Featured The State of Myanmar: ISP–Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025–2026 State of Myanmar by ISP Admin
7 Oct 2025 ISP Clips The Ledo Road: Geopolitics and the Challenge of Regional Connectivity This route passes through Sadung and Kanpiketi—areas controlled by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which continues to fight against the central regime and operates along the historic Ledo Road.
5 Oct 2025 ISP Clips What’s Really in the Junta’s 7 New MoUs with China? During junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to China, the two sides inked seven MOUs — a clear sign of Beijing’s growing backing for Myanmar’s embattled military regime amid ongoing nationwide conflict.
3 Oct 2025 ISP Clips The junta chief presented heirs in his Beijing visit The junta chief presented five generals on his visit to Beijing, foreshadowing the transition to the Tatmadaw's next generation.
3 Oct 2025 ISP Clips Civilian deaths are increasing Over the past four years, at least 92 incidents of mass civilian killings—defined as 10 or more deaths in a single event—have been documented nationwide, resulting in at least 1,808 civilian deaths.
issue:113, 3 Oct 2025 Mapping Resistance Forces Secure Three Flanks of Banmauk On September 20, resistance groups seized Banmauk town on the Kachin–Sagaing border, extending their control across the eastern, western, and southern parts of the township.
issue:SB2025-004, 2 Oct 2025 Situation Brief Seizing Banmauk: An Unveiled Face of the Conflict Economy Beyond a collaborative conquest by forces under the Military Region No. 1, the successful operation expands resistance’s control over gold mines and border trade routes—critical lifelines for sustaining the conflict economy and for financing their fight.
issue:FU-01, 30 Sep 2025 Flash Updates Fourth-Generation Generals Rise to the Heart of Power All generals overseeing military operations now belong to the Tatmadaw’s fourth generation. Commanders younger in age and cohort are in charge, with potential implications for operations nationwide.
issue:112, 26 Sep 2025 Mapping Rare Earth Export Routes in Kachin State Raw rare earth minerals from mines controlled by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) are currently exported to China via one formal border trade station and three informal border gates.
issue:GT-02, 26 Sep 2025 Tracker Fortune and Risk: The KIO’s Rare Earth Dilemma Following a record decline in rare earth exports to China in 2025, the Chinese government exerted pressure on the KIO, and the KIO’s resource governance plays a key factor in political bargaining and power consolidation.
issue:111, 23 Sep 2025 Mapping Over 50 Percent of Massacres Caused by Airstrikes Out of 92 incidents of mass civilian deaths, defined as the killing of 10 or more civilians in a single event, 1,808 people were killed. Among them, 57 percent of these deaths were the result of the junta’s airstrikes.
issue:CST-01, 22 Sep 2025 Tracker At least 92 Incidents of Civilian Massacres Recorded in Myanmar Of these, 88 were carried out by the Myanmar junta, killing 1,723 civilians. Contrarily, resistance forces were responsible for four incidents, leaving 85 dead.
issue:109, 17 Sep 2025 Mapping Significant Territories Under The Resistance’s Hand Following Operation 1027, resistance forces captured significant territory, leading the State Administration Council (SAC) to lose control of 98 towns and several key outposts.
16 Sep 2025 Recap Memo Armed Struggle – Will It Lead to Political Resolution? The real test lies ahead. Can the resistance turn battlefield momentum into political achievement? Can fleeting victories be institutionalized into lasting gains?
issue:ST-03, 11 Sep 2025 Tracker Potential Heirs: Kyaw Swar Lin and Company Debut in China Of the five officers who accompanied the junta chief to China, three are seen as potential leaders of the Tatmadaw’s fourth generation, and were presented to Chinese leaders, firming up succession plan.
issue:27, 2 Sep 2025 ISP OnPoint Prospective 4th Generation Tatmadaw – Pathways to Reform or Further Regression? During the critical 10 months from the launch of Operation 1027 in October 2023 to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Naypyitaw in August 2024, the regime faced an unprecedented shock.
