percent** perceived that the election process would **not help resolve the current political crisis**. In contrast, **86 percent** considered it helpful for the Myanmar military regime.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Comparing responses across the six surveyed community groups, **100 percent of PDFs/LDFs** expressed that China's electoral process push was not helpful for long-term conflict resolution (represented by the responses "not at all helpful" and "not helpful"). Similarly, **89 percent of CSOs, 87 percent of EAOs, 82 percent of prominent individuals, and 64 percent of the business community** shared this view. Notably, **50 percent of the political society group** considered it helpful for long term conflict resolution in Myanmar (represented by the responses "helpful" and "very helpful"). Regarding the question on whether the election pathway could be helpful for ASEAN's efforts, **88 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 73 percent of EAOs, 68 percent of CSOs, 65 percent of prominent individuals, and 50 percent of the business community group** responded that it was not. In contrast, 56 percent of the political society group held the view that the election process helped ASEAN's position, followed by **40 percent of the business community**. All groups similarly perceived that the election process was not helpful for resolving the current political crisis, with **94 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 83 percent of CSOs, 80 percent of EAOs, 76 percent of the prominent individuals group, 67 percent of the business community group, and 63 percent of the political society group** expressing this view. Conversely, all groups viewed the election process as beneficial to the regime. This perspective was shared by **94 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 88 percent of prominent individuals, 85 percent of CSOs, 84 percent of the business community, 81 percent of political society, and 80 percent of EAOs**.



◀ See the previous surveys

Question-32

How helpful has China's election process advocacy been in resolving Myanmar's conflict in the long term?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not helpful at all	47%	49%	25%	26%	56%	47%	69%
Not helpful	34%	40%	19%	38%	26%	40%	31%
Helpful	14%	10%	44%	19%	17%	7%	0%
Very helpful	2%	1%	6%	7%	0%	7%	0%
Do not know	1%	0%	6%	5%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	1%	0%	5%	2%	0%	0%

Question-33

How helpful has China's election process advocacy been for ASEAN's efforts to address Myanmar's crisis?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not helpful at all	22%	23%	6%	10%	30%	20%	25%
Not helpful	42%	45%	31%	40%	35%	53%	63%
Helpful	33%	31%	50%	40%	32%	27%	13%
Very helpful	1%	1%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	1%	0%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	0%	0%	7%	3%	0%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of 'Not helpful at all' and 'Not helpful' are grouped together as 'Not helpful,' while 'Helpful' and 'Very helpful' are grouped as 'Helpful' for the purpose of analysis.

Question-34

How helpful has China's election process advocacy been for the Myanmar Armed Forces?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not helpful at all	6%	10%	0%	2%	6%	7%	0%
Not helpful	5%	5%	0%	7%	3%	13%	6%
Helpful	44%	37%	56%	60%	44%	40%	38%
Very helpful	42%	48%	25%	24%	44%	40%	56%
Do not know	1%	1%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	0%	13%	5%	3%	0%	0%

Question-35

How helpful has China's election process advocacy been in addressing Myanmar's immediate political crisis?


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not helpful at all	48%	58%	25%	26%	50%	53%	56%
Not helpful	29%	25%	38%	40%	26%	27%	38%
Helpful	15%	12%	25%	19%	18%	0%	6%
Very helpful	4%	3%	6%	5%	3%	20%	0%
Do not know	1%	0%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	3%	2%	0%	7%	3%	0%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of 'Not helpful at all' and 'Not helpful' are grouped together as 'Not helpful,' while 'Helpful' and 'Very helpful' are grouped as 'Helpful' for the purpose of analysis.

Question-36

What are China's motivations for increasing its engagement in resolving Myanmar's political crisis?

Respondents were asked to identify the main reasons for China's more active involvement in resolving Myanmar's political crisis relative to prior years, selecting up to three reasons from a provided list.



See the previous surveys

Recent events indicated China has been engaging more actively in resolving Myanmar's political crisis. Among the various reasons that could have prompted China to take more action, the top three reasons chosen by respondents were: **China's strategic projects being attacked or seized by 63 percent of respondents**, **military successes of the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) by 58 percent** and **increasing unity of the resistance forces by 37 percent**. Other reasons include the **EAOs' declining interest in regional talks, like the Haigeng Discussions, chosen by 33 percent**; **security threats to Chinese nationals in Myanmar, cited by 31 percent**; **SAC's rigid stances, mentioned by 27 percent**; and the **National Unity Government's (NUG) moderate view of China, selected by nine percent**.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Across the six surveyed community groups, **82 percent of prominent figures, 80 percent of EAOs, 63 percent of the political society group, and 57 percent of the business community group** most strongly believe that China's increased involvement stems from its strategic projects being attacked or seized. The military successes of the Three Brotherhood Alliance were cited as a reason by **67 percent of CSOs and 63 percent of PDFs/LDFs**. Additionally, **63 percent of PDFs/LDFs** attributed China's involvement to the growing unity among the opposition forces.

Question-36

What are China's motivations for increasing its engagement in resolving Myanmar's political crisis?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
SAC's rigid position	27%	29%	31%	26%	24%	33%	19%
Military successes of the 3BHA	58%	67%	25%	50%	55%	60%	63%
NUC's moderate view of China	9%	11%	13%	5%	6%	0%	25%
Increasing unity of the resistance forces	37%	42%	13%	40%	26%	33%	63%
Waning EAO Interest in region-based talks, such as the Haigeng Discussions	33%	34%	38%	31%	38%	20%	19%
China's strategic projects being attacked or seized	63%	55%	63%	57%	82%	80%	31%
Security threats to Chinese nationals in Myanmar	31%	27%	44%	36%	27%	33%	44%
Do not know	1%	0%	6%	2%	0%	0%	6%
Prefer not to answer	3%	1%	6%	7%	3%	0%	0%




3

Perceptions of the Role of China in Myanmar's Peace Processes

Question-37

Perception on China's efforts towards Myanmar's peace processes

Stakeholders were asked to choose one option that best matches their view on China's efforts regarding Myanmar's peace processes following the 2021 coup.



Analysis of the Survey Results

The survey reveals that the majority of the respondents across all six groups predominantly believed that China's efforts center on **stabilizing areas tied to its interests**. This perspective was held by the highest percentage of respondents from EAOs (93 percent). Notably, **no respondents** from EAOs believed that China prioritizes armed groups aligned with its interests, peace for the whole of Myanmar, or the emergence of a federal democratic Myanmar. Similarly, none of the PDFs/LDFs respondents viewed the latter two as China's priorities. Among all the listed options, **the emergence of a federal democratic Myanmar** received the lowest level of agreement across all groups.

Question-37


Perception on China's efforts towards Myanmar's peace processes

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Prioritize stability of the areas in which China has interests	61%	59%	44%	52%	64%	93%	69%
Prioritize ascendancy of armed groups associated with China's interests	10%	17%	19%	10%	2%	0%	6%
Prioritize peace in all of Myanmar	7%	2%	25%	19%	5%	0%	0%
Prioritize the emergence of Myanmar as a federal democratic country	1%	1%	0%	5%	0%	0%	0%
Do not agree with any of the above options	14%	14%	6%	10%	20%	7%	13%
Others	7%	6%	0%	5%	11%	0%	13%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question-38

What impact does China’s involvement have on Myanmar’s peace and political reconciliation process?

For survey question No. 38, respondents were asked to assess the impact of China’s involvement in Myanmar’s peace and political reconciliation process using a four-point scale, ranging from 1. Very negative impact to 4. Very positive impact.



Regarding the impact of China's involvement in Myanmar's peace and political reconciliation process, nearly two-thirds (61 percent) of respondents viewed it negatively, while over one-third (35 percent) of the respondents viewed it positively. Compared to previous surveys, negative perception has grown by 32 percentage points from 2022 and 15 percentage points from 2023.



See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Views on China's involvement in Myanmar's peace and political reconciliation process diverge sharply across groups. A majority of respondents from **PDFs/LDFs (69 percent)**, **prominent individuals (69 percent)**, **CSOs (68 percent)**, and **EAOs (60 percent)** viewed China's role as having a negative impact. In contrast, the **political society group (69 percent)** and **business community (54 percent)** saw it as a positive influence. Notably, **43 percent of the business community** and **19 percent of the political society group** still expressed negative views, underscoring internal divisions within these groups.

Question-38

What impact does China's involvement have on Myanmar's peace and political reconciliation process?


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Very negative impact	13%	17%	6%	10%	14%	7%	6%
Negative impact	48%	51%	13%	33%	55%	53%	63%
Positive impact	33%	28%	63%	52%	24%	40%	19%
Very positive impact	2%	1%	6%	2%	2%	0%	0%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	4%	3%	6%	2%	6%	0%	13%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of "Very negative impact" and "Negative impact" were grouped under "Negative impact," while "Positive impact" and "Very positive impact" were grouped under "Positive impact," for the purpose of analysis.

Question-39

How much influence does China have over EAOs in northern Shan State?

Respondents were asked to assess the degree of China's influence over EAOs in northern Shan State using a four-point scale, ranging from 1. No influence at all to 4. Significant influence.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Myanmar's key stakeholders across the six policy communities predominantly believed that China has influence over EAOs in northern Shan State. Nearly **all prominent individuals (99 percent)** reported this view, followed closely by **95 percent of CSOs, 95 percent of the business community, 94 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 94 percent of EAOs, and 87 percent of the political society group.**

Question-39

How much influence does China have over EAOs in northern Shan State?


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
No influence at all	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
No influence	3%	5%	6%	0%	2%	7%	6%
Some influence	62%	60%	31%	64%	70%	53%	69%
Significant influence	34%	35%	56%	31%	29%	40%	25%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	0%	5%	0%	0%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of "No influence at all" and "No influence" were grouped under "No influence," while "Some influence" and "Significant influence" were grouped under "Influence," for the purpose of analysis.

Question-40

How much influence does China have over the State Administration Council (SAC)?

For survey question No. 40, respondents were asked to assess China's influence over the State Administration Council (SAC) using a four-point scale, ranging from 1. No influence to 4. Significant influence.



See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Respondents across all communities predominantly agreed that China holds influence over the SAC. This view was held by **94 percent** of **CSOs, prominent individuals, and PDFs/LDFs**, **93 percent** of **EOs**, **89 percent** of the **business community**, and **82 percent** of the **political society group** (represented by the responses “some influence” or “significant influence”). Notably, among **PDFs/LDFs**, **50 percent** selected “significant influence.”

