Conflict, Peace & Security

The State of Myanmar: ISP–Myanmar’s Annual Strategic Review and Foresight 2025–2026

Domestic and international actors seeking a change toward federal democracy in Myanmar must now think strategically and prepare to act on three trends in 2026: the post-election landscape where the role of the fourth generation Tatmadaw becomes more prominent, the prospects for conflict de-escalation or ceasefires, and how to engage with eminent China’s role in Myanmar politics.

Junta Leader’s Constant Shake-Up: 50 Changes of RMC Commanders Since the Coup

The junta has increased the frequency of leadership changes across the 14 Regional Military Commands (RMCs), whose commanders oversee frontline military operations. While some changes followed battlefield setbacks, others occurred in commands that experienced relatively low levels of active fighting.

95 Civilian Massacres Recorded Since the Coup

Of these, 91 cases were committed by the Myanmar junta forces, killing 1,776 civilians. In contrast, resistance forces were responsible for four incidents, leaving 85 dead. These conditions indicate that the levels of civilian protection during conflict are extremely challenging.

AA’s Pursuit of Junta Arms Plants Looks Uncertain

As the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) scales back operations in northern Shan, it has intensified its campaign in the west, where the Arakan Army (AA) is facing sustained pressure along the Rakhine coast. Although the AA may attempt to seize the junta’s Defense Industry (KaPaSa) factories, holding such facilities would be difficult under current conditions.

Political Prisoners Make Up Only 13 Percent of Releases in 18 Amnesties

International consensus on Myanmar centres on the release of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and the start of inclusive dialogue. As the junta’s latest amnesty still excludes key political figures, pressure over political-prisoner releases is likely to persist.

issue:23,

28 Nov 2025

ISP Clips

Myanmar Conflict Declines in 2025

According to recent research, fighting has fallen by roughly one-third compared with last year. Airstrikes and civilian casualties have also declined. However, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) continues to rise: this year alone, nearly 700,000 additional people have been forced from their homes. It remains unclear whether violence will keep decreasing under Chinese mediation or whether military intensity will escalate again around the election.

Regime Regains 11 Percent of Lost Ground in Northern Shan

The State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) has regained control of 44.4 percent of the Mandalay–Muse trade route. However, the regime has so far reclaimed only about 11.3 percent—roughly 3,120 square miles (8,081 square kilometers)— of the northern Shan State territory lost after Operation 1027.

EAOs Still Control Nearly Half of the Mandalay-Muse Route

The stretch between Kyaukme and Hsipaw is held by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), while Hsipaw to Lashio is controlled by the TNLA, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC).