One year after the 2021 military coup, ISP-Myanmar initiated a research survey of Myanmar’s Key Stakeholders and their Perceptions of Sino-Myanmar relations with technical support from the People’s Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE). The initiative aims to collect specific knowledge of key individuals from the Myanmar policy communities to identify similarities and differences in their views about the key factors shaping Sino-Myanmar relations. In particular, the study aims to comprehend the different interpretations of 1) the roles played by China in Myanmar’s political arena after the military coup, 2) the long-running deadlock in the peace process in which China remains involved, 3) the impacts of China’s investment and trade, 4) China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) projects, and 5) humanitarian aid provided by China during Covid pandemic.
In addition, it also sets out to understand how various stakeholders in Myanmar perceive China’s efforts to develop its soft power and the prevalence of China produced technology (mobile phones, applications, and security threat of the electronic devices) in Myanmar.
The key stakeholders include civil society organizations, members of political parties, the business sector, scholars, activists, leaders of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and others well versed in China’s political, economic and international affairs. ISP-Myanmar’s findings aim to contribute to the policy-making and program implementation of organizations involved in Sino- Myanmar relations.
Data Collection Methods
In this research survey, ISP-Myanmar employed a quantitative research methodology implemented in three steps. The first step of pre-survey preparation involved constructing of a sampling frame, identifying potential participants, and collecting information about selected participants, formu-lating research questions, and training interviewers. The second step in¬volved conducting survey interviews with voluntary participants from differ¬ent policy communities. The third step involved data compilation, data entry, data analysis process, and writing.
For the pre-survey preparation and construction of the sampling frame, ISP-Myanmar and PACE worked together to formulate the survey’s objectives and its framework, to select methods for analysis, as well as to prepare survey questions. Then, the team selected a sampling frame for the sample population of survey participants and developed a schemata for classifying them according to their backgrounds. This stage involved in-person and online consultations (at least 20 online) with experts and leaders from civil society organizations, political parties and the business sector to discuss the selection of potential survey participants. These meetings included more than 30 individuals from different sectors.
Awareness of Sino- Myanmar relations was the main criteria for selecting survey participants. For this reason, it was impossible to randomly sample the survey population, which is a common method for surveys. Therefore, ISP-Myanmar applied a purposive sampling method to categorize survey participants, and the sampling was based on one’s capacity to influence policies related to Sino-Myanmar relations. Using this selection framework, 340 participants were initially selected to take the survey. However, due to the political situation in Myanmar, not all of these individuals could partici¬pate. Prospective interviewees were selected again according to the same standards. Out of total of 501 individuals who were approached for the sur¬vey, 215 completed the survey.
The table presents four communities involved in Sino-Myanmar relations. They are (1) Civil Society Organizations, (2) Political Parties, (3) Business Associations/Organizations and (4) Prominent Individuals, Scholars, Professionals, and Leaders of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), as well as influential people from social and religious organizations. To select the survey participants, the survey team considered the recommendations made by the key experts after consulting with them at least 20 times with 30 individuals from different sectors. These key experts made their recommendations based on the individual’s professional background, level of expertise in Sino-Myanmar relations, and level of engagement with China and their influence on Sino-Myanmar policy issues.
The survey team selected members from 47 political parties that won seats in national and local legislatures (Hluttaw) in 2015 and 2020 and that are located in Kachin State, Shan State, Mandalay Region, Magway Region and Rakhine State. The latter are from areas where the Chinese-govern¬ment-financed China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) project will take place.
The team also selected 212 individuals from civil society organizations that are 1) working on research projects related to Sino-Myanmar relations; 2) monitoring Chinese-financed projects and their impacts on environmental and land issues; and 3) supporting the rights of local communities.
The research team also approached a total of 125 business associations/ organizations directly involved in the CMEC (especially those involved in investment and trade projects). This selection was based on data received from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and In¬dustry (UMFCCI).
Moreover, the survey team selected 117 individuals working on research related to Sino-Myanmar relations, well-known scholars and professionals influencing policy issues, activists, leaders of EAOs and influential persons from social and religious groups.
To carefully analyze the role of China in different sectors of Myanmar, survey participants were selected from areas with the following features, areas where CMEC projects are slated to take place, areas with strong economic ties to China, and areas where projects strategic to China already exist. Therefore, the number of participants from each area are not evenly distributed.
In the survey, the selection of participants was aimed to ensure gender par¬ity. However, an equal gender balance amongst survey participants was not possible due to the following conditions: the majority of the community lead¬ers selected based on the China expertise criteria are men, and surveyors were not able to reach many women leaders because of the need to take precautions following the military coup. Despite these unfavorable condi¬tions, among the 501 contacts, 215 people participated in the survey – 166 men (77.2 percent) and 49 women (22.8 percent).