Question-40

How much influence does China have over the State Administration Council (SAC)?


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EOs	PDFs/LDFs
No influence at all	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
No influence	5%	6%	0%	7%	5%	7%	6%
Some influence	69%	60%	69%	79%	82%	80%	44%
Significant influence	23%	34%	13%	10%	12%	13%	50%
Do not know	1%	0%	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	0%	5%	2%	0%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of “No influence at all” and “No influence” were grouped under “No influence,” while “Some influence” and “Significant influence” were grouped under “Influence,” for the purpose of analysis.

Question-41

The main purpose of China’s mediation between Myanmar conflict actors

A list of options were given on the primary purpose of China's mediation efforts between EAOs along the Myanmar-China border and the SAC, such as in the Mongla (2022) and Haigeng (2023-2024) peace talks, and respondents were asked to select one option that best matched their view. This question is newly added in this round of survey.



Among respondents, the majority (69 percent) of respondents indicated that China’s mediation aims to facilitate the implementation of its strategic investment projects. Meanwhile, 12 percent perceived that China seeks to “ensure border security,” and another 12 percent viewed China’s intentions as to “reopen border trade.” Five percent believed China targets the resolution of conflicts in northern Shan State, while two percent suggested it focuses on safeguarding Chinese nationals in northern Shan State.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Respondents across all six policy communities predominantly perceived that China's mediation efforts are driven by the goal of implementing its strategic investment projects. This view was most strongly held by **80 percent of EAOs**, **73 percent of CSOs**, **69 percent of PDFs/LDFs**, **68 percent of prominent individuals**, **63 percent of the political society group**, and **57 percent of the business community group**.

Question-41

What is the purpose of China's mediation between EAOs and the State Administration Council?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
To ensure border security	12%	8%	13%	10%	20%	13%	6%
To reopen border trade	12%	10%	13%	21%	8%	0%	19%
To resolve conflicts in northern Shan State	5%	5%	6%	10%	3%	0%	6%
To safeguard Chinese nationals in northern Shan State	2%	4%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%
To implement its strategic projects	69%	73%	63%	57%	68%	80%	69%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	0%	2%	2%	0%	0%



◀ See the previous surveys

Questions-42 to 44


Impacts of China's mediated talks

For survey questions No. 42 to 44, respondents were asked their views on the impacts of China's mediated peace talks between the State Administration Council (SAC) and northern Shan State EAOs (EAOs) on some areas, using a four-point scale ranging from 1. Totally disagree to 4. Totally agree.

- Totally disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Totally agree
- Do not know
- Prefer not to answer


■ Question-42

Weaken emerging political entities following the coup




■ Question-43

Helpful for Myanmar's peace process



■ Question-44


Worsen Myanmar's conflict



Question-45


Impacts of China's mediated talks

For survey question No. 45, respondents were asked their views on the impacts of China's mediated peace talks between the State Administration Council (SAC) and northern Shan State EAOs (EAOs) on the short-term ceasefires, using a four-point scale ranging from 1. Totally disagree to 4. Totally agree.



■ Question-45

Steer towards short-term ceasefires



Among respondents, **52 percent agreed** that the discussions **undermined post-coup emerging political forces**, while **45 percent disagreed**. A clear majority (**72 percent**) **rejected the notion that the discussions support Myanmar's peace process**, with only **26 percent in agreement**. On the statement that the discussions **exacerbate conflict**, **63 percent agreed** and **33 percent disagreed**. Notably, **80 percent** believed the discussions aimed only for **short-term ceasefires**, with just **16 percent disagreeing**. Compared to the 2023 survey, perceptions that the discussions weaken post-coup political forces rose by **12 percentage points**, views that they worsen conflict increased by **16 points**, and the belief that they target only short-term ceasefires rose by **eight points**.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Myanmar's key stakeholders expressed mixed views on the impact of China's mediation efforts. On the statement that the discussions weaken post-coup emerging political forces, opinions were divided across all groups, with a slight majority leaning toward agreement. Regarding the impact on Myanmar's peace process, most groups—except the political community—rejected the idea that China's mediation supports peace efforts. Within the political community, opinions were split: **50 percent** agreed, while **44 percent** disagreed. The business community was similarly divided, with **47 percent** in agreement and **50 percent** in disagreement. On the statement that China's mediation talks are worsening the various conflicts, a majority of the respondents from **CSOs (78 percent)**, the **prominent individuals group (61 percent)** and **EOs (60 percent)** agreed. On the other hand, **56 percent of the political society group, 48 percent of the business community, and 44 percent of PDFs/LDFs and 40 percent of EOs** disagreed. The view that China's mediation discussions aimed mainly at short-term ceasefires was widely shared, with agreement ranging from a high of **91 percent** among **prominent individuals** to a low of **63 percent** among the **political community**.

Question-42

Weaken emerging political entities following the coup

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EOs	PDFs/LDFs
Totally disagree	7%	12%	0%	2%	5%	7%	6%
Disagree	38%	37%	31%	45%	36%	40%	44%
Agree	46%	46%	50%	43%	45%	47%	50%
Totally agree	6%	5%	13%	5%	9%	7%	0%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	0%	0%	5%	5%	0%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of "Totally disagree" and "Disagree" were grouped under "Disagree," while "Agree" and "Totally Agree" were grouped under "Agree," for the purpose of analysis.

Question-43

Helpful for Myanmar's peace process

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Totally disagree	18%	22%	13%	12%	20%	7%	13%
Disagree	54%	62%	31%	38%	52%	67%	69%
Agree	25%	16%	44%	45%	26%	20%	19%
Totally agree	1%	0%	6%	2%	0%	7%	0%
Do not know	1%	0%	6%	0%	2%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	0%	2%	2%	0%	0%

Question-44

Worsen Myanmar's conflict

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Totally disagree	5%	4%	6%	10%	5%	0%	6%
Disagree	28%	17%	50%	38%	27%	40%	38%
Agree	55%	68%	31%	40%	53%	53%	38%
Totally agree	8%	10%	6%	5%	8%	7%	6%
Do not know	2%	0%	6%	2%	3%	0%	6%
Prefer not to answer	3%	2%	0%	5%	5%	0%	6%

Question-45


Steer towards short-term ceasefires

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Totally disagree	3%	5%	6%	2%	0%	0%	13%
Disagree	13%	17%	25%	14%	6%	13%	6%
Agree	65%	61%	50%	60%	76%	80%	69%
Totally agree	15%	16%	13%	14%	15%	7%	13%
Do not know	2%	0%	6%	5%	3%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	1%	0%	5%	0%	0%	0%

Question-46

How effective is China in helping the Rohingya repatriation process?

For survey question No. 46, respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of the Myanmar-Bangladesh-China tripartite solution for Rohingya repatriation using a four-point scale, ranging from 1. Not effective at all to 4. Very effective.



The majority of respondents (**82 percent**) viewed the Myanmar-Bangladesh-China tripartite solution for Rohingya repatriation as **ineffective**, with **18 percent** indicating that it has **not been effective at all**. Only **seven percent** considered it **effective**, and **no respondents** rated it as **very effective**. Compared to the 2023 survey, no significant changes were observed.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Myanmar's key stakeholders across all communities perceived the tripartite solution as ineffective. This view was most prevalent among the **prominent individuals group (90 percent)**, followed by **EOs (80 percent)**, **CSOs (80 percent)**, **PDFs/LDFs (76 percent)**, the **political society group (69 percent)**, and the **business community (59 percent)**. Notably, **19 percent of PDFs/LDFs** indicated they were unaware of the process.

Question-46

How effective is China in helping the Rohingya repatriation process?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not effective at all	18%	20%	13%	14%	23%	7%	13%
Not effective	64%	70%	56%	45%	67%	73%	63%
Somewhat effective	7%	4%	19%	19%	0%	20%	6%
Very effective	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	8%	5%	6%	19%	8%	0%	19%
Prefer not to answer	2%	2%	6%	2%	3%	0%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of 'Not effective at all' and 'Not effective' are grouped together as 'Not effective,' while 'Somewhat effective' and 'Very effective' are grouped as 'Effective' for the purposes of interpretation and analysis.




4

Perceptions of
China–Myanmar Economic Relations

Question–47

To what extent do China’s economic investments benefit the general public in Myanmar?

For survey question No. 47, respondents were asked to rate the benefits of China’s economic investments for Myanmar’s people using a four-point scale, ranging from 1. Not beneficial at all to 4. Very beneficial.



Regarding this question, views among key stakeholder respondents were divided, **51 percent** viewed China’s economic investments as **beneficial**, while **47 percent** indicated that they were **not beneficial**. Compared to the 2022 and 2023 surveys, the proportion of respondents selecting “not beneficial at all” has increased annually.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

A large majority of the respondents from the **business community (81 percent)**, **political society (69 percent)**, and **PDFs/LDFs (56 percent)** viewed Chinese investments as beneficial to the general public in Myanmar. In contrast, the majority of respondents from **CSOs (61 percent)**, and **EAOs (53 percent)** considered them not beneficial. Respondents from the **prominent individuals group** were split with **49 percent** viewing Chinese investment as not beneficial to the public, and **48 percent** seeing it as beneficial.

Question-47

To what extent do China's economic investments benefit the general public in Myanmar?


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not beneficial at all	12%	19%	0%	0%	11%	13%	6%
Not beneficial	35%	42%	19%	19%	38%	40%	38%
Beneficial	50%	37%	63%	79%	48%	47%	56%
Very beneficial	1%	1%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	2%	1%	6%	0%	3%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of "Not beneficial at all" and "Not beneficial" were grouped under "Not beneficial," while "Beneficial" and "Very beneficial" were grouped under "Beneficial," for the purpose of analysis.

Question–48

What is your view on China being Myanmar’s primary economic partner?

For survey question No. 48, respondents were asked about their perception of China being Myanmar’s largest economic partner, choosing between two options: 1. Concerning or 2. Welcoming.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Myanmar's key stakeholders predominantly found China being Myanmar's largest economic partner as concerning. **CSOs (83 percent)** expressed the highest level of concern, followed by **EAOs (80 percent)**, **prominent individuals (65 percent)**, **PDFs/LDFs (63 percent)**, and the **political society group (56 percent)**. However, the **business community (62 percent)** viewed it as welcoming.