The preparations to mitigate against potential biases in interviews, any risks posed by post-coup security situation, and the COVID-19 pandemic included the following: 1) The development of a manual for survey enumer¬ators and their supervisors to follow and 2) 9 out of 11 enumerators received in-person training before their deployment for the survey.
During the second stage, individual interviews were conducted from 17 Feb¬ruary 2022 to 12 March 2022. ISP-Myanmar interviewed 215 individuals out of 501 individuals, who were initially selected from four communities.
Among them, 47 percent are from CSOs, 26.5 percent are prominent indi¬viduals such as scholars, professionals, activists, respected individuals from social and religious groups, and leaders of EAOs. 20 percent are from Busi¬ness Associations/Organizations and 7.4 percent are from political parties.
Although ISP-Myanmar’s team initially decided to conduct interviews in per¬son, (but given concerns posed) by Covid-19 and instability relating to the coup, the survey team decided that online interviews, using Zoom, were appropriate. Those unable to attend an interview via Zoom were asked to fill out a form. Of 215 survey respondents, 187 were interviewed via Zoom, and 28 respondents answered by a form.
In the third stage of data collection, from 13-25 March 2022, the data from respondents was first recorded on the response sheets, then later stored as digital records in a database. Later data assistants from ISP-Myanmar and PACE independently checked and verified the data twice. The responses of each interviewee were codified and reviewed using specialized software. If an error was detected, a full review of the original documents was conducted and corrected if necessary.
Research Process and Ethics
The team faced a challenging situation with threats posed by the military coup, compounded by frequent internet and telecommunications shutdowns, and electricity outages. Meanwhile, the Omicron variant of COVID-19 posed further challenges. Moreover, activists from the political and policy communities faced security concerns including the risk of arrest for exercising their right to expression. Therefore, the survey team strictly followed security protocols and health-related measures while implementing this survey in line with ethical guidelines developed by ISP-Myanmar and PACE for researchers.
In doing so, an ethics board of ISP-Myanmar members reviewed the methods with attention to possible risks and developed measures to ensure good research practices, depending on the requirements. Crucially, they managed to minimize the possible negative impacts by considering potential security risks for survey participants in advance, including the possible leakage of personal information about participants and the impact of conflicts of interest on research findings. The survey was conducted in such a way as to minimize the risk of any further spread of the Omicron variant of COVID-19, as well as to safeguard the physical and mental health of survey participants.
ISP-Myanmar provided all participants with a guarantee that their personal information, such as their names, would not be published, so that they could express their opinions freely when answering survey questions. Potential survey participants were informed of these precautions when invited to take part. Even before the survey was conducted, enumerators, supervisors, and trainers were tested for COVID-19 with Rapid Antigen Tests and provided the required equipment to prevent infection.
Several measures were developed by recording whether people directly involved in the survey or their family members were infected with COVID one week before the training, as well as daily temperature checks for each enumerator, trainer, and supervisor during the training and survey period. Throughout the survey period and data entry processes, various safety measures, such as the provision of separate rooms for each interview, as well as the rules and regulations regarding the risk of COVID-19 infections were issued.
Significant Survey Findings
Findings
General Perceptions of China
Among the survey participants, a majority indicated a negative view of China. In response to the question of ‘Is China a good neighbor for Myanmar or not?,’ 42 percent indicated that China was ‘no good’ and 13 percent responded that it was ‘no good at all.’ At the same time, 40 percent expressed a positive view of China with 38 percent answering ‘good’ and two percent replying ‘very good.’
Comparison of the results
When comparing sentiments on China as a neighbor expressed by different policy communities, negative attitudes were strongest among civil society organizations, as 70 percent indicated either ‘no good at all’ or ‘no good.’ Among prominent individuals and members of EAOs, 53 percent responded either ‘no good at all’ or ‘no good.’ As for political parties and the business community, their views on China were more positive, as 59 percent of political parties, indicated ‘good’ and 68 percent of the business community answered either ‘very good’ or ‘good.’
Survey participants were asked to select from a list of challenges posed by China to Myanmar related to economic and geopolitical issues. 39 percent selected China’s economic domination as the biggest challenge; 31 percent pointed to its geopolitical influence. 19 percent of respondents selected China’s involvement in Myanmar’s armed conflict. Only four percent chose China’s domination in Myanmar’s security sector as the main challenge. No one selected Chinese influence in culture and demography as a challenge.