Question-48

What is your view on China being Myanmar's primary economic partner?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Concerning	68%	83%	56%	36%	65%	80%	63%
Welcoming	26%	12%	31%	62%	24%	20%	31%
Do not know	1%	1%	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	5%	4%	0%	2%	11%	0%	6%




See the previous surveys

Question–49

When do you expect economic relations between Myanmar and China to improve?

For survey question No. 49, respondents were asked to indicate when they expect improvements in China–Myanmar economic relations by selecting one option from a list of time periods.



Among respondents, **35 percent**, the highest proportion, believed that economic relations between Myanmar and China could improve after three years, beyond 2027. Conversely, **34 percent** anticipated no improvement at all.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Myanmar's key stakeholders expressed varied expectations for improvements in China–Myanmar economic relations. The **political society group (63 percent)**, **PDFs/LDFs (44 percent)**, **prominent individuals (39 percent)**, **business community (36 percent)**, and **EOOs (33 percent)** indicated improvements are likely after three years. In contrast, **CSOs (48 percent)**, others from the **prominent individuals group (35 percent)**, and **EOOs (33 percent)** saw no prospect for improvement.

Question-49

When do you expect economic relations between Myanmar and China to improve?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EOOs	PDFs/LDFs
Within one year	2%	2%	0%	2%	2%	7%	6%
Within two years	10%	9%	6%	29%	2%	13%	6%
Within three years	8%	10%	6%	12%	8%	0%	6%
After three years	35%	27%	63%	36%	39%	33%	44%
Not anticipated at all	34%	48%	6%	14%	35%	33%	25%
Do not know	5%	4%	6%	5%	6%	13%	6%
Prefer not to answer	5%	2%	13%	2%	9%	0%	6%




See the previous surveys

Questions-50 and 51


What has the impact of post-coup armed conflicts been on Chinese investment and trade in Myanmar?

For survey questions No. 50 to 51, respondents were asked to assess the impact of armed conflicts following the 2021 coup on Chinese investment and trade in Myanmar, using a four-point scale ranging from 1. No negative impact at all to 4. Very high negative impact. These questions were newly introduced in this year's survey.

■ Question-50 : Investment



■ Question-50 : Trade



Overwhelmingly, **92 percent** viewed that the post-coup armed conflicts negatively impacted Chinese investment in Myanmar, while only **six percent** believed there was no negative impact on Chinese investment. Similarly, **97 percent** perceived that the armed conflicts have had a negative impact on Myanmar-China trade, while **two percent** viewed that there was no negative impact.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Myanmar's key stakeholders unanimously agreed that post-coup armed conflicts have negatively impacted Chinese investment in Myanmar. Notably, all respondents from the **business community** and **PDFs/LDFs** (100 percent) expressed complete agreement, followed by **prominent individuals** (97 percent), **EAOs** (94 percent), and the **political society group** and **CSOs** (88 percent each). Similarly, all respondents from the **business community**, **EAOs**, **PDFs/LDFs**, and **prominent individuals** (100 percent) believed that post-coup armed conflicts have negatively affected Myanmar-China trade. This view was shared by the **political society group** (94 percent) and **CSOs** (93 percent). A notable distinction is that, only 13 percent of **CSOs**, seven percent of **EAOs** and three percent of **prominent individual respondents** viewed no negative impact, with only one percent of the **CSOs respondents** choosing "no negative impact at all."

Question-50

What has the impact of post-coup armed conflicts been on Chinese investment and trade in Myanmar?


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
No negative impact at all	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
No negative impact	6%	12%	0%	0%	3%	7%	0%
Negative impact to some extent	70%	64%	63%	76%	70%	87%	88%
Very high negative impact	22%	22%	25%	24%	27%	7%	13%
Do not know	1%	0%	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of "Very high negative impact" and "Negative impact to some extent" were grouped under "Negative impact," while "No negative impact" and "No negative impact at all" were grouped under "No negative impact," for the purpose of analysis. Read the responses for Question 51 in detail on ISP-Myanmar's website.

Question-52

How do you think China is most likely to respond to the impact of armed conflict on its interests in Myanmar?

For survey question No. 52, respondents were asked to select one option regarding China's potential response to armed conflicts affecting its projects in Myanmar, with options including pressure on all groups, alignment with the SAC, or engagement with resistance forces.



Armed conflict in Myanmar has increasingly jeopardized Chinese projects, leading to attacks, seizures, and destruction. **Fifty-nine percent of respondents** believed China is likely to pressure all sides to find a conflict resolution in order to safeguard its investments. A further **17 percent** anticipated China would throw its support behind the State Administration Council (SAC), while **12 percent** expected it to prioritise engagement with resistance forces.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Across all groups, the largest proportion of respondents believed that China would pressure all parties to resolve any conflicts. This view was held by **77 percent of prominent individuals**, **67 percent of EAOs**, **55 percent of CSOs**, **50 percent of the political society group**, and **45 percent of the business community group**. Meanwhile, the view that China would prioritize engagement with resistance forces was selected by **25 percent of PDFs/LDFs** and **20 percent of EAOs**.

Question-52


How do you think China is most likely to respond to the impact of armed conflict on its interests in Myanmar?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Nothing to worry about	8%	7%	0%	14%	6%	7%	19%
Withdraw Chinese investments	3%	2%	6%	7%	0%	7%	6%
Increase engagement with resistance forces	12%	12%	13%	14%	3%	20%	25%
Fully support the State Administration Council	17%	23%	19%	19%	14%	0%	6%
Pressure all parties to seek a conflict resolution	59%	55%	50%	45%	77%	67%	44%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	1%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question–53

If China were to make new investments in Myanmar during the current crisis, what is your view?

For survey question No. 53, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree if China were to make new investments in Myanmar during the current crisis, using a four-point scale ranging from 1. Totally disagree to 4. Totally agree.



The majority of respondents, **73 percent**, expressed disagreement (represented by the responses “totally disagree” and “disagree”) with China making new investments in Myanmar during the current crisis. In contrast, agreement (represented by the responses “totally agree” and “agree”) accounted for **23 percent**.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

The majority of Myanmar's key stakeholders—across all groups except the business community—expressed strong opposition to new Chinese investments amid the ongoing crisis. **Civil society organizations (88 percent), PDFs/LDFs (82 percent), prominent individuals (74 percent), EAOs (67 percent), and members of the political society group (57 percent)** all indicated disagreement. In contrast, **55 percent of the business community** supported the idea of new Chinese investments.

Question-53

If China were to make new investments in Myanmar during the current crisis, what is your view?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Totally disagree	33%	40%	13%	10%	38%	40%	44%
Disagree	40%	48%	44%	33%	36%	27%	38%
Agree	20%	10%	19%	48%	18%	33%	13%
Totally agree	3%	2%	19%	7%	2%	0%	0%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	0%	0%	2%	6%	0%	6%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of "Totally disagree" and "Disagree" were grouped under "Disagree," while "Agree" and "Totally agree" were grouped under "Agree," for the purpose of analysis.




5

Perceptions of China–Myanmar
Economic Corridor (CMEC) Projects

Question-54

Which country benefits more from CMEC projects?

For survey question No. 54, respondents were asked to identify whether CMEC projects would be mutually beneficial, more beneficial to China, or more beneficial to Myanmar.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

The survey revealed that across all respondent groups, CMEC projects are perceived to benefit China more. This sentiment was shared by **CSOs (94 percent)**, **EOs (93 percent)**, **prominent individuals (88 percent)**, **PDFs/LDFs (81 percent)**, the **business community (62 percent)**, and the **political society group (56 percent)**. In contrast, among those who viewed the projects as mutually beneficial, the **business community group** recorded the highest share, at **36 percent**.

Question-54

Which country benefits more from CMEC projects?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EOs	PDFs/LDFs
Benefit both countries equally	12%	2%	25%	36%	12%	7%	13%
Benefit China more	84%	94%	56%	62%	88%	93%	81%
Benefit Myanmar more	1%	1%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	1%	1%	6%	0%	0%	0%	6%
Prefer not to answer	1%	2%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%




◀ See the previous surveys

Question–55

What do you believe is the main purpose of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor?

For survey question No. 55, respondents were asked for their opinion on the likely purpose of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). Respondents were asked to choose one option that best matches their opinion.



Most stakeholders held the view that **China aims to assert control over geopolitically strategic locations** through CMEC (66 percent). Additionally, 17 percent thought that **the aim of CMEC was to expand China's influence over Myanmar and regional countries**, while 16 percent believed it was for **China's economic benefit**. Notably, in all three survey rounds, the perception that **China seeks to use CMEC to control geopolitically strategic locations** has been the most dominant.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Respondents across different communities predominantly perceived that China's purpose for CMEC is to **assert control over geopolitically strategic locations**. This perspective was held most strongly by **EAOs (87 percent)**, followed by **CSOs (70 percent)**, the **political society group (69 percent)**, the **business community group (60 percent)**, the **prominent individuals group (59 percent)**, and **PDFs/LDFs (56 percent)**.

Question-55

What do you believe is the main purpose of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
For Chinese economic interest	16%	14%	19%	14%	17%	7%	31%
To expand China's influence over Myanmar and other regional countries	17%	14%	6%	19%	24%	7%	13%
To assert control over geopolitically strategic locations	66%	70%	69%	60%	59%	87%	56%
Do not know	1%	0%	6%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	1%	0%	5%	0%	0%	0%




◀ See the previous surveys

Question–56

The biggest concern regarding the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)

For survey question No. 56, respondents were asked to select the biggest concern about the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) from a list.



Regarding the biggest concern about the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), **37 percent of respondents** expressed most concern over **China’s growing geopolitical influence in the region**. Additionally, **21 percent** chose concern about **Myanmar falling into a debt trap**, while **17 percent** were most concerned about **socio-environmental impacts**. There were no significant variances compared with previous surveys. Notably, concern over geopolitical influence has been the most prevalent for **three consecutive years** of the survey.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

All surveyed key stakeholders in Myanmar expressed concern about China's geopolitical influence. This concern was chosen by most among the perceived risks across all groups—led by **EOs (60 percent)**, followed by **PDFs/LDFs (50 percent)**, the **political society group (44 percent)**, the **business community group (40 percent)**, the **prominent individuals group (36 percent)**, and **CSOs (29 percent)**. Notably, the second-highest concerns varied across groups: **32 percent of prominent figures** cited debt-trap risks, **28 percent of CSO respondents** pointed to socio-environmental impacts, and **24 percent of the business community** expressed concern about China's economic influence.