Regarding the main benefits gained by Myanmar from its relations with China, 37 percent of the respondents replied market access, while 33 percent felt it was foreign direct investment. Only nine percent selected infrastructure development. 11 percent answered that Myanmar gained ‘no benefit at all’ as a result of its relations with China. Only four percent of respondents indicated development aid from China was a benefit.
Comparison of the results
One significant finding is that majority of respondents from Myanmar’s policy communities view market access as the main benefit gained by its engagements with China. 47 percent of political parties and 40 percent of both civil society organizations and business associations share this view. Since there is little difference between these numbers, it is clear that the perceptions among respondents from these three policy communities are effectively similar. However, 37 percent of prominent individuals and EAOs leaders chose foreign direct investment. Overall, only one percent and four percent of respondents selected technology transfer and development aid, respectively. This suggests that there was not much difference in the responses of the four communities surveyed.
In terms of trade, 67 percent, the largest proportion of the respondents, ranked Myanmar as dependent on China; only six percent perceived that Myanmar does not depend on China. Regarding investment sector, 47 percent perceived Myanmar as dependent on China; 12 percent answered that Myanmar is not. Regarding Myanmar’s peace process, 52 percent perceived Myanmar as dependent on China; 12 percent held the opposite opinion. In terms of development, 36 percent answered that Myanmar does not depend on China – only 23 percent viewed that Myanmar as dependent on China for development; the majority (40 percent) remained neutral.
In the case of politics, 51 percent of the respondents perceived Myanmar as dependent on China. 24 percent of the respondents were neutral, which is more than those who answered ‘Myanmar does not depend on China’ (20 percent). In the education sector, the majority (82 percent) felt that Myanmar does not depend on China, and only two percent answered that Myanmar was dependent on China.
As for healthcare sector, 62 percent of respondents felt that Myanmar does not depend on China, while 14 percent of respondents viewed Myanmar as dependent on China. 23 percent of respondents answered ‘neutral’ to this question. As for technology, those who viewed Myanmar as not dependent on China and those who answered no position totaled 36 percent; 25 percent perceived Myanmar as dependent on China. In the security sector, 38 percent viewed Myanmar as dependent on China, whereas 28 percent answered that there was no dependency. As for diplomacy, 54 percent noted that Myanmar was dependent on China, while only 11 percent who answered that Myanmar was not dependent on China for diplomatic support.
Comparison of the results
In analyzing the views of Myanmar’s dependence on China from each community, there was no difference when it came to investment; 47 percent felt that Myanmar as dependent on China, while 40 percent remained neutral.
Regarding the peace process, although the number of respondents who viewed that Myanmar is dependent on China was the largest, when looking at each community, 40 percent of the respondents from prominent individuals and EAOs leaders and 41 percent of the respondents from political parties were ‘neutral.’
Among the communities, 53 percent of respondents from political parties indicated that Myanmar does not depend on China when it comes to politics. 46 percent of the prominent individuals from different sectors and EAOs members, the largest proportion, answered that Myanmar is dependent on China for its security sector. 38 percent of respondents from civil society groups and 47 percent of respondents from political parties expressed the opinion that Myanmar does not depend on China in the security sector.
Among the communities expressing the view that Myanmar is dependent on China for trade, the highest were the business community (77 percent) and political parties (76 percent). With regard to the question of Myanmar’s dependence on China for development, civil society groups scored the highest with 48 percent, while 35 percent of respondents from political parties indicated that Myanmar does not depend on China. Another 35 percent from political parties took a neutral position.
Regarding the question of what interest does China pursues in Myanmar, the majority (46 percent) of respondents selected ‘to gain geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean.’ Gaining natural resources from Myanmar ranked second (28 percent), the gaining sea access for Yunnan Province (16 percent), and then China wants to expand the market for its products (four percent). Among the listed responses was ‘no interest at all’ and ‘making an alliance in ASEAN,’ but none of the respondents selected either of these. All respondents answered this question.
Comparison of the results
In analyzing the perceptions of each community for Question No. 14, civil society organizations and prominent individuals from different sectors and EAOs leaders exhibited the strongest support – both at 49 percent – for gaining geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean as China’s main interest. Whereas, 41 percent of respondents from political parties and 35 percent of business associations also shared this view.
Similarly, the communities of civil society organizations, political parties, prominent individuals group, and EAOs leaders indicated the view that China’s engagement reflects an interest in Myanmar’s natural resources, the second largest. 33 percent of the respondents from the business community answered sea access for Yunnan province.