Question-56

The biggest concern regarding the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EOs	PDFs/LDFs
No concern	4%	1%	0%	14%	2%	0%	13%
Debt trap	21%	19%	19%	14%	32%	20%	6%
Political influence	8%	13%	6%	2%	5%	0%	13%
For economic benefits for China	12%	10%	0%	24%	11%	7%	13%
Geopolitical influence	37%	29%	44%	40%	36%	60%	50%
Socio-environmental impacts	17%	28%	19%	2%	14%	13%	6%
Do not know	1%	1%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	6%	2%	2%	0%	0%



See the previous surveys

Questions–57 to 59


Views on the impacts of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)

For survey questions No. 57 to 59, respondents were asked to what extent they agree or disagree with a series of statements regarding CMEC’s potential positive impacts on the peace process, economic development, socio-economic advancements, and potential exit from economic and political crises, using a four-point scale ranging from 1. Totally disagree to 4. Totally agree.

- Totally disagree
- Agree
- Do not know
- Disagree
- Totally agree
- Prefer not to answer

Question–57

CMEC has positive impacts on the peace process.




Question–58

CMEC aids Myanmar’s economic development.



Question–59

CMEC helps improve the socio-economic conditions of the general public.



Question-60


Views on the impacts of the China–Myanmar
Economic Corridor (CMEC)

For survey question No. 60, respondents were asked to what extent they agree or disagree with a series of statements regarding CMEC’s potential positive impacts on the peace process, economic development, socio-economic advancements, and potential exit from economic and political crises, using a four-point scale ranging from 1. Totally disagree to 4. Totally agree.

- Totally disagree
- Agree
- Do not know
- Disagree
- Totally agree
- Prefer not to answer

■ Question-60

CMEC is a potential exit for the economic and political crises.



Respondents were notably more skeptical about CMEC's political impacts than its economic benefits. A strong majority (**71 percent**) disagreed that CMEC offers a solution to Myanmar's economic and political crises, and **69 percent** rejected the idea that it contributes to the peace process. Views were split on the positive impact on socio-economic livelihoods, with **54 percent** disagreeing and **43 percent** agreeing. In contrast, perceptions of CMEC's economic contribution were more favorable. While still mixed, **61 percent** agreed that CMEC supports economic development, compared to **37 percent** who disagreed.

Analysis of the Survey Results

A closer look reveals that the majority of **CSOs (85 percent)**, **prominent figures (71 percent)**, **EAOs (67 percent)**, and **PDFs/LDFs (62 percent)** disagreed that CMEC would positively impact the peace process. In contrast, a majority of respondents from the **political society group (63 percent)** and **business community group (55 percent)** believed it would. This divide suggests a significant perception gap between civil and resistance actors on the one hand, and institutional and economic elites on the other regarding CMEC's role in promoting peace. A strong majority of respondents from the **business community (91 percent)**, **political society (75 percent)**, **prominent individuals (66 percent)**, and **PDFs/LDFs (56 percent)** agreed that CMEC would contribute to Myanmar's economic development. In contrast, opinions were more divided among EAOs and CSOs. While **53 percent of EAOs** agreed and **47 percent** disagreed, **CSOs** leaned slightly toward disagreement, with **52 percent** rejecting the statement and **46 percent** supporting it. Additionally, the majority of the **business community group (72 percent)**, the **political society group (63 percent)**, and **EAOs (60 percent)** agreed that CMEC would improve Myanmar people's socio-economic livelihoods, whereas **CSOs (74 percent)** and **PDFs/LDFs (51 percent)** disagreed. A large majority of those from **EAOs (93 percent)**, **CSOs (76 percent)**, **PDFs/LDFs (76 percent)**, **prominent individuals (71 percent)**, **business community (60 percent)**, and **political society (50 percent)** disagreed that CMEC would provide a solution to Myanmar's economic and political crises, while the **political society group (44 percent)** and **business community group (38 percent)** weakly agreed.



◀ See the previous surveys

Unless otherwise stated, responses of "Totally disagree" and "Disagree" were grouped under "Disagree," while "Agree" and "Totally agree" were grouped under "Agree," for the purpose of analysis.

Question-57

CMEC has positive impacts on the peace process.

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Totally disagree	16%	28%	0%	5%	15%	0%	6%
Disagree	53%	57%	31%	38%	56%	67%	56%
Agree	27%	14%	50%	50%	27%	33%	25%
Totally agree	2%	0%	13%	5%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	2%	1%	6%	0%	2%	0%	13%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%

Question-58

CMEC aids Myanmar's economic development.

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Totally disagree	7%	11%	0%	2%	3%	0%	13%
Disagree	30%	41%	19%	7%	29%	47%	25%
Agree	57%	46%	56%	81%	64%	53%	50%
Totally agree	4%	1%	19%	10%	2%	0%	6%
Do not know	1%	1%	6%	0%	0%	0%	6%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%

Question-59

CMEC helps improve the socio-economic conditions of the general public .


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Totally disagree	11%	18%	0%	2%	9%	0%	13%
Disagree	43%	56%	31%	24%	39%	40%	38%
Agree	41%	24%	50%	62%	48%	60%	44%
Totally agree	2%	0%	13%	10%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	2%	2%	6%	0%	3%	0%	6%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%

Note: Please see the table for question No. 60 at ISP-Myanmar's website.

Question-61

Views on the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor’s impacts on Myanmar’s society and environment

Respondents were asked to assess to what extent CMEC would affect the socio-environmental aspects in Myanmar, using a four-point scale ranging from 1. No negative impact at all to 4. Very high negative impact.



Regarding the socio-environmental impacts of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), **88 percent of respondents** perceived CMEC to have had a negative impact, while **seven percent** considered it to have had no negative impact. There were no considerable differences compared with the previous two years' survey results.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Overall, all surveyed stakeholder groups in Myanmar felt that CMEC has a negative impact on Myanmar's society and environment. Respondents from **EAOs** expressed the strongest concern with **100 percent**, followed by **CSOs (94 percent)**, **PDFs/LDFs (87 percent)**, **prominent individuals (85 percent)**, the **business community (76 percent)**, and the **political society group (75 percent)**.

Question-61

Views on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor's impacts on Myanmar's society and environment


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
No negative impact at all	2%	3%	0%	2%	2%	0%	0%
No negative impact	5%	2%	6%	17%	5%	0%	6%
Negative impact to some extent	53%	41%	56%	74%	50%	80%	56%
Very high negative impact	35%	53%	19%	2%	35%	20%	31%
Do not know	2%	0%	13%	0%	5%	0%	6%
Prefer not to answer	3%	1%	6%	5%	5%	0%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of "Very high negative impact" and "Negative impact to some extent" were grouped under "Negative impact," while "No negative impact" and "No negative impact at all" were grouped under "No negative impact," for the purpose of analysis.

Question-62

Engagement regarding the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor projects

For survey question No. 62, respondents were asked whether Chinese company officials engaged with the key stakeholders regarding the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) projects or not and if they were contacted, respondents were asked to select from two types of contact if applicable.



Regarding consultations related to the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), **82 percent of respondents** reported that Chinese companies did not contact or engage with them at all. **Eleven percent** indicated that they were engaged directly by responsible personnel, while **five percent** stated that contact occurred through local authorities. Compared to previous surveys, the number of respondents reporting no engagement has increased annually.

Analysis of the Survey Results

The majority of respondent groups reported no contact from Chinese companies regarding CMEC projects. This was affirmed by CSOs (86 percent), prominent individuals (85 percent), PDFs/LDFs (81 percent), EAOs (80 percent), the business community (74 percent), and the political society group (69 percent). However, the political society group (25 percent), the business community (17 percent), and CSOs (10 percent) indicated that they were engaged directly by responsible personnel. Additionally, EAOs (20 percent) and PDFs/LDFs (13 percent) reported receiving contact through local authorities. Notably, 13 percent of PDFs/LDFs stated they were unaware of any contact.

Question-62

Engagement regarding the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor projects

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
No engagement	82%	86%	69%	74%	85%	80%	81%
Contacted by China company officials	11%	10%	25%	17%	9%	7%	6%
Contacted through local authorities	5%	3%	6%	7%	3%	20%	13%
Do not know	2%	2%	6%	0%	2%	0%	13%
Prefer not to answer	1%	1%	0%	2%	2%	0%	0%




See the previous surveys

Question–63

What was the main purpose of engagement conducted by Chinese companies involved in the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor?

For survey question No. 63, respondents were asked to identify the purposes of engagement by Chinese companies implementing CMEC, with the option to select multiple purposes. This question was newly introduced in the 2024 survey.



Regarding engagement related to CMEC, **half of respondents** said Chinese companies sought to ensure the **continuation of existing projects by requesting cooperation**. **One-fourth** believed the purpose was to **warn local actors against disrupting or damaging projects**, while **one-fifth** said the goal was to propose **new trade or investment opportunities**. Additionally, **30 percent** cited other reasons, including explaining project benefits, building local support, and encouraging academic institutions to clarify that the projects do not represent a debt trap.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Respondent groups reported varying perceptions of the purposes behind these engagements. Notably, **100 percent of PDFs/LDFs** said the companies warned against disrupting the projects. Meanwhile, **CSOs (67 percent)**, **EOs (67 percent)**, and the **business community (50 percent)** pointed to efforts to ensure project continuity. The **political society (75 percent)** and **prominent public individuals (75 percent)** cited other purposes, including public outreach, local engagement, and reputational management in response to debt-related concerns.

Question-63

What was the main purpose of engagement conducted by Chinese companies involved in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EOs	PDFs/LDFs
To warn stakeholders not to disrupt or harm CMEC projects	25%	42%	0%	0%	0%	67%	100%
To cooperate in the continuation of ongoing projects	50%	67%	25%	50%	38%	67%	33%
To offer new trade or investment opportunities	20%	17%	0%	50%	13%	0%	0%
Other reasons	30%	8%	75%	20%	75%	0%	0%
Do not know	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%




See the previous surveys

Question-64

Perceived status of China–Myanmar Economic Corridor project implementation

Respondents were asked about their perceptions of the implementation status of CMEC between the State Administration Council (SAC) and China following the 2021 coup, with the option to select more than one response if applicable.



Regarding the implementation status of CMEC projects in the post-coup period, **62 percent of respondents** perceived that CMEC was being partially implemented. Additionally, **28 percent** indicated that the project's implementation had been halted, while **five percent** viewed it as being implemented rapidly. **Eight percent** of respondents stated they did not know CMEC's current implementation status. Compared to the 2023 survey, there were slight changes: respondents reporting halted implementation increased by **10 percentage points**, while those noting partial implementation decreased by **four points**, and those perceiving rapid implementation decreased by **seven points**.

Analysis of the Survey Results

In examining responses from the six communities regarding the status of CMEC implementation, the **business community (55 percent)**, **political society (50 percent)**, and **EAOs (47 percent)** primarily indicated halted implementation. Conversely, **PDFs/LDFs (75 percent)**, **prominent individuals (71 percent)**, and **CSOs (70 percent)** perceived partial implementation. **Fewer than 10 percent of respondents** across all groups reported rapid implementation. Notably, **EAOs (20 percent)**, **PDFs/LDFs (13 percent)**, and the **political society group (13 percent)** stated they did not know the implementation status.

Question-64

Perceived status of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor project implementation

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Halted implementation	28%	22%	50%	55%	17%	47%	13%
Partial implementation	62%	70%	31%	43%	71%	33%	75%
Rapid implementation	5%	7%	6%	2%	6%	0%	0%
Do not know	8%	4%	13%	10%	8%	20%	13%
Prefer not to answer	1%	1%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%




See the previous surveys

Question–65

Should the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor be implemented during Myanmar’s current political crisis?

For survey question No. 65, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the implementation of CMEC by China during Myanmar’s current political crisis.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Perceptions of the potential implementation of CMEC amid Myanmar's ongoing political crisis reveal varied opinions among different groups. Strong opposition was observed among **CSOs (90 percent)**, **PDFs/LDFs (88 percent)**, **prominent individuals (76 percent)**, and **EAOs (73 percent)**. In contrast, opinions within the political society and business community were evenly split. While a slight majority of the **business community (57 percent)** and **political society group (50 percent)** opposed implementation, a significant minority—**43 percent** and **44 percent**, respectively—expressed support.

Question-65

Should the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor be implemented during Myanmar's current political crisis?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Agree	19%	10%	44%	43%	15%	27%	6%
Disagree	77%	90%	50%	57%	76%	73%	88%
Do not know	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	3%	1%	0%	0%	9%	0%	6%




See the previous surveys

Question-66

Reasons for agreement with the implementation of China–Myanmar Economic Corridor projects

For survey question No. 66, respondents who agreed with the implementation of CMEC were asked to select up to three reasons for their agreement. This question was newly introduced in the current survey.



The survey revealed that the most common reason for supporting the implementation of CMEC was its potential to promote economic growth and infrastructure development, cited by **68 percent of respondents**. The second most common reason was that CMEC was a way to help address Myanmar's current economic crises, chosen by **54 percent**. The third most common reason given, at **50 percent**, was that CMEC could increase market access to China and other regional countries.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Reasons for supporting CMEC implementation varied across the six stakeholder groups. The potential for economic and infrastructure development was the most widely cited reason, reported by **100 percent of PDFs/LDFs**, **89 percent of the business community**, **80 percent of the prominent individuals group**, and **75 percent of EAOs**. CMEC as a solution to the current economic crisis was endorsed by **100 percent of PDFs/LDFs**, followed by **70 percent of the prominent individuals group**. The opportunity for increased market access was highlighted by **75 percent of EAOs**, **67 percent of the business community**, and **57 percent of the political society group**. The prospect of improving socio-economic livelihoods was selected by **100 percent of PDFs/LDFs**, **71 percent of political actors**, and **50 percent of prominent individuals**. Notably, PDFs/LDFs unanimously supported CMEC for its role in economic development, crisis mitigation, and livelihood improvement.

Question-66


Reasons for agreement with the implementation of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor projects

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Improve economic and infrastructure development	68%	20%	57%	89%	80%	75%	100%
Receive industrial and technological transfers from China	18%	30%	0%	28%	10%	0%	0%
Increased market share from China and regional countries	50%	30%	57%	67%	30%	75%	0%
Solution for current economic crises	54%	60%	14%	61%	70%	25%	100%
Improve socio-economic livelihoods	36%	20%	71%	22%	50%	25%	100%
Aid national stability	26%	50%	29%	17%	20%	25%	0%
Reduce current conflicts	24%	30%	43%	6%	40%	25%	0%
Others	2%	10%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question-67

Reasons for disagreement with the implementation of China–Myanmar Economic Corridor projects

For survey question No. 67, respondents who disagreed with the implementation of CMEC were asked to select up to three reasons for their disagreement. This question was newly introduced in the current survey.



The most common reason for disapproval of CMEC, selected by **56 percent**, was that it could harm local livelihoods and the environment. **Fifty-two percent** pointed to rising Chinese political influence over Myanmar, while **41 percent** were concerned about geopolitical tensions threatening national stability. Additionally, **38 percent** feared a debt trap, and **35 percent** noted the risk of economic overdependence on China.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Views varied across stakeholder groups on their top three reasons for not supporting CMEC implementation. Concerns over harm to livelihoods and the environment were most frequently cited by **political society (63 percent)**, **CSOs (62 percent)**, and **PDFs/LDFs (57 percent)**. Worries about Chinese political influence were highest among **political actors (75 percent)**, followed by **EAOs (55 percent)** and **CSOs (52 percent)**. Geopolitical instability was highlighted by the **business community (54 percent)**, **PDFs/LDFs (50 percent)**, and **political society (50 percent)**. The debt trap concern was noted by **PDFs/LDFs (50 percent)**, **political society (50 percent)**, and **prominent individuals (44 percent)**.

Question-67

Reasons for disagreement with the implementation of China-Myanmar Economic Corridor projects

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Harms local livelihoods and environment	56%	62%	63%	33%	56%	55%	57%
Lacks information and transparency	27%	33%	13%	21%	30%	9%	7%
Risk debt trap and compromised national sovereignty	38%	33%	50%	38%	44%	36%	50%
Increased economic dependence on China	35%	37%	25%	38%	32%	27%	43%
Fuel conflicts for competing interests	23%	19%	13%	25%	32%	27%	21%
Increased China's influence	52%	52%	75%	46%	50%	55%	50%
More powerful countries' geopolitical rivalries could threaten national stability	41%	41%	50%	54%	28%	45%	50%
Others	4%	3%	0%	4%	8%	9%	0%
Do not know	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%



6

Perceptions of China's Regional Integration Plans Through Myanmar

Questions-68 to 71


Awareness of China’s regional integration initiatives

For survey questions No. 68 to 71, respondents were asked about their awareness of China's regional integration initiatives implemented in Myanmar following the 2021 coup. This set of questions was newly introduced in this current survey.

Yes No


■ Question-68

Are you aware of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)?



■ Question-69

Are you aware of the International Land–Sea Trade Corridor (ILSTC)?




■ Question-70

Are you aware of the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation (LMC)?



■ Question-71

Are you aware of the Global Development Initiative (GDI)?



Question-72


Awareness of China’s regional integration initiatives

For survey question No. 72, respondents were asked about their awareness of China's regional integration initiatives implemented in Myanmar following the 2021 coup. This question was newly introduced in this current survey.

Yes No

Question-72

Are you aware of the Global Security Initiative (GSI)?



The survey revealed that a majority of respondents were unaware of many of China’s regional integration initiatives. The LMC was the only initiative which had more respondents (**71 percent**) who said they were aware of the initiative than those who were not (**29 percent**). Regarding the RCEP, **59 percent** reported being unaware, while **41 percent** indicated awareness. For the ILSTC, **66 percent** were unaware, and **34 percent** were aware. The GDI was unknown to **65 percent**, with **35 percent** aware, and the GSI was unknown to **67 percent**, with **33 percent** indicating awareness. Compared with the 2023 survey, awareness rose across all six stakeholder groups. Recognition of the RCEP increased by **eight percentage points**, the LMC by **13 points**, and the GSI by **eight points**. Awareness of the ILSTC and the GDI also edged up slightly.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Awareness of China's regional integration initiatives varied across the six stakeholder groups, with notable differences emerging primarily in relation to the RCEP. While awareness levels for most initiatives were generally consistent—either aware or unaware—across all groups, the RCEP stood out as the only initiative with markedly divergent proportions of awareness among different stakeholder groups. For the RCEP, the **business community (50 percent)** and **prominent individuals (56 percent)** reported the highest share of awareness, while the majority of other groups: **CSOs (71 percent)**, **PDFs/LDFs (69 percent)**, and **political society (63 percent)** reported being unaware of the initiative. Regarding the ILSTC, awareness was limited overall. **Prominent individuals (42 percent)**, **EAOs (33 percent)**, and the **business community (33 percent)** demonstrated familiarity, while the majority of **PDFs/LDFs (81 percent)**, **political society (75 percent)**, and **CSOs (68 percent)** reported the highest share of unaware stakeholders. The LMC initiative registered the highest overall awareness among all initiatives, with a majority of respondents from most stakeholder groups reporting familiarity. The **business community (88 percent)**, **prominent individuals (82 percent)**, and **EAOs (80 percent)** demonstrated the highest share of awareness. In contrast, awareness was notably lower among **PDFs/LDFs (44 percent)**, **CSOs (41 percent)**, and the **political society group (31 percent)**, where most respondents indicated unfamiliarity with the initiative. For the GDI, **PDFs/LDFs (44 percent)** reported the highest share of awareness, followed by **prominent individuals (42 percent)** and **EAOs (40 percent)**, while the **political society group (75 percent)**, **CSOs (70 percent)**, and the **business community (62 percent)** were unaware of the initiative. Awareness of the GSI was low across all groups. **Prominent figures (41 percent)** and **EAOs (40 percent)** reported the highest share of familiarity. However, the majority of stakeholders remained unaware, particularly within the **political society group (88 percent)**, **CSOs (70 percent)**, and **PDFs/LDFs (69 percent)**.

Note: Read the responses for Question 71 in detail on ISP-Myanmar's website.

Question-68

Are you aware of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Yes	41%	29%	38%	50%	56%	47%	31%
No	59%	71%	63%	50%	44%	53%	69%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question-69

Are you aware of the International Land-Sea Trade Corridor (ILSTC)?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Yes	34%	32%	25%	33%	42%	33%	19%
No	66%	68%	75%	67%	58%	67%	81%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question-70

Are you aware of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC)?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Yes	71%	59%	69%	88%	82%	80%	56%
No	29%	41%	31%	12%	18%	20%	44%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question-71


Are you aware of the Global Development Initiative (GDI)?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Yes	35%	29%	25%	38%	42%	40%	44%
No	65%	71%	75%	62%	58%	60%	56%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Question-73

The goal of China's regional integration initiatives

Respondents were asked to select one perceived objective of China's regional integration initiatives from a provided list. This question was newly introduced in this current survey.



According to the survey, **58 percent of respondents** believed China's objective is to build a China-led regional political, economic, and security framework. Another **32 percent** viewed it as an effort to expand geopolitical influence in the region, including Myanmar.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Perceptions across stakeholder groups were relatively similar; the dominant view in all six was that China aims to establish a China-led regional framework, **EAOs (67 percent)**, **PDFs/LDFs (63 percent)**, and **CSOs (61 percent)** viewed this way. Meanwhile, the view that China seeks to expand geopolitical influence was also noted by **prominent individuals (35 percent)**, **CSOs (34 percent)**, and **EAOs (33 percent)**.

Question-73

The goal of China's regional integration initiatives

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Promote regional economic development including Myanmar	5%	2%	13%	17%	2%	0%	0%
Enhance regional connectivity via Myanmar	4%	3%	6%	10%	3%	0%	6%
Expand geopolitical influence in the region, including Myanmar	32%	34%	25%	26%	35%	33%	31%
Build a China-led regional political, economic, and security framework	58%	61%	44%	48%	59%	67%	63%
Do not know	1%	0%	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%



◀ See the previous surveys

Questions-74 to 76

Who benefits from China's regional integration initiatives?

For survey questions No. 74 to 76, respondents were asked to assess the extent to which China's regional integration initiatives benefit various organizations and groups in Myanmar, rating their perception on a scale from 1. Not beneficial at all to 4. Very beneficial.

- Not beneficial at all
- Beneficial
- Do not know
- Not beneficial
- Very beneficial
- Prefer not to answer


■ Question-74

Beneficial for the State Administration Council (SAC)?




■ Question-75

Beneficial for Ethnic Armed Organizations (EOs)?



■ Question-76

Beneficial for the National Unity Government (NUG)?



Questions-77 and 78


Who benefits from China's regional integration initiatives?

For survey questions No. 77 and 78, respondents were asked to assess the extent to which China's regional integration initiatives benefit various organizations and groups in Myanmar, rating their perception on a scale from 1. Not beneficial at all to 4. Very beneficial.

- Not beneficial at all
- Beneficial
- Do not know
- Not beneficial
- Very beneficial
- Prefer not to answer


■ Question-77

Beneficial for Myanmar citizens?



■ Question-78

Beneficial for private business owners?



Respondents broadly perceived two distinct camps in relation to the beneficiaries of China's regional integration initiatives: those who benefit—namely the SAC, EAOs, and private business owners—and those who do not, particularly the NUG and ordinary citizens. An overwhelming majority (**91 percent**) believed the initiatives benefit the SAC, with only **5 percent** expressing the opposite view. Similarly, **80 percent** saw private business owners as beneficiaries, compared to **14 percent** who disagreed. Perceptions toward EAOs were more mixed, though still leaned positive: **55 percent** believed they benefit, while **37 percent** did not. In stark contrast, only **13 percent of respondents** viewed the NUG as benefiting from these initiatives, with **75 percent** believing they do not. Likewise, just **25 percent** believed Myanmar citizens benefit, while a substantial **69 percent** indicated they do not.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Perceptions on who benefits from China's regional integration initiatives were largely consistent across stakeholder groups, with notable exceptions in views from EAOs regarding their own benefit and from the business sector regarding benefits to ordinary citizens. The belief that the initiatives primarily benefit the State Administration Council (SAC) was nearly universal—endorsed by **100 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 94 percent of the political society group, 91 percent of prominent individuals, and 91 percent of the business community**. Views on whether EAOs benefit were more divided: while **EAOs themselves (54 percent), CSOs (39 percent), and prominent individuals (39 percent)** reported no perceived benefit, other groups such as **CSOs (61 percent), the business community (60 percent), and PDFs/LDFs (56 percent)** saw the EAOs as beneficiaries. Perceptions of the National Unity Government (NUG) as a beneficiary were minimal. Only a small portion of the **business community (17 percent), CSOs (21 percent), and PDFs/LDFs (13 percent)** believed that the NUG derived benefit, while strong majorities across **PDFs/LDFs (88 percent), EAOs (87 percent), and prominent figures (82 percent)** believed otherwise. Notably, **no respondents from EAOs** perceived any benefit to the NUG. Opinions on benefits to ordinary citizens were more polarized. The **business community (52 percent), political society (38 percent), and EAOs (27 percent)** believed citizens benefit to some extent, while large majorities in **CSOs (85 percent), PDFs/LDFs (76 percent), and prominent individuals (68 percent)** disagreed. Perceptions of benefit to private business owners were more favorable and widely shared. **PDFs/LDFs (88 percent), political society (88 percent), and CSOs (82 percent)** strongly believed they benefit, including the **business sector themselves (67 percent)**. Very few respondents—**CSOs (16 percent), prominent individuals (15 percent), EAOs (13 percent), and PDFs/LDFs (13 percent)**—thought otherwise.

Unless otherwise stated, responses of "Not beneficial at all" and "Not beneficial" were grouped under "Not beneficial," while "Beneficial" and "Very beneficial" were grouped under "Beneficial," for the purpose of analysis.

Question-74

Beneficial for the State Administration Council (SAC)?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not beneficial at all	2%	5%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%
Not beneficial	3%	6%	0%	0%	2%	7%	0%
Beneficial	63%	60%	56%	67%	70%	47%	75%
Very beneficial	27%	30%	38%	24%	21%	40%	25%
Do not know	2%	0%	6%	5%	0%	7%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	0%	0%	5%	6%	0%	0%

Question-75

Beneficial for Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not beneficial at all	5%	3%	6%	2%	9%	7%	6%
Not beneficial	32%	36%	25%	24%	30%	47%	31%
Beneficial	53%	57%	50%	60%	45%	40%	56%
Very beneficial	2%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	3%	0%	13%	5%	5%	7%	6%
Prefer not to answer	5%	0%	6%	10%	11%	0%	0%

Question-76

Beneficial for the National Unity Government (NUG)?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not beneficial at all	17%	16%	19%	17%	20%	20%	13%
Not beneficial	58%	61%	44%	38%	62%	67%	75%
Beneficial	13%	20%	6%	17%	6%	0%	13%
Very beneficial	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	6%	2%	13%	17%	3%	13%	0%
Prefer not to answer	5%	0%	19%	12%	9%	0%	0%

Question-77

Beneficial for Myanmar citizens?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not beneficial at all	18%	28%	6%	7%	15%	13%	13%
Not beneficial	51%	57%	50%	29%	53%	53%	63%
Beneficial	25%	14%	38%	50%	26%	27%	19%
Very beneficial	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	3%	1%	6%	5%	2%	7%	6%
Prefer not to answer	2%	0%	0%	7%	5%	0%	0%

Question-78

Beneficial for private business owners?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not beneficial at all	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Not beneficial	14%	15%	6%	12%	15%	13%	13%
Beneficial	73%	74%	69%	67%	74%	67%	88%
Very beneficial	7%	8%	19%	10%	3%	13%	0%
Do not know	3%	2%	6%	5%	2%	7%	0%
Prefer not to answer	3%	0%	0%	7%	6%	0%	0%



◀ See the previous surveys




7

Perceptions of China's Soft Power

Question-79

How beneficial is China's development aid?

Respondents were asked to assess the extent to which China's development aid benefits communities in Myanmar, rating their perception on a scale from 1. Not beneficial at all to 4 .Very beneficial.



The survey revealed that **55 percent of respondents** perceived China's development aid as not beneficial, while **40 percent** indicated it was beneficial. Compared with the 2023 survey, the share of respondents who viewed China's aid as beneficial rose by **24 percentage points**, while the proportion with negative view fell by **25 points**.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Perceptions of the benefits of China's development aid varied across the six stakeholder groups. CSOs were most likely to perceive China's aid as not beneficial, with **63 percent** reporting this view, followed by prominent figures (**61 percent**) and PDFs/LDFs (**57 percent**). Conversely, the **political society** group most strongly perceived the aid as beneficial, with **75 percent** indicating this perception, followed by the **business community** (**60 percent**). Notably, **EAOs** showed an equal split, with **47 percent** perceiving the aid as beneficial and **47 percent** as not beneficial.

Question-79

How beneficial is China's development aid?


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not beneficial at all	13%	19%	0%	2%	14%	0%	19%
Not beneficial	42%	44%	19%	36%	47%	47%	38%
Beneficial	40%	32%	75%	60%	33%	40%	38%
Very beneficial	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%
Do not know	3%	2%	6%	2%	5%	7%	6%
Prefer not to answer	2%	3%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%

For analysis, responses of "Not beneficial at all" and "Not beneficial" were grouped under "Not beneficial," while "Beneficial" and "Very beneficial" were grouped under "Beneficial."

Question-80

Is China's economic development model an ideal model for Myanmar to emulate?

For survey question No. 80, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement that China's economic development model is an ideal model for Myanmar's economic development.



The survey revealed that **56 percent of respondents** expressed disagreement with the statement that China's economic development model is an ideal model for Myanmar, while **40 percent** indicated agreement. Compared with the 2022 and 2023 surveys, disagreement rose by **nine and two percentage points**, respectively, while agreement declined by **five points** from 2022.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Perceptions of China's economic development model as an ideal model for Myanmar varied across the six stakeholder groups. **Prominent figures** were most likely to express disagreement, with **64 percent** reporting this view, followed by **CSOs (61 percent)**, **EOs (60 percent)**, and **PDFs/LDFs (56 percent)**. Conversely, the **political society group** most strongly indicated agreement, with **63 percent** endorsing the model, followed by the **business community (60 percent)**.

Question-80

Is China's economic development model an ideal model for Myanmar to emulate?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EOs	PDFs/LDFs
Agree	40%	34%	63%	60%	32%	33%	44%
Disagree	56%	61%	31%	38%	64%	60%	56%
Do not know	2%	3%	6%	0%	0%	7%	0%
Prefer not to answer	2%	2%	0%	2%	5%	0%	0%




See the previous surveys

Question-81

Is democracy with Chinese characteristics a model for Myanmar to emulate?

For survey question No. 81, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement that democracy with Chinese characteristics is suitable and should be adopted in Myanmar.




The survey revealed that **90 percent of respondents** expressed disagreement with the idea that democracy with Chinese characteristics is suitable and should be adopted in Myanmar, while **seven percent** indicated agreement. Compared with the 2022 and 2023 surveys, disagreement rose by **three percentage points**, while agreement declined by **one** and **two points**, across the respective years.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Perceptions of democracy with Chinese characteristics as a suitable model for Myanmar were overwhelmingly negative across the six stakeholder groups. CSOs were most likely to express disagreement, with **95 percent** reporting this view, followed by prominent figures (**94 percent**), EAOs (**93 percent**), PDFs/LDFs (**88 percent**), the political society group (**81 percent**), and the business community (**74 percent**). Among those who agree with the statement, the **business community** had the highest percentage at **19 percent**.




◀ See the previous surveys

Question-82

Should Myanmar emulate China’s governance model?

For survey question No. 82, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that China’s governance model is suitable and should be adopted in Myanmar.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Perceptions of China's governance model as a suitable model for Myanmar were predominantly negative across the six stakeholder groups. **CSOs** were most likely to express disagreement, with **93 percent** reporting this view, followed by **PDFs/ LDFs** (88 percent), prominent individuals (86 percent), EAOs (80 percent), the political society group (69 percent), and the business community (67 percent). Meanwhile, 25 percent of the political society group and 24 percent of the business community agreed on the model's suitability.

Question-82

Should Myanmar emulate China's governance model?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Agree	10%	6%	25%	24%	5%	13%	6%
Disagree	85%	93%	69%	67%	86%	80%	88%
Do not know	2%	1%	6%	2%	2%	7%	6%
Prefer not to answer	3%	0%	0%	7%	8%	0%	0%




◀ See the previous surveys

Question-83

Have you ever participated in trips or training programs to China organized by Chinese institutions?

For survey question No. 83, respondents were asked whether they had participated in study tours or training programs organized by the Chinese government, businesses, universities, or other institutions, and if they did so, how many times.



The survey revealed that **71 percent of respondents** reported they had never participated in study tours or training programs organized by China. **Twelve percent** indicated they had participated in one trip, while **13 percent** reported participating in two to five trips.



◀ See the previous surveys

Analysis of the Survey Results

Participation in study tours or training programs to China organized by Chinese institutions varied across the six stakeholder groups. **PDFs/LDFs** were most likely to report never participated, with **94 percent** indicating this, followed by **CSOs** (86 percent) and the **political society group** (69 percent). The **business community** had the highest participation rates, with **21 percent** reporting one trip and **26 percent** indicating two to five trips.

Question-83

Have you ever participated in trips or training programs to China organized by Chinese institutions?

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Never participated	71%	86%	69%	43%	62%	67%	94%
Participated in one trip	12%	8%	13%	21%	15%	20%	0%
Participated in two to five trips	13%	6%	6%	26%	18%	13%	6%
Participated in six or more trips	3%	0%	6%	10%	3%	0%	0%
Do not know	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	1%	6%	0%	2%	0%	0%



◀ See the previous surveys




8

Perceptions of the Use of Chinese Technology

Question-84

The use of communications and information technology and devices made by Chinese companies

For survey question No. 84, respondents were asked whether they use communications and information technology and devices made by Chinese companies from a given list, with the option to select more than one if applicable.



The survey revealed that **28 percent of respondents** reported they do not use any of the listed Chinese-made products. However, **50 percent** indicated using Chinese-made mobile phones, **25 percent** used WeChat, **25 percent** used TikTok, and **23 percent** used Chinese CCTV security systems. Compared to the 2023 survey, no significant changes were observed.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Usage of Chinese-made communications and information technology and devices varied across the six stakeholder groups. **PDFs/LDFs** and the **political society group** were the highest users of Chinese-made mobile phones, with **69 percent** and **63 percent** respectively. **EAOs** reported the lowest use of **TikTok**, with only **seven percent** indicating usage. The **business community** showed the highest usage of **WeChat** and **Chinese CCTV security systems**, with **50 percent** and **57 percent** respectively.

Question-84


The use of communications and information technology and devices made by Chinese companies

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Do not use any	28%	28%	19%	7%	45%	40%	19%
Chinese mobile phones	50%	54%	63%	50%	33%	60%	69%
WeChat	25%	19%	13%	50%	24%	20%	19%
TikTok	25%	32%	31%	26%	15%	7%	19%
CCTV security systems	23%	20%	13%	57%	12%	20%	6%
Do not know	1%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	6%
Prefer not to answer	0%	0%	0%	3%	2%	0%	0%


Questions-85 to 87

Perceived level of security and privacy associated with Chinese technology


For survey questions No. 85 to 87, respondents were asked about their perceived level of security and privacy associated with each item from the list of communication and information technology devices made by Chinese companies that they presently use.




■ Question-85
Mobile phones



■ Question-86
WeChat




■ Question-87
TikTok



Question-88


Perceived level of security and privacy associated
with Chinese technology

For survey question No. 88, respondents were asked about their perceived level of security and privacy associated with each item from the list of communication and information technology devices made by Chinese companies that they presently use.



Question-88

CCTV surveillance systems



Although many respondents used mobile phones made by Chinese companies, when asked about the perceived security of these phones, **73 percent** responded that they do not feel secure. Similarly, regarding the use of WeChat, **64 percent** answered that they do not feel secure. For TikTok, **63 percent** expressed concerns about its security, while **69 percent** believed CCTV security systems were not secure. Notably, perceptions of insecurity regarding Chinese-made communications, information, and technology devices rose by **13 to 19 percentage points** compared to the 2023 survey.

Analysis of the Survey Results

The survey reveals that among the six respondent communities, **CSOs** and **EAOs** expressed the highest share of concerns about the security of mobile phones made by Chinese companies, with **80 percent** rating them as not secure. **Prominent individuals** and **CSOs** showed the highest share of concern regarding Chinese made CCTV systems, **78 percent** believed they were not secure, and **71 percent** thought WeChat was insecure. More than three-fourths (**76 percent**) of **CSOs** rated TikTok as not secure.

Question-85

Mobile phones

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not secure at all	37%	45%	19%	26%	38%	33%	31%
Not secure	36%	35%	19%	40%	39%	47%	19%
Neutral	13%	12%	31%	19%	8%	7%	19%
Secure	3%	3%	0%	5%	0%	0%	13%
Very secure	1%	1%	0%	0%	2%	0%	6%
Do not know	8%	2%	31%	7%	12%	7%	13%
Prefer not to answer	2%	2%	0%	2%	2%	7%	0%

Unless otherwise stated, responses of "Not secure at all" and "Not secure" were grouped under "Not secure," while "Secure" and "Very secure" were grouped under "Secure," for the purpose of analysis.

Question-86

WeChat

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not secure at all	36%	48%	6%	17%	41%	33%	19%
Not secure	28%	21%	19%	45%	30%	27%	38%
Neutral	9%	8%	19%	14%	5%	13%	13%
Secure	2%	4%	0%	2%	0%	0%	6%
Very secure	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%
Do not know	22%	18%	56%	19%	23%	20%	19%
Prefer not to answer	2%	2%	0%	2%	2%	7%	0%

Question-87

TikTok


	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not secure at all	36%	50%	13%	19%	33%	27%	31%
Not secure	30%	26%	19%	40%	35%	20%	25%
Neutral	8%	7%	13%	10%	5%	20%	6%
Secure	4%	4%	0%	10%	2%	0%	13%
Very secure	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	20%	12%	56%	19%	23%	27%	25%
Prefer not to answer	2%	1%	0%	2%	3%	7%	0%

Note: Please see the detailed table question No. 88 on the ISP-Myanmar website.


Questions-89 to 91

Perceived Trust in Chinese State-Owned Media


For survey questions No. 89 to 91, respondents were asked about their perceived level of trust in Chinese state-owned media outlets broadcasting in the Burmese language. These questions were newly added in this round of survey.




Question-89
Xinhua Myanmar



Question-90
CRI Myanmar



Question-91
Pauk Phaw




Question-92

Perceived Trust in Chinese State-Owned Media

For survey question No. 92, respondents were asked about their perceived level of trust in Chinese state-owned media outlets broadcasting in the Burmese language. These questions were newly added in this round of survey.

- Not trustworthy at all
- Neutral
- Do not know
- Not trustworthy
- Trustworthy
- Prefer not to answer

■ Question-92
Mingala



For Xinhua Myanmar, **44 percent** responded, “not trustworthy,” and **22 percent** responded do not know. For CRI Myanmar, **44 percent** answered “not trustworthy at all,” and **38 percent** did not know. For 'Pauk Phaw,' **49 percent** expressed a lack of trust, and **39 percent** did not know. For Mingala, **48 percent** believed it was not trustworthy, and **37 percent** did not know.

Analysis of the Survey Results

The survey shows limited awareness and widespread distrust of Chinese state-owned media in Burmese language among Myanmar's key stakeholder groups. **Forty-four percent of the political society group** reported being unaware of Xinhua Myanmar, while **56 percent of prominent individuals** deemed it untrustworthy. Awareness of CRI Myanmar was also low: **75 percent of the political society group**, **50 percent of the business community**, **41 percent of CSO respondents**, and **40 percent of EAOs** said they were unfamiliar with it. Similarly, Pauk Phaw was poorly received, with **63 percent of PDFs/LDFs** expressing distrust.



◀ See the previous surveys

Unless otherwise stated, responses of "Not trustworthy at all" and "Not trustworthy" were grouped under "Not trustworthy," while "Trustworthy" and "Very trustworthy" were grouped under "Trustworthy," for the purpose of analysis.

Question-89

Xinhua Myanmar

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not trustworthy at all	18%	22%	0%	10%	23%	13%	19%
Not trustworthy	26%	30%	19%	7%	33%	13%	31%
Neutral	24%	17%	31%	40%	18%	40%	31%
Trustworthy	7%	5%	6%	12%	6%	13%	13%
Very trustworthy	2%	1%	0%	5%	2%	0%	0%
Do not know	22%	24%	44%	26%	17%	20%	0%
Prefer not to answer	1%	1%	0%	0%	2%	0%	6%

Question-90

CRI Myanmar

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Political Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EAOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not trustworthy at all	19%	22%	6%	7%	26%	13%	19%
Not trustworthy	25%	26%	13%	17%	30%	27%	31%
Neutral	14%	9%	6%	24%	20%	13%	6%
Trustworthy	3%	3%	0%	2%	0%	7%	13%
Very trustworthy	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%
Do not know	38%	41%	75%	50%	23%	40%	19%
Prefer not to answer	1%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	6%

Question-91

Pauk Phaw

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EOOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not trustworthy at all	24%	28%	6%	10%	29%	20%	38%
Not trustworthy	25%	25%	13%	19%	32%	20%	25%
Neutral	10%	10%	6%	21%	8%	7%	0%
Trustworthy	1%	2%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%
Very trustworthy	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	39%	35%	75%	48%	29%	47%	38%
Prefer not to answer	2%	1%	0%	2%	3%	0%	0%

Question-92


Mingala

	Overall	Civil Society Organizations	Policial Society	Business Community	Prominent Individuals	EOOs	PDFs/LDFs
Not trustworthy at all	21%	24%	0%	10%	27%	20%	25%
Not trustworthy	27%	30%	19%	17%	30%	20%	38%
Neutral	11%	10%	6%	19%	12%	13%	0%
Trustworthy	2%	2%	0%	0%	2%	7%	0%
Very trustworthy	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Do not know	37%	33%	75%	50%	26%	40%	38%
Prefer not to answer	2%	2%	0%	2%	3%	0%	0%

The graphic consists of a large yellow circle in the top-left corner with a white ring inside. A thin yellow line forms a large circle around the text, with a smaller yellow circle at the bottom-right. The background is a solid blue color.

Appendix


SURVEY METHODOLOGY



The survey conducted by ISP-Myanmar employed a quantitative research methodology implemented in four stages. The first stage involved preliminary preparations for the survey and data analysis, including designing the survey, setting a detailed timeline, contacting potential participants to explain about the survey, encouraging participation, and verifying the accuracy of participants' information.

The second stage included sampling key individuals for the research, confirming the survey methodology (sampling frame and survey method development), preparing and editing questions. The questions were reviewed to analyze changes between findings of the two previous surveys. Additionally, based on the evolving context of China-Myanmar relations, new questions were added, and some existing questions were removed. Furthermore, guidelines for supervisors and enumerators were drafted, security protocols were established, enumerators were selected, and training sessions for enumerators were conducted.

The third stage involved conducting interviews with individuals designated as sample groups for research analysis. The fourth stage encompassed data entry, documentation, analysis, and report writing. As in the previous year, ISP-Myanmar and the People's Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE) collaborated on



► preliminary preparations, survey design, methodology confirmation, objective setting and analysis methods, question preparation, sampling, and conducting interviews with targeted individuals. Prior to the survey, discussions were held with relevant experts to ensure the sampling criteria were met, and meetings were conducted with targeted groups. Measures were taken to ensure reliability and validity by adhering to necessary standards. A pilot study was conducted with at least five individuals meeting the criteria, and their feedback was collected.

Given the survey's primary objective, respondents needed to have a certain level of awareness of China-Myanmar relations. As random sampling was not feasible, purposive sampling was used to select participants based on their leadership and policy influence on China-Myanmar relations.

ISP-Myanmar categorized respondents into six communities based on specific criteria: (1) political society, including political parties and politicians; (2) CSOs; (3) business community; (4) EAOs; (5) prominent individuals, such as scholars, professionals, activists, and influential social or religious figures; and (6) leaders of armed groups based in areas with Chinese projects, specifically groups that emerged during the Spring Revolution. To build baseline data, ISP-Myanmar

gathered information from the websites of the Union Election Commission (UEC) and the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI). Additionally, preliminary discussions were held with leaders from various communities, CSOs in Myanmar and Thailand, EAOs, and PDFs/LDFs, and lists of prospective respondents were compiled. The expertise, knowledge, engagement, policy influence, and geopolitical significance of individuals and organizations in China-Myanmar relations were assessed with experts' recommendations. This data was updated and verified two months before the survey.

In compiling the list for the political community, political parties that won seats in various assemblies (Hluttaw) in the 2015 and 2020 elections and parties that are active in Kachin State, northern Shan State, Mandalay Region, Magway Region, and Rakhine State—key areas for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)—were selected and designated as potential respondents. However, the State Administration Council (SAC) revised and enacted a new Political Parties Registration Law, resulting in many political parties that had won seats in the 2020 election not re-registering. For this survey, a total of 73 political leaders from these political parties, including those who are vocal about CMEC projects, were identified and included in the list.

The team also identified 230 individuals from CSOs that are: 1) working on research projects related to Sino-Myanmar relations, 2) monitoring Chinese-financed projects and their impacts on environmental and land issues, and 3) supporting the rights of local communities. The research team also identified a total of 151 union and state level business community members who are involved in China-related investment and trade projects, including those directly participating in CMEC. This list was based on data received from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI).

The survey team also identified 152 individuals working on research related to Sino-Myanmar relations, well-known scholars and experts who can influence policy issues, activists, leaders of EAOs and influential persons from social and religious groups.


The list of relevant EAOs include solely those with ethnic affiliations and those that have engaged with previous governments in either formal or informal capacities. A total of 23 groups were identified.

Similarly, in the process of identifying newly emerged armed groups like PDFs/LDFs, the relevant PDFs/LDFs list includes groups that are operating in regions where Chinese investments were located.

Additionally, the team considered the size of their forces, selecting groups with 100 or more members, as well as groups designated as "active" by ISP-Myanmar's Conflict data criteria which has three levels: active, rule and control. Utilizing these criteria, a total of 66 PDFs/LDFs were identified.


Due to the ongoing political instability and conflict following the coup, widespread displacement, disruptions to network and internet connectivity, and other structural changes have occurred in many organizations. In response, ISP-Myanmar, in collaboration with PACE, conducted four rounds of data reviews and validations for this edition of the survey. To ensure the accuracy of foundational respondents' contact data, assessments of both individual and organizational conditions were carried out. One month prior to the survey, contact information of the 281 organizations and individuals from conflict-affected areas were verified. These included 149 business organizations, 99 members of community-based organizations, 11 prominent or influential individuals, and 22 members of political organizations. In this manner, a baseline respondent list was established, comprising a total of 695 individuals from six key stakeholder communities. ■

SAMPLING FOR SURVEY



For this survey, the interview sample was selected based on the baseline respondent list, with the number of individuals from each of the six communities calculated proportionately. Our survey research team calculated and stratified the samples from the baseline list. However, the number of respondents representing EAOs and People's Defense Forces (PDFs/LDFs) were lower than the other four communities. Therefore, to ensure their responses were represented in the survey findings, additional samples from these groups were included based on the baseline data. Consequently, a mixed proportion approach was used to select the individuals for interviews.

Efforts were made to prioritize gender balance in the selection of interview samples. However, achieving equal gender representation was challenging due to the predominance of male policy-makers in the selected sectors, the fact that many female policy-makers from the political society group were in hiding due to post-coup political crises and conflicts, the majority of policy-makers in the business community being male, and the leadership of EAOs and PDFs/LDFs consisting solely of males. Additionally, this year, respondents with diverse gender identities also participated in the survey. The survey included 193 males, 64 females, and three others, corresponding to 74 percent males, 24 percent females, and one percent others. The number of female respondents increased by five



■ Baseline Data, Mixed Proportion Sample, and Interviewed Respondents

Community	Baseline Data	Mixed Proportion Sample	Number of Respondents
CSOs	230	105	105
Political Society	73	35	16
Business Community	151	65	42
Prominent Individuals	152	66	66
Ethnic Armed Organizations	23	23	15
PDFs/LDFs	66	58	16
Total	695	352	260

► individuals compared to the previous year, representing a one percentage point increase. This year's survey successfully interviewed 260 individuals from the six communities, including 105 from CSOs, 16 from political society, 42 from business associations, 66 prominent individuals, 16 from PDFs/LDFs, and 15 from EAOs.

Prior to conducting the survey interviews, ISP-Myanmar and PACE collaborated to produce a handbook for survey enumerators. This handbook systematically outlined the survey's objectives, sample selection results, and procedures. It provided detailed guidelines on asking questions, recording responses, and prioritizing respondents' security, along with rules, ethical considerations, and standards. The handbook's appendix included explanations of academic terms and abbreviations used in the survey questions to aid respondents' understanding. Two days before the survey, training was provided to the enumerators on the handbook's contents

and survey methods, including survey objectives, methodologies, interview techniques, ethical considerations, safety precautions, and preparations. Additionally, a specialized training session was conducted to enhance the enumerators' understanding of China-Myanmar relations, covering China's involvement in Myanmar's politics, peace processes, conflicts, crises, trade, investment, and regional integration programs.

● Political and Security Risk Mitigation

In conducting the survey research questions, special emphasis was placed on ethical considerations. Politically sensitive terms were carefully crafted in accordance with research ethics. Similarly, systematic measures were taken to mitigate cybersecurity risks in every survey response. In addition to prioritizing the physical safety of ISP-Myanmar team members and survey enumerators, attention was also given to ensuring there were no gaps in psychological safety. ■

ABOUT ISP-MYANMAR

Established in 2016, the Institute for Strategy and Policy (ISP) - Myanmar is an independent, non-partisan, and non-governmental think tank. ISP-Myanmar promotes democratic leadership and public participation in public affairs as a means to encourage a resilient and tolerant society. Its goals are the advancement of democracy, the building of a federal union, and the strengthening of civil society in Myanmar. The institute's three core activities comprise a policy-oriented research program, a capacity-building and leadership engagement program, and a communications and outreach program. ISP-Myanmar is focusing research in four areas: Conflict, Peace, and Security Studies, China Studies based on the two countries' relations, Conflict Economy Studies, and Socio-economic Studies. Based on primary research data, ISP-Myanmar extends its work on data presentation, analysis, and conflict trends. In addition, ISP-Myanmar has conducted an annual survey on "Myanmar's Key Stakeholders and their Perceptions of Sino-Myanmar Relations" since 2022. ISP-Myanmar has been exploring socio-economic conditions in post-coup Myanmar through the Research Network Program and has published findings to enhance the knowledge of the on-the-ground situation in Myanmar. ISP-Myanmar has regularly launched the three-month intensive "Bridge Education Program" (BEP) to fill the gap in learning opportunities caused by the 2021 military coup. For more information about ISP-Myanmar, visit our websites at www.ISPMyanmar.com and [ISP Gabyin Community](https://www.facebook.com/ISPMyanmar). ■

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